Agency Through Adaptation: Explaining The Rockefeller and Gates Foundation’s Influence in the Governance of Global Health and Agricultural Development by Stevenson, Michael
Agency Through Adaptation: Explaining The Rockefeller and Gates 
Foundation’s Influence in the Governance of Global Health and 
Agricultural Development 
 
by 
 
Michael Stevenson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Global Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2014 
 
© Michael Stevenson 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
 
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
The central argument that I advance in this dissertation is that the influence of the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) in the 
governance of global health and agricultural development has been derived from their ability 
to advance knowledge structures crafted to accommodate the preferences of the dominant 
states operating within the contexts where they have sought to catalyze change. 
Consequently, this dissertation provides a new way of conceptualizing knowledge power 
broadly conceived as well as private governance as it relates to the provision of public goods. 
 
In the first half of the twentieth-century, RF funds drove scientific research that produced 
tangible solutions, such as vaccines and high-yielding seed varieties, to longstanding 
problems undermining the health and wealth of developing countries emerging from the 
clutches of colonialism. At the country-level, the Foundation provided advanced training to 
a generation of agricultural scientists and health practitioners, and RF expertise was also 
pivotal to the creation of specialized International Organizations (IOs) for health (e.g. the 
League of Nations Health Organization) and agriculture (e.g. the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research) as well as many informal international networks of 
experts working to solve common problems. Finally in the neo-liberal era, RF effectively 
demonstrated how the public-private partnership paradigm could provide public goods in 
the face of externally imposed austerity constraining public sector capacity and the failure of 
the free-market to meet the needs of populations with limited purchasing power.  
 
Since its inception, the BMGF has demonstrated a similar commitment to underwriting 
innovation through science oriented towards reducing global health disparities and 
increasing agricultural productivity in poor countries, and has greatly expanded the 
application of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) approach in both health and agriculture. 
Unlike its intellectual forebear, BMGF has been far more focused on end-points and silver 
bullets than investing directly in the training of human resources. Moreover whereas RF has 
for most of its history decentralized its staff, those of BMGF have been concentrated mainly 
at its headquarters in Seattle. With no operational programs of its own, BMGF has instead 
relied heavily on external consultants to inform its programs and remains dependent on 
intermediary organizations to implement its grants. 
 
Despite these and other differences, both RF and BMGF have exhibited a common capacity 
to catalyse institutional innovation that has benefited historically marginalized populations in 
the absence of structural changes to the dominant global power structure. A preference for 
compromise over contestation, coupled with a capacity for enabling innovation in science 
and governance, has resulted in broad acceptance for RF and BMGF knowledge structures 
within both state and international policy arenas. This acceptance has translated into both 
Foundations having direct influence over (i) how major challenges related to disease and 
agriculture facing the global south are understood (i.e. the determinants and viable 
solutions); (ii) what types of knowledge matters for solving said problems (i.e. who leads); 
and (iii) how collective action focused on addressing these problems is structured (i.e. the 
institutional frameworks).  
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Preface  
 
Variations of the main argument of this dissertation and supporting empirical evidence have 
been presented publicly via three conference presentations and one co-authored journal 
article.  
 
I presented a version of chapter five entitled “The Rockefeller Revolution: Establishing a 
Template for Philanthropic Power in the Governance of Global Food Security” at both the 
2011 ISA annual convention in Montreal, QC, and the 2011 Canadian Political Science 
Association Annual Conference, Waterloo, ON. 
 
I also presented the central argument of the dissertation supported by material taken from 
chapters four and six at the 2013 ISA annual convention in San Francisco in a paper entitled 
“Agency Through Adaptation: Explaining the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations’ Influence 
in Global Governance via the Public-Private Partnership Paradigm.” 
 
Finally, a paper co-authored with Michael Moran, (“Illumination and Innovation: What 
Philanthropic Foundations Bring to Global Health Governance, Global Society, 27(2), 2013: 
117-137) contained empirical evidence from chapters four and six, and variations of several 
arguments made in the dissertation. The most notable of these are that critical perspectives 
comprise the majority of historical studies on RF’s influence in world affairs, and that RF 
and BMGF have been innovators in global governance through their creation of governance 
mechanisms that have worked to fill public and private sector gaps. 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Knowledge  Construc tion as  a Gateway to  Power in  Global Governance  
 
Historically and continuing today, private foundations have played key roles in attempts to 
fill gaps created by public and private sectors within the United States. This phenomenon is 
both a reflection of and an adaptation to the longstanding distrust of ‘‘big’’ government and 
commitment to free markets embedded in the American psyche. While certainly not limited 
to the United States, private philanthropic foundations are very much a product of the 
American polity.  
 
Ideas advanced by two particular private American philanthropic foundations, the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) have 
featured prominently in collective-action focused on improving health and reducing hunger 
across the global South. This chapter articulates why RF and BMGF are worthy of an in-
depth comparison and how their common willingness to accommodate state expressed 
preferences within geographic and temporal contexts where they have sought to catalyze 
change in pursuit of their larger goal of providing public goods to vulnerable populations is 
at the root of the influence in the governance of global public health and agricultural 
development. Their agency, I argue, provides a new way of conceptualizing both knowledge 
power and private governance as it relates to the production and provision of public goods. 
 
While RF and BMGF are but two of the approximately 60,000 private-grant making 
foundations currently registered under section 501c(3) of the United States Internal Revenue 
Code, RF and BMGF distinguish themselves by the fact that the vast majority of private 
American foundations limit the focus of their efforts to domestic issues and draw from 
endowments of less than US$10 million. RF and BMGF in contrast are the only American 
foundations with endowments of over US$1 billion that work on both global health and 
agricultural development issues.1  
 
                                                
1 Foundation Center, International Grantmaking Update: A Snapshot of US Foundations Trends (New York: 
Foundation Center, 2010), 1-8. Accessed August 17, 2011. 
http://Foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/intl_update_2010.pdf  
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While established in very different temporal contexts, RF and BMGF were both born out of 
the vision of individual entrepreneurs and the culture of American capitalism, and both have 
devoted significant portions of their resources to strengthen public health and agricultural 
systems in developing countries. RF was the first American foundation that took its 
domestic role (and all the potential benefits and shortcomings that came with it), and applied 
it to areas of the world where its leadership felt there was a need. Yet RF, now a century old, 
has largely dismantled its once vast agricultural program and appears to be reducing the 
scope of its public health initiatives as well. BMGF in contrast was only established in 1994 
but has since become the largest philanthropic organization in the world and the single 
largest private donor to global health and agricultural development initiatives. Since its 
inception, however, BMGF has sought to emulate RF, both in terms of the issues on which 
it has chosen to focus and the strategies it has relied on to bring about change.  
 
This dissertation provides an explanation of how RF and BMGF have achieved influence in 
domestic, international and global policy making arenas regarding how public health and 
agricultural challenges should be conceptualized and overcome over time. Consequently the 
dissertation examines the ability of the two foundations to shape the actions and means 
adopted by individual states, the inter-state system, and global to society as whole, to 
organize itself in collective action focused on agricultural development and the promotion 
and protection of population health, including the delivery of collective solutions in pursuit 
of common goals.2  Both foundations, I argue, have displayed an ability to create and 
advance knowledge structures for understanding and responding to public health and 
agricultural challenges that have served as roadmaps for collective action. The central 
argument that I advance in this dissertation is that the influence of RF and BMGF in the 
governance of global health and agricultural development has been derived from their ability 
to advance knowledge structures crafted to accommodate the preferences of the dominant 
states operating within the contexts where they have sought to catalyze change.   
 
From the first decade of the twentieth-century to the present, Rockefeller money has been 
illuminating how science-enabled innovation can help overcome longstanding challenges 
                                                
2 Richard Dodgson, Kelly Lee, and Nick Drager, Global Health Governance: a Conceptual Review (Geneva: WHO, 
2002), 6, Accessed May 11, 2009. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/a85727_eng.pdf 
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perceived to be jeopardizing health and food security and constraining economic 
development across the global South. In the context of the immediate post-colonial era, RF 
funds drove scientific research that produced tangible solutions, such as vaccines and high-
yielding seed varieties, to longstanding problems. Moreover, it also led the construction of 
new institutions across the global South that trained a cadre of national leaders in the 
domains of public health and agriculture. For these reasons, the Foundation was accepted by 
such states as a modernizing force.  
 
Moreover, capitalizing on the rise in state support for international cooperation, RF 
expertise was pivotal to the creation of specialized International Organizations (IOs) for 
health (e.g. the League of Nations Health Organization(LNHO)) and agriculture (e.g. the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) and the spread of international 
networks of experts working to solve common problems.  Finally, in response to the spread 
of neo-liberalism, RF demonstrated how the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) paradigm 
could provide public goods in the face of externally imposed austerity constraining public 
sector capacity and the failure of the free-market to meet the needs of populations with 
limited purchasing power. Since its inception, BMGF has greatly expanded the application of 
the PPP approach in both health and agriculture. 
 
Consequently, the agency of RF and BMGF in the governance of global health and 
agricultural development is rooted in their capacity to anticipate and adapt to changes in the 
distribution of global political and economic power. The Foundations’ agency illustrates that 
one way for global governance schemes to be institutionalized and ultimately inform 
collective action is to work with, as opposed to contest, power asymmetries in the world 
order, so as not to risk losing the support of those with the capacity to undermine their 
effectiveness. As will be demonstrated in the empirical sections, both RF and BMGF have 
exhibited a common capacity to catalyse institutional innovation that has benefited 
historically marginalized populations in the absence of structural changes to the dominant 
global power structure. 
 
A preference for compromise over contestation, coupled with a capacity for enabling 
innovation in science and governance, has resulted in broad acceptance for RF and BMGF 
 4 
knowledge structures within both state and international policy arenas. This acceptance has 
translated into the Foundations having direct influence over (i) how major challenges related 
to disease and agriculture facing the global south are understood (i.e. the determinants and 
viable solutions); (ii) what types of knowledge matters for solving said problems (i.e. which 
“experts” are most suited to lead); and (iii) how collective action focused on addressing these 
problems is structured (i.e. the institutional frameworks).  
 
The two foundations’ influence in the governance of global health and agricultural 
development lends support to the assertions of critical constructivists that elites play a 
privileged role in the process of knowledge construction.3 Nevertheless the willingness of 
the two foundations to accommodate the expressed preferences of the most powerful states 
and firms within the contexts they have sought to catalyze change does not mean that the 
contents of their knowledge structures were intended to reinforce the many structural 
inequities stemming from the unequal global distribution of power. Instead, this dissertation 
demonstrates that their approaches to collective action have been purposefully adapted to 
externally imposed constraints and opportunities created by state expressed preferences 
within geographic and temporal contexts where they have sought to catalyze change. As 
transnational actors of influence, they have attained legitimacy by enabling the development 
of strategies and institutional frameworks devised by their own staff and/or the communities 
of experts they support, which have proven capable of providing public goods to vulnerable 
populations in developing countries when public sector authorities mandated to fill this role 
have been unable to do so.  
 
 
1 .2 New perspec t i ves on publ i c -privat e  cooperat ion  and knowledge  power 
 
The dissertation begins by briefly examining debate concerning the utility of philanthropic 
foundations in the context of American society. This examination is followed by a review of 
                                                
3 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,’’ Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 391–416. 
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what has been written to date on the subject of RF and BMGF influence over efforts to 
strengthen public health and agricultural systems in developing countries. 
  
I show how the RF’s influence over international policy related to public health and 
agricultural development was largely ignored by mainstream twentieth century International 
Relations (IR) scholars. Nevertheless, a diverse group of historians, sociologists, political 
scientists and public health scholars have contributed to the rich body of literature in 
existence chronicling RF’s many contributions to the theory and practice of international 
development.  Typically, however, these works have been restricted in scope to particular 
activities (e.g. RF’s role in agricultural development) and geographical spaces (e.g. Mexico) 
and time (e.g. the immediate post-colonial period). Such specificity is critical for providing 
detail for the historical record. However, it does not lend itself to developing a broader 
understanding of the capacity in which the RF has excelled as an agent of change, how this 
has been accomplished, and why its agency has been important for the governance of 
collective action.  
 
Over the last decade, however, three factors have culminated in a dramatic increase in IR 
theorists’ interest in the agency of private foundations in world politics, two of which relate 
to important disciplinary shifts occurring within IR itself.  
 
First and most significant for this study, there is increased diversity of views of how power is 
distributed in the world order and what this means for solving complex global challenges. 
This is evidenced by the broad embrace of global governance as both a multi-theoretic 
perspective on the distribution of authority within the world order and a functional approach 
to how global collective goods problems are most effectively and fairly addressed.4 Global 
governance as a perspective has emerged to address three critical shortcomings of IR theory: 
IR’s increasing inability to explain (i) the apparent decrease in effectiveness on the part of 
states and the interstate system to address critical challenges created by globalization;5 (ii) the 
dramatic increase of power (and sometimes authority) being wielded by non-state actors in 
                                                
4 Klaus Dingwerth and Philip Pattberg, ‘‘Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics,” Global 
Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 185-203. 
5 Alice Ba and Matthew Hoffmann, eds., Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (New York: Routledge, 
2005). 
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the governance of domains long associated exclusively with the state;6 and (iii) the competing 
normative agendas shaping the world order (i.e. the ideational realm).7 Global governance 
theorists thus view authority as having both structural and ideational aspects to it. 
 
Second, as evidenced by the broad embrace of constructivism as an approach by many 
scholars, increased attention is being paid to the origins and significance of ideas and norms 
shaping collective action.  
 
Third, led by BMGF, a new generation of private American philanthropic foundations has 
emerged to focus on creating solutions for longstanding health and development challenges, 
which has elicited both praise and concern, thereby raising interest in their work as a topic of 
scholarly inquiry.  
 
To date, the overwhelming majority of the scholarship that has sought to illuminate the 
influence of either RF or BMGF in the governance of global health and agricultural 
development has been undertaken by individuals employing theoretical lenses that can be 
classified broadly as being either liberal or critical in orientation.  
 
Through the liberal lens, RF and BMGF have been portrayed in a predominately positive 
light. Liberals tend to see the Foundations as semi-autonomous entities that have 
strategically used their wealth to promote universal ideals, strengthen international 
institutions, and foster innovation.8 Their utility in the governance of global health and 
agricultural development has centered around public sector capacity building, providing 
support for both innovation in science and technology and inter-state cooperation,9 and 
more recently, bridging gaps created by states and markets adversely impacting the world 
                                                
6 Michael Barnett and Robert Duvall, ‘‘Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 
(2005): 39-75. 
7 John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 
1998).  
8 See for example Peter Bell, ‘‘The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor,’’ International Organization 25 
(June 1971): 465-478. 
9 See for example John Farley, To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller 
Foundation (1913-1951) (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Arthur A. Goldsmith, ‘‘The 
Rockefeller Foundation Indian Agricultural Program: Why it Worked,’’ in Western Philanthropy and Cultural 
Context: Western Philanthropy in South, East and Southeast Asia in the 20th Century, eds., Soma Hewa and Philo Hove 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), 85-114.  
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poor.10 In their capacity as “honest brokers,” liberals see RF and BMGF working to facilitate 
cooperation between public, private and third sectors in pursuit of creating viable solutions 
to complex challenges driving disease and hunger and inhibiting economic growth across the 
global South.11  At the same time, with no formal rule-making authority, the Foundations 
must convince states of the merit of their ideas in order to see them institutionalized. 
 
Critical perspectives—which account for the majority of historical and contemporary 
analyses—tend to view the foundations as conservative extensions of the transnational elite,12 
seeking to reinforce the dominant liberal economic model via their health and agricultural 
development initiatives.13 Critical scholars have emphasized the inherent contradictions of 
the Foundations’ focus on reducing global disparities given the source of the endowments, 
and their affiliations with the same firms and states that have been the engineers and 
proponents of structural inequality in international institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization.14 
 
Concerns expressed over RF’s historical influence in collective action range from its 
perceived bias for bringing technology-centred strategies to bear on problems that often 
have deep socio-political determinants,15 to facilitating the blurring of private and public 
roles and responsibilities in global governance.16 Contemporary critical global governance 
scholars, by contrast, focus primarily on BMGF. Even more than its intellectual ancestor, 
BMGF is viewed as a purveyor of (i) scientific determinism (i.e. expanding the biomedical 
                                                
10 See for example William Muraskin, The Politics of International Health: The Children’s Vaccine Initiative and the 
Struggle to Develop Vaccines for the Third World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Robert Herdt, 
‘‘People, Institutions, and Technology: A Personal View of the Role of Foundations in International 
Agricultural Research and Development 1960–2010,’’ Food Policy 37 (2012): 179–190. 
11 See for example Michael Moran, ‘‘Philanthropic Foundations and Global Health Partnership Formation: The 
Rockefeller Foundation and IAVI,’’ in Health for Some: The Political Economy of Global Health Governance, eds., 
Sandra MacLean, Sherri Brown, and Pieter Fourie (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 118-129.  
12 Robert Arnove, Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad (Boston: GK Hall, 
1980).  
13 E. Richard Brown, ‘‘Public Health Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and 
Abroad,” American Journal of Public Health 66, no. 9 (1976): 897; Bruce Jennings, Foundations of International 
Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988): 185-188. 
14 Eric Holt-Gimenez, Miguel A. Altieri, and Peter Rosset, ‘‘Ten Reasons Why the Rockefeller and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation’s Alliance for Another Green Revolution Will Not Solve the Problems of Poverty 
and Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa,’’ Food First Policy Brief no. 12 (October 2006): 1-11. 
15 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Marriage of Convenience: Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico (Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, 2006). 
16 Peter Utting, UN-Business Partnerships: Whose Agenda Counts? (Geneva: UNRISD, 2000). 
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approach to public health and technological approach to agriculture);17 (ii) market-liberalism 
(i.e. functioning as a vehicle for facilitating US hegemony by expanding markets for 
American firms);18 and (iii) elitism in governance (i.e. skewing global research trajectories 
based on individual interests,19 and undermining the legitimacy of public institutions via the 
promotion of informal governance mechanisms outside of IO control).20 Its legitimacy in 
global governance is diminished by its private actor status, exemplified by its lack of 
transparency regarding how it makes decisions,21 and that it cannot be held accountable for 
its actions.22 BMGF is thus considered by critical scholars to be an enabler of a top-down, 
technocratic approach to development, operating with insufficient accountability, 
transparency and legitimacy. Ultimately those employing a critical perspective consider the 
Foundation as incapable of challenging the structural determinants of inequality so long as it 
aligns itself with actors who benefit from such inequity.  
 
Current concern over BMGF’s perceived lack of legitimacy, accountability and bias for 
technology and avoidance of social determinants of health are consistent with larger 
historical reservations over American philanthropic influence in development. These 
concerns originated in the neo-Gramscian literature in the 1980s, which also spoke to but 
was by no means limited to public health.23 What binds the two waves of critical literature 
examining the role of the Foundations in global health and agricultural development are the 
strong concerns expressed over the particular ideas that the Foundations have advanced 
                                                
17 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, ‘‘Gates’s Grandest Challenge: Transcending Technology as Public Health Ideology,’’ 
The Lancet 366, no. 9484 (2005): 514–519. 
18 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of 
American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
19 David McCoy, Gayatri Kembhavi, Jinesh Patel, and Akish Luintel, ‘‘The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s 
Grant-Making Programme for Global Health,’’ The Lancet 373, no. 9675 (2009): 1645-1653. 
20 Simon Rushton and Owain Williams, ‘‘Private Actors in Global Health,’’ in Partnerships and Foundations in 
Global Health Governance, eds., Simon Rushton and Owain Williams (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),  
18–19; David McCoy and Lindsey McGoey, ‘‘Global Health and the Gates Foundation: In Perspective,’’ in 
Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health Governance, eds., Simon Rushton and Owain Williams (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 152, 156. 
21 The Lancet, ‘‘What Has the Gates Foundation Done for Global Health?’’ The Lancet 373, no. 9675 (2009): 
1577. 
22 Kent Buse and Gill Walt, ‘‘Global Public-Private Partnerships. Part II: What are the Health Issues for Global 
Governance?’’ The Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78, no. 5 (2000): 704-705; see also McCoy, Kembhavi, 
Patel, and Luintel.  
23 See for example: Edward Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American 
Foreign Policy: the Ideology of Philanthropy (Albany: State University of New York Press, See also: Jennings, 
Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture. 
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regarding the determinants of and solutions to development-related challenges, and the 
processes through which those ideas are advanced in the policy arena. 
 
Critical scholars have played an important role in illuminating RF and BMGF’s influence in 
public policy formation related to public health and agricultural development. However by 
fixating on the Foundations’ status as members of the global elite operating with minimal 
accountability and limited transparency compared to their public sector counterparts, I argue 
that the critical lens has served to distract from RF and BMGF’s chief function as global 
governors, whilst understating their individual agency as discrete actors in world politics.  
 
RF and BMGF’s comparative advantage over other actors has not simply been their ability 
to bring needed resources to bear on issues adversely affecting large segments of the world’s 
poor. Without explicitly chastising them, the Foundations have provided Northern states, 
IOs, and most recently pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies with institutional 
frameworks that work to compensate for their individual shortcomings as global governors. 
 
This thesis differentiates itself from the liberal view of RF and BMGF’s power through the 
argument that knowledge construction has been and continues to be the basis of the 
Foundations' agency in global governance. While conceding that as non-state actors, the two 
foundations are unable to advance their agendas autonomously,24 the dissertation challenges 
the liberal perspective that RF and BMGF have merely been supporters of political change 
initiated by states.25 In fact, they have been the catalysts of some of the most significant 
innovation in governance developed over the last half century, focused on the development 
and distribution of public goods geared towards the world’s poorest people. The combined 
effectiveness and political palatability of their ideas and strategies concerning how to 
strengthen public health and agricultural systems across the developing world has ensured 
those same ideas and approaches have been embraced and institutionalized by states.   
                                                
24 Margaret E. Keck and Katheryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in World Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 98-99. 
25 Helmut K. Anheier and Siobhan Daly, ‘‘Philanthropic Foundations: A New Global Force?’’ in Global Civil 
Society Yearbook 2004/2005, eds., Mary Kaldor, Helmut K. Anheier, and Marlies Glasius (London: Sage, 2004), 
158-174. 
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The liberal-critical divide over the net-benefit of RF and BMGF’s involvement in the 
governance of global health and agricultural development underscores that the ability of a 
single private actor to shape how collective action problems are approached remains an issue 
of great theoretical and practical relevance for those who study the distribution of power 
within the world order. While other foundations have been examined in other sectors, to 
date, no single work has sought to categorize these two foundations as a novel form of 
transnational actor or provide an explanation for their agency over space and time in the 
governance of global health and agricultural development. This dissertation seeks to fill that 
gap.  
 
By drawing attention to RF and BMGF’s agency, I am not seeking to make a generalizable 
argument about private philanthropic influence in world politics. Rather, I illuminate two 
exceptions that have attained an anomalous degree of policy influence because of their 
ability to shape collective action through knowledge construction.  
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to demonstrate how knowledge construction has been the 
basis of RF and BMGF’s power and authority in global governance. The long-term relevance 
of RF and BMGF’s influence to the theory and practice of global governance, I argue, 
provides a new way of conceptualizing knowledge power broadly conceived as well as 
private governance as it relates to the provision of public goods.  Consequently I argue that 
RF and BMGF have direct relevance to the broader literature on global governance theory 
related to public-private cooperation and knowledge power. 
  
Since 1972, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to how the transnational network 
form has heightened the influence of non-state actors in world affairs.26  While states as a 
typology are still largely viewed as the most powerful and legitimate actors operating in the 
                                                
26 See for example, Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sanieev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, Restructuring World 
Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); 
Michelle Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley, ‘‘Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The 
Cities for Climate Protection Program,’’ International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): 471–493; D. Stone, ‘‘Global 
Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks,’’ Policy Studies Journal 36 (2008): 19–38; 
and William K. Carroll, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the 21st Century (London: 
Zed Books, 2010).  
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world order, the hierarchy of non-state global governors remains unclear.27 Accordingly, this 
work seeks to contribute to a range of theoretical attempts to frame power,28 how non-state 
trans-national actors employ power to achieve influence,29 and where sites of private 
authority in global governance lie.30  
 
Moreover the focus on both global health and agricultural development provides a unique 
opportunity to bridge common interests in private governance: for example, the blurring of 
private and public authority that is occurring across the development spectrum. Through a 
survey of some of the Foundations’ more prominent initiatives in the domains of global 
health and agricultural development, this dissertation seeks to provide a clearer 
understanding of the power exhibited by two unique and highly relevant actors in global 
affairs.  
 
RF and BMGF do not fit neatly within existing actor categories in world politics. For 
example, RF has a legacy of providing technical advice to governments for improving 
services, such as disease control, which in the post-war era are almost exclusively provided 
by states. This advisory role is atypical for a private organization, for it is usually held by 
other public organizations, whether national such the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, or international, such as UN specialized agencies. Yet the 
Foundation has also been a catalyst for bringing private sector resources to bear on these 
same public sector challenges, and an important underwriter of the activities of NGOs 
working at the grassroots level. Its proven capacity to innovate around public sector 
shortcomings and market failures, and its willingness and ability to interface between public, 
private and third sectors, in pursuit of increasing access to public goods, make it and its 
intellectual progeny a wholly unique form of transnational actor. Consequently, I argue that 
when viewed in isolation, no single theory sufficiently can explain the agency of RF and 
                                                
27 See for example Stephen D. Krasner, ‘‘Abiding Sovereignty,’’ International Political Science Review 22, no. 3 
(2001): 229-251; Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, eds., Who Governs the Globe? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
28 Contrasting, for example, power as conceptualized by R. Dahl, ‘‘The Concept of Power,’’ Behavioral Science 2, 
no. 3 (July 1957): 201; with Barnett and Duvall, ‘‘Power in International Politics,” 39-75. 
29 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1972). 
30 See for example Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs 
(New York: University of New York Press, 1999).  
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BMGF. However, when modified and fused, existing theories of power can in fact be 
sufficiently adapted to provide explanation for the two foundations’ influence in global 
governance.  
 
First, this research builds on the theory of neo-functionalism.31 Proponents of neo-
functionalism accurately predicted that technocratic influence over collective action would 
emerge from sources other than the IOs, which functionalists such as David Mitrany 
envisioned as the future centers of global governance.32 A lack of consensus among experts 
on complex issues has driven this emergence, and is explained by the fact that complexity 
ensures problems can be conceptualized in very different ways.33 Attaining public policy 
influence through expertise means demonstrating to governments the merit of embracing 
particular ways of understanding and solving complex problems.  
 
Second, the dissertation leans heavily on the concept of epistemic community concept, often 
associated with Peter Haas.34 Historically, RF achieved policy influence at the national level 
by cultivating epistemic communities within the public sectors of the countries where the 
Foundation worked and building support for their unifying ideas through demonstrations of 
effectiveness. In this way, RF functioned as a norm entrepreneur,35 providing both visibility 
and credibility to particular ideas up for consideration in a competitive ideational realm. 
Moreover RF’s agency shows that decentralized and non-hierarchical global policy networks 
linking state and non-state actors are by no means a recent phenomenon.36 While this study 
differentiates itself from Haas’s work by showing that public policy formulating epistemic 
communities are cultivated within and emerge from sources other than public sectors, it 
nonetheless reinforces his core argument that for epistemic communities to see their ideas 
and norms institutionalized, states must first accept them. 
 
                                                
31 See for example Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).  
32 David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975).  
33 Karen Litfin, Ozone Discourses (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 41.  
34 Peter Haas, ‘‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,’’ International 
Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35.   
35 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’’ International 
Organization 52, no.4 (1998): 887-917. 
36 See for example Jan Martin Witte, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Thorsten Benner, ‘‘Beyond Multilateralism: 
Global Policy Networks,’’ International Politics and Society 2 (2000): 176-88.  
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Third, the research informing this dissertation draws inspiration from previous attempts to 
understand structural change,37 and builds directly on the work of Susan Strange,38 Doris 
Fuchs,39 and others,40 illuminating the indirect authority of private actors differentiating itself 
from these works through its focus on private, not-for-profit, philanthropic entities seeking 
public policy influence. 
 
Despite this differentiation, it is argued that the three ways of conceptualizing corporate 
power, as laid out by Fuchs,41 apply equally to RF and BMGF. First, RF and BMGF’s power 
can be seen as being discursive, in that they have demonstrated an ability to successfully 
define or ‘‘frame’’ problems. Second, their power can equally be described as being 
instrumental, in that their frameworks for strengthening public health and agricultural 
development across the Global South has been repeatedly embraced by states whom they 
depend upon to see their goals realized.  Third, their power can be conceptualized as being 
structural because of their ability to set both research and policy agendas. Historically RF 
attained agenda-setting power via the construction of epistemic communities within public 
sectors, which states looked to, in order to establish the rules and operational frameworks of 
the systems governing the provision of public goods intended to strengthen both public 
health and food security in both individual countries and across the Global South. Yet both 
RF and BMGF have attained structural power through their significant endowments, as a 
plethora of aspiring grantees seek their funds and are willing to work with the rules and 
processes favoured by the Foundations. RF and BMGF have used this structural power to 
bring innovative new governance approaches (e.g. productive development partnerships) to 
the attention of states, whose support is needed if they are to be institutionalized.  Yet 
through the Foundations’ willingness to work within the confines of dominant paradigms 
(e.g. the neoliberal model), evidenced through their contemporary promotion of governance 
innovations that do not call for fundamental changes to the rules of the global political 
                                                
37 Steven Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
38 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988). 
39 Doris Fuchs, ‘‘The Commanding Heights?: The Strength and Fragility of Business Power in Global Politics,’’ 
Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005): 771-802.  
40 Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs, ‘‘Agrifood Corporations, Global Governance and Sustainability: A 
Framework for Analysis,’’ in Corporate Power in Global Agrifood Governance, eds., Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 3.  
41 Fuchs; Doris Fuchs and Marcus Lederer, ‘‘The Power of Business,’’ Business and Politics 9, no. 3 (2007): 1-17. 
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economy, they may also be using their structural power to support existing structures of the 
global political economy which contribute to the problems they seek to overcome.  
 
1 .3 The Empiri cal  Evidence  
 
In the first two empirical chapters, I show how RF’s influence over how public health and 
agricultural challenges have been addressed across the global South, has been contingent on 
the Foundation’s ability to perform three functions.  
 
First, from the second decade of the twentieth-century to the present, RF has been an 
enabler of science-enabled innovation. As such the Foundation has been effective in 
demonstrating for would-be adopters, how science and resultant technology can provide 
solutions to longstanding challenges perceived to be jeopardizing public health and food 
security and constraining economic development.  
 
Second, in the immediate post-colonial era, RF’s technical expertise served as a point of 
entry for advising developing country governments on how their public health and 
agricultural systems were best organized. In all of the countries where it operated in this 
period, RF enabled country-level epistemic expansions, meaning the Foundation facilitated for 
states the training of indigenous communities of experts in select scientific disciplines. By 
virtue of their training, these communities of experts approached health and agricultural 
problems in ways that reflected and reinforced the dominant norms and ideas guiding the 
Foundation’s work. RF’s epistemic expansions heightened the credibility of its positions 
within national public policy arenas, and with the rise of collective consciousness embodied 
by the establishment of the League of Nations (LN), within international public policy 
making institutions the Foundation helped forge. 
 
Third RF has proven itself to be a master of private diplomacy. This means that the Foundation 
has repeatedly demonstrated a capacity to convene informal, private dialogue between those 
actors–initially states and multilateral organizations, but later civil society organizations and 
firms–whose individual receptivity and cooperative ability have been deemed essential for 
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the successful institutionalization of the Foundation’s strategies and institutional frameworks 
designed to strengthen public health and agriculture in developing countries. 
 
In the neo-liberal era, Northern governments expressed a clear volition for private sector 
involvement in the development and distribution of global public goods. RF’s framework for 
creating vaccines for neglected diseases in the face of cuts to public sector research capacity 
accommodated this volition. The product development partnership paradigm used public 
funds and the promise of agenda-setting power to entice firms into innovating for the 
world’s poor, in order to overcome important state and market gaps. RF began successfully 
applying this approach in the early 1990s to such neglected diseases as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis (TB) and malaria, which serves to demonstrate the Foundation’s unique capacity 
catalyze normative and institutional change in global governance in the absence of any 
dramatic changes in the overall distribution of political power.  
 
In the second two empirical sections, I show how BMGF has embraced and expanded the 
scale of public-private partnerships as the basis for increasing access to public goods across 
the global South. While RF drew the scientific blueprints and business plans of many of the 
most prominent global health and agricultural partnerships in existence today, BMGF has 
become the primary financial backer for all of these initiatives. Moreover, in building 
programs from scratch, BMGF has relied extensively on RF’s network for guidance, as 
external advisors but also for filling leadership positions within the Foundation itself. This is 
particularly evident in its still nascent agricultural program.  
 
Despite RF serving as an important inspiration for the Gates family in the creation of their 
foundation, there are substantial differences between the two organizations. RF’s credibility 
within the global South has been attained in large part by its long history of public sector 
capacity building in science, with an emphasis on providing advanced training to individuals 
though post graduate fellowships. While BMGF has shown considerable interest in investing 
in science, with some notable exceptions, it has been far more focused on end-points and 
silver bullets than investing in directly into the training of human resources. 
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Moreover whereas RF for much of its history decentralized its staff, those of BMGF have 
been concentrated at its headquarters in Seattle. For decades RF had field officers based in 
the countries where it has operated, who were constantly cognizant of on the ground 
realities, and directly involved in managing research or operational programs and training 
indigenous staff. BMGF by contrast has a handful of sparsely staffed regional offices and no 
operational programs. It has instead relied on external consultants to inform its programs, 
and remains dependent on intermediary organizations to implement its grants. 
 
Furthermore, whereas RF’s grant making has relied heavily on building personal 
relationships and providing high-degrees of latitude to grantees as to how they achieve their 
ends, BMGF has moved towards a matrix-scale approach. Its emphasis on metrics and 
shorter end-points is both a product of making grants of much higher magnitude and a 
reflection of increasing bureaucratization within the organization, which now employs over 
one thousand people.  
 
Finally, since its inception, BMGF has been represented on the boards of organizations it 
has played a lead role in creating or sustaining. With few exceptions, RF has had no 
representation on the board of entities it was involved in establishing. Instead, however, 
these new entities effectively became spin-offs of RF, with staff members leaving the 
Foundation to play a leadership role in the new organizations. While BMGF lacks RF’s 
historical memory and legacy in public sector capacity building, knowledge structures–even if 
unoriginal–remain the basis of its agency in global governance. However the degree to which 
BMGF can adapt to future shifts in the global distribution of political and economic power 
has yet to be determined. The implications of its agency and the significance of its 
contributions to global governance may only be appraised based on the first twenty years of 
its existence. 
 
In addition to providing a brief synopsis of the dissertation’s main arguments, the conclusion 
illuminates three broader implications of the embrace of RF and BMGF driven partnership 
paradigm for the governance of global health and agricultural development.  
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The first is that while PPPs have helped IOs such as the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) perform their 
intended functions, they have also provided states with institutional alternatives through which 
to channel health and agricultural-related overseas development aid, which has indirectly 
undermined the IOs’ status as the lead coordinators of collective action in their respective 
domains.  
 
Second, through PPPs, RF and BMGF have facilitated the unlocking of privately held 
intellectual property for the intended benefit of the public good without radical changes 
being made to the international trade law. However their ability to bring about such 
governance innovation has been limited to issue areas where they have demonstrated 
expertise, and trade-related intellectual property rights are just one of many drivers of global 
inequity adversely impacting public health and agricultural development across the global 
South.  
 
Third, the proliferation of the PPP paradigm across the development spectrum has provided 
firms with new opportunities to become formally involved in the development and 
management of institutional frameworks guiding collective action aimed at reducing global 
disparities. While this has increased such firms agenda-setting power in global governance, 
through PPPs, the Foundations are illuminating how firms can help public authorities reduce 
socio-economic disparities without deriving profit or incurring financial risk. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
 
A combination of historical, interpretive and comparative approaches were employed to 
examine the central question of how the two Foundations exhibit power in global 
governance. This study is qualitative in approach given the emphasis it places on 
understanding how individuals associated with RF and BMGF perceive reality (i.e. what they 
perceive to be the core determinants of the problems they have involved themselves in 
addressing).42 More specifically, I incorporate elements of two particular qualitative research 
                                                
42 Lesley Gross Portney and Mary P. Watkins, Foundations of Clinical Research: Applications to Practice (Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall Health, 2000), 272.  
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approaches in order to answer the question of how the two foundations influence outcomes 
in global governance. Through the first approach, interpretive biography43, I set out to 
describe the attitudes and values of the professional groups working for, advising and 
empowered by RF and BMGF, related to public health and agricultural development. The 
second approach is that of phenomenology, which seeks to illuminate the interpretations of 
a particular phenomenon (in this case the influence of RF and BMGF in the governance of 
global health and agricultural development) by individuals who have experienced it (e.g. 
former and current program officers, decision makers within the two Foundations).44  
 
A comparative case study analysis,45 of RF and BMGF’s work in public health and 
agricultural development, formed the basis of my explanations of how the two foundations 
differ. In this regard I sought to explain variation between what they do, why and how, with 
an emphasis on looking at the Foundations’ initiatives in a temporal context to assess the 
degree of commonality in their approaches.  
 
Two stages of research informed this study. The first stage (from January 2010-October 
2010) involved an extensive review of existing literature (monographs, journal articles, 
Foundation documents, and print media) on the RF and BMGF’s work in global public 
health and agricultural development. This was combined with a review of existing power 
theory broadly defined to gauge its relevance to the research question of how these two 
private American foundations exert influence in global governance, how this has been 
sustained over time, and why such agency matters.  
 
These reviews both informed and were supplemented by thirty-four key informant 
interviews (approved by the University of Waterloo’s Office of Reseach Ethics: ORE # 16468), 
undertaken in the second stage of research (from November 2010-January 2012). In an 
attempt to expose the beliefs and values informing the two foundations’ agendas and answer 
the principal questions that formed the basis for this project, sixty-five interview requests 
were sent to current and former Foundation employees, known external advisors, 
                                                
43 Norman K. Denzin, Interpretive biography (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989). 
44 Portney and Watkins, Foundations of Clinical Research, 273-74.  
45 See for example Alexander R. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).  
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representatives from state developments agencies (e.g. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and IOs (e.g. WHO)), organizations established with 
Foundation monies (e.g. The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)), grantees, as well 
as non-associated professionals working in public health and agricultural development in the 
public, private and third sectors. Thirty-four of these individuals agreed to semi-structured 
telephone interviews lasting from between 25 to 150 minutes in duration. 
 
Subjects were selected based on the perceived likelihood of them being a rich source of 
information. Examples of interviewees include Akin Adesina, Former Vice-President for  
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA); Catherine Bertini, Former Executive 
Director of the World Food Program; Robert Herdt, a former Vice-President of RF ; Tikki 
Pang, Former Director of the World Health Organization’s Research Policy and 
Cooperation department; Gordon Perkin, Co-Founder of the not-for-profit Program for 
Appropriate Technologies in Health (PATH) and the inaugural President of BMGF’s Global 
Health Program; Gary Toenniessen, Managing Director of RF and the founding President  
(interim) of AGRA; Tachi Yamata, Former President of BMGF’s Global Health Program; 
Ariel Pablos-Mendez, former Director of Health Equity at RF; and Robert Zeigler, Director 
General at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 
 
All interviews were ‘semi-structured’ to provide a common thematic template and a means 
to compare responses but also to allow for sufficient flexibility to capitalize on opportunities 
afforded by individual interviewees’ unique professional circumstances. This format 
provided an opportunity to ask both very general and very specific questions. 
 
Examples of general questions posed to interviewees were as follows: 
 
– Can you please describe the processes through which the (BMGF) Global Health 
program identifies funding priorities, makes grant decisions and reviews internal 
policies and how this may have changed in the last decade? 
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– How, in your view, is the proliferation of global health partnerships occurring 
outside of UN framework affecting the ability of WHO to fulfill its mandate as the 
technical and coordinating authority for health issues in the international sphere? 
 
– What, from your perspective, does accountability look like for an organization that 
advocates ideas, which to be realized – others must ultimately embrace or 
implement? 
 
Issue-specific questions posed to interviewees included the following: 
 
– Can you please speak about the evolution of the Montpellier panel (e.g. the 
individuals involved in establishing it, the rationale, and the role - if any played - by 
RF/ BMGF)? 
 
– Up until recently, BMGF was a primary funder to the CIGIAR without regular 
member status. Accordingly, what were the motivations underlying the Foundation’s 
decision to become a regular member of CGIAR? 
 
– What is the Foundation’s view is on compulsory licensing? 
 
Each interview was built on those preceding it until the data being collected no longer 
yielded new information, which indicated that the sample size was sufficient. All answers to 
the same questions were grouped and reviewed to allow for the identification of common 
themes. To be included in the dissertation, questions of fact required confirmation in the 
form of at least one published source. Because a primary focus of this project was to 
illuminate the ideas and norms guiding RF and BMGF, individual perspectives were included 
when it became clear that such perspective were representative of the views of a larger 
group. This confirmation came in the form of the same or similar answers to common 
questions.  Moreover additional sources of data, such as newspaper articles and speeches, 
were used to ‘‘triangulate’’ information, concepts and normative perspectives. The focus of 
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the data analysis and interpretation was to identify themes in what were largely narrative 
descriptions provided by interviewees.46  
 
1.5 Chapter synopses   
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing explanations for RF and BMGF’s policy-
influence in the domains of public health and agricultural development. This survey reveals 
that almost all analyses undertaken to date have employed either liberal or critical theoretical 
perspectives, which has produced two markedly different explanations of the Foundations’ 
power in these two domains. 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrates how existing theory related to public-private cooperation and 
knowledge power can be used to provide an alternative explanation for the two 
Foundations’ influence in these two issue areas. 
 
Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the empirical chapters, which provide substance to the theoretical 
claims advanced above. 
 
The final chapter provides a summary of the dissertation’s main arguments and casts light on 
three implications of the global diffusion of the Foundation-championed public-private 
partnership paradigm in the governance of global public health and agricultural 
development.  
 
                                                
46 Portney and Watkins, Foundations of Clinical Research, 274-277. 
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Chapter 2: Existing explanations for RF and BMGF agency in global governance 
 
2.0 Introduc t ion  
 
This chapter begins by locating private foundations as products of an American polity 
historically distrustful of ‘‘big’’ government yet at the same time cognizant of the need for 
sources of capital and innovation to fill gaps created by public and private sectors. I then 
examine the longstanding neglect by mainstream International Relations (IR) scholars of the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF), which I attribute to the intangibility of knowledge power. 
Subsequently, I review the rich historiography on RF’s efforts to strengthen public health 
and agricultural development across the global South, which has been created by a diverse 
array of scholars, whose analyses I divide into two liberal and critical perspectives broadly 
defined. This liberal-critical divide I argue pertains equally to the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation’s (BMGF’s) contemporary efforts to shape collective action in the same two 
domains. The critical-liberal divide, I contend, has meant that RF and BMGF have typically 
been portrayed as either members of the transnational capitalist elite working to advance the 
interests of their peers or as aids of interstate cooperation committed to the principles of 
idealism, and later liberal institutionalism.  Each perspective has provided valuable and 
unique insights as to how the Foundations influence outcomes as well as the implications of 
their influence. At the same time, I argue, both perspectives have tended to overemphasize 
the Foundations’ loyalties while understating their individual agency. 
 
RF and BMGF knowledge structures have not overtly challenged political and economic 
power disparities in the interstate system. Yet based on their individual organizational 
contributions that have altered the way complex problems have been addressed through 
collective action, neither have they sought to reinforce the status quo. Indeed, the 
institutionalization of the Foundations’ strategies has led to fundamental changes in how 
governments have organized individual and collective responses to public health and 
agricultural challenges in developing countries.  
 
Moreover, in the neoliberal era, the Foundations have been effective champions of Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs) as an approach to governing global health and agricultural 
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challenges. The embrace by governments of RF and later BMGF-enabled PPPs, has resulted 
in non-state actors–namely International Organizations (IOs), Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)–changing their behaviors and cooperating 
for the benefit of the world’s marginalized in ways that prior to 1995 would have seemed 
unimaginable.  This suggests that neither those working exclusively through either liberal or 
critical lenses have sufficiently considered the social constructivist position that knowledge 
construction can, in and of itself, be a vehicle for autonomous agency in world politics. 
 
The willingness and capacity of the Foundations to work around global power disparities is 
significant, as critical scholars of health and agriculture have long questioned not only the 
credibility of RF and BMGF’s views of how global health inequities and agricultural 
challenges should be overcome but also the political compromises that the two Foundations 
have been willing to make in pursuit of achieving their goals. Yet critical lenses, which have 
framed the Foundations as perpetuators of a science and technology approach to 
development, have done little to illuminate RF’s longstanding and BMGF’s more recent 
capacity to catalyse institutional innovation within the dominant system that benefits the 
world’s poor. 
 
As non-state actors, RF and BMGF are undeniably limited in their ability to affect the global 
distribution of political and economic power, meaning they lack the means to catalyze 
‘‘transformative’’ or systematic change,  which only occurs when decision making power is 
conferred to those previously marginalized. However as “norm entrepreneurs,”1 they have 
repeatedly demonstrated that innovation in governance can reduce the adverse effects of 
socio-economic inequity in the absence of changes to the global power structure, which 
underpins such inequities. Their outputs serve to undermine claims that any attempt at 
innovation to solve the challenges associated with marginalization will otherwise fail because 
the root of the problems will remain unaddressed.2 Accordingly, RF and BMGF should not 
be seen as conservative actors seeking to maintain the status quo but rather catalysts of 
innovation in global governance.  
                                                
1 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’’ International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
2 See for example Nino Antadze and Francis Westley, ‘‘Funding Social Innovation: How Do We Know What 
To Grow?’’ The Philanthropist 23, no. 3 (2010): 343-356.  
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Ideological myopia associated with reliance on one theoretical lens appears to be the 
principal reason for the longstanding liberal-critical divide, which has distracted from RF and 
now BMGF’s capacity to catalyze change via knowledge construction. As noted by Susan 
Strange, analyses undertaken by scholars wedded to particular theoretical lenses tend to 
provide explanations consistent with the general assumptions shaping those lenses. Their 
conclusions are largely inevitable because their research is teleological by design.3 Historically 
and continuing today, the role that private actors play in attempts to resolve public 
challenges is a polarizing subject, which ideologically-informed research tends to amplify. 
This study draws from a range of theoretical perspectives in an attempt to avoid the 
ideological and teleological trappings associated with examining its subject through a single 
theoretical lens. 
 
2 .1 – RF and BMGF as produc t s  o f  the  Ameri can Pol i t y  
 
Much of the contemporary debate over the ideas and influence of RF and BMGF in global 
governance mirrors historical debates over the role and contributions of private 
philanthropic foundations in American society. Critical American historians have cast RF as 
an organization imbued with a faith in science and technology, committed to the principle of 
upward causation and as an underwriter of a technocratic elite within the United States via 
fellowships and project-based grants.4 Viewed through a critical lens, RF program officers 
have functioned as ‘‘managers of science,’’ catalyzing groundbreaking interdisciplinary 
research,5 certainly, but also actively lobbying for the advancement of reductionist forms of 
problem solving to the detriment of social-science methodologies.6 Seen in this light, RF’s 
public policy influence within the United States has meant that, for example, social policy 
has played second fiddle to the biomedical paradigm as an approach to public health, which 
has invariably aided the rise of the now powerful healthcare industry. At the same time, it 
                                                
3 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 16.  
4 Lilly E. Kay, The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
5 Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991).  
6 Edward K. Oasa and Bruce H. Jennings. ‘‘Science and Authority in International Agricultural Research, ’’ 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scientists 14 (1982): 30-45. 
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has been argued by E. Richard Brown that RF’s support for restricting entry into the medical 
profession has reduced Americans’ access to healthcare, thereby increasing health inequities.7  
 
Scholars, rooted in the liberal school,8 have taken a very different view of the contributions 
made by large foundations in American society.9 For these scholars, the primary utility of 
this unique independent power in the American political economy has been to subsidize 
social innovation and facilitate positive social change. As publicly subsidized vehicles 
through which a private vision of the public good is articulated and implemented within the 
public sphere, liberals acknowledge that private foundation agency illustrates that material 
wealth can translate into political influence.10 Nevertheless, through the liberal lens, not only 
have large foundations such as RF and the Ford Foundation (FF) been important providers 
of funding for progressive CSOs, they have also been creators of incentives for market 
engagement to ensure the production of needed public goods, thereby correcting for state 
and market failures giving rise to complex social problems.  
 
While RF and BMGF continue to advance particular ways of understanding and responding 
to complex societal problems within the context of the United States, their importance as 
transnational actors lies in their success in filling gaps in global governance. In doing so, the 
two foundations have projected onto the world a model of problem solving that is uniquely 
American. While their ability to do so has been aided by twentieth-century American 
hegemony, chapters 4 to 7 demonstrate that the state-market gaps created by the ability of 
the United States to project its own power on the world have also been eased in the neo-
liberal era by the two foundations functioning in this capacity. 
 
  
 
                                                
7 E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979). 
8 See for example Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler, eds., Private Funds, Public Purpose: Philanthropic 
Foundations in International Perspective (New York: Springer, 1999); Kenneth Prewitt, ‘‘Foundations as Mirrors of 
Public Culture,’’ American Behavioral Scientist 42 (1999): 977-986; Kenneth Prewitt, ‘‘American Foundations: 
What Justifies Their Unique Privileges and Powers,’’ in The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations: United States and 
European Perspectives, eds., Kenneth Prewitt, Mattei Dogan, Steven Hydermann, and Stefan Toepler (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 27-46.  
9 Prewitt, ‘‘Foundations as Mirrors.’’ 
10 Prewitt, ‘‘American Foundations,’’ 30-45. 
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2.2 - Mainst ream IR’s  longs tanding negle c t o f  RF and ini t ial  di sin teres t  in BMGF  
 
Until very recently, scholarship undertaken by mainstream IR scholars focused on the 
transnational activities of the large foundations has been limited. Perhaps it is not surprising 
then that the concept of RF and BMGF as discrete actors in world politics remains largely 
novel. 
 
Peter Bell first brought attention to the political influence of professionally staffed and 
managed foundations with assets exceeding US$ 100 million in a 1971 article examining the 
FF.11 Large foundations such as FF and RF, he argued, were products and reflections of 
twentieth-century American society, whose resources in the post-colonial era were 
instrumental in the development of the health, agriculture and educational sectors of many 
Third World countries. Not only was FF a modernizing force, Bell argued that it was also a 
projector of liberalism, pluralism, gradualism and rationalism in the countries where it 
operated. Yet according to Bell, the autonomy of the large American foundations was 
limited, evidenced by the fact that FF and its peers were unwilling to challenge American 
foreign policy overtly. In fact, during the Cold War when Bell wrote his article, values such 
as liberalism and rationalism and an embrace of scientific reform espoused by FF were 
largely in sync with US foreign policy. As acknowledged by Bell himself, FF in this period 
was the largest financial supporter of social science research in Latin America. Moreover, 
Bell asserted, FF functioned as a proxy for the United States Agency for International 
Development and an ideological counter to Marxist revolutionaries and the Catholic 
Church.12 Yet as will be demonstrated, numerous examples can be found of RF and BMGF 
working to change American foreign policy. This has occurred, however, through 
persuasion, for example in the form of evidence-gathering to substantiate positions 
advocated for and via funding other organizations to act as lobbyists, as opposed to open 
contestation.  
 
                                                
11 Peter Bell, ‘‘The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor Bell,’’ International Organization 25 (June 1971): 
465-478. 
12 Ibid., 121; 116. 
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Bell’s appraisal of FF was part of a larger, albeit brief surge in interest in non-state 
transnational actors. The transnational perspective, laid out in a volume edited by Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye, forced IR scholars to consider whether the rise of transnational 
organizations, which was seen to be changing attitudes and constructing new instruments of 
influence, were in fact making the state-centric paradigm inadequate for understanding world 
politics.13 Unfortunately, for those advocating this broadened perspective of authority in 
world politics, the general argument of the book was set up, according to Paul Wapner, as a 
zero-sum game. Questions as to whether an increase in transnational activity was 
undermining the state as the primary unit of analysis could “easily be beaten back by state-
centric thinkers” which effectively occurred through Kenneth Neal Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics.14 The ensuing broad embrace of regime theory,15 which fixated on 
whether and how interstate regimes matter in international politics, effectively shut down 
interest in transnational actors for close to two decades.16 While critiques of regime theory 
for ignoring non-state actors abounded by the early 1990s, short shrift was paid to the 
influence of RF and BMGF in global governance by mainstream IR scholars, until quite 
recently.    
 
Despite mainstream IR scholars’ longstanding disinterest in RF, a diverse group of 
academics, including historians, sociologists, and political scientists, among others, have 
collectively produced a rich historiography chronicling the the Foundation’s twentieth-
century role in shaping the public health and agricultural trajectories of many developing 
countries, and it is to that collection this literature review first turns. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1972), xxi; xxiii.  
14 Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 162; Kenneth Neal 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison–Wesley Pub. Co., 1979).  
15 John G. Ruggie, ‘‘Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors and Practices,’’ European Journal of 
International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 499-531. 
16 Wapner. 
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2.3 – The RF his toriography at  a glance   
 
This section provides a brief overview of existing explanations for RF’s influence in the 
governance of global health and agricultural development. These are categorized as being 
either liberal or critical in their orientation, for there are very few examples of works that do 
not employ one of these two lenses–broadly defined–in their analysis of RF’s influence. This 
polarity is important because it has resulted in the two very different assessments of the 
Foundation’s purpose and agency in world affairs becoming prominent. On the one hand, 
the liberal perspective, exemplified by Amy Staples, sees RF’s longstanding support for 
empowerment of IOs focusing on attaining freedom from want, as evidence that the 
Foundation’s primary role in global governance has been to catalyze states’ commitment to 
idealism and internationalism.17 Critical interpretations, in contrast, exemplified by Edward 
Berman’s, and more recently Inderjeet Parmar’s neo-Gramscian analyses, portray the 
Foundation as a vehicle that has been successfully employed to embed a positivist and pro-
capitalist culture within the elite of developing countries.18 In the eyes of these theorists, this 
penetration of ideas and norms, served first and foremost in the twentieth-century to extend 
American control over production in the countries where RF operated.19 While merit can be 
found in both viewpoints, I argue that this longstanding historical liberal-critical divide 
which now also applies to analyses of BMGF in the current era has resulted in the 
Foundation’s loyalties to Northern states being overemphasized, individual agency 
understated and comparative advantage over other actors in global governance 
underappreciated. Moreover with few exceptions, these studies have been geographically and 
issue-focused, leaving little opportunity for generalization across time and space as to how 
the Foundation’s influence has been achieved and sustained.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Amy Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health 
Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006), 1-2.  
18 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in 
the Rise of American Power (New York : Columbia University Press, 2012). 
19 1983). 
 29 
2.31 Liberal perspectives of RF’s contributions to global health and agricultural development  
 
Seen through a liberal lens, RF’s influence over how health challenges in developing 
countries have been approached has been derived from three distinct foci.  
 
First, numerous multi-year country-level programs focused on public sector capacity building 
demonstrated to developing country governments the Foundation’s commitment to their 
modernization. RF’s establishment of the Peking Union Medical Hospital in China in 1915, 
for example, which was intended to be the locus of training for the country’s medical elite,20 
and received strong backing from within the Chinese government, academics, and members 
of the business scientific community,21 embodies this, as well as the Foundation’s 
commitment to the biomedical model which was so persuasive in that era. However this 
commitment to public sector capacity building can also be seen in Sri Lanka where RF 
developed its local health unit model, which integrated health services and emphasized 
prevention and education and the use of local resources to strengthen public health in 
predominantly rural areas.22  
 
Second, liberal scholars have also emphasized RF’s commitment to scientific innovation for 
the public good, illustrated by its development of the world’s first yellow fever vaccine in 
1937.23 Through the liberal lens, therefore, RF has been viewed as a modernizing force, 
largely welcomed by those it has aspired to help,24 which has reduced developing countries’ 
dependency on outside agents.25  
                                                
20 Qiusha Ma, ‘‘The Peking Union Medical College and the Rockefeller Foundation’s Medical Program’s in 
China,’’ in Rockefeller Philanthropy and Modern Biomedicine: International Initiatives from World War I to the Cold War, 
ed., William H. Schneider (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2002), 158. 
21 Laurence A. Schneider, ‘‘The Rockefeller Foundation, the China Foundation, and the Development of 
Modern Science in China,’’ Social Science and Medicine 16 (1982): 1217-1221.  
22 Soma Hewa, ‘‘Globalizing Primary Care: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the Development of Community-
Based Approach to Public Health in Sri Lanka – What Can We Learn?’’ in Philanthropic Foundations and the 
Globalization of Scientific Medicine and Public Health, eds., Benjamin B. Page and David A. Valone (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2007), 59-60. 
23 See Wilbur G. Downs, ‘‘The Rockefeller Foundation Virus Program: 1951-1971 with Update to 1981,’’ 
Annual Review of Medicine 33 (1982): 1-30; William H. Schneider, Rockefeller Philanthropy and Modern Biomedicine. 
International Initiatives from World War I to the Cold War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). 
24 See for example Ma; Laurence A. Schneider.  
25 Carl E. Taylor and Henry G. Taylor. ‘‘Community Based Primary Health Care: Empowerment and Equity,’’ 
in Philanthropic Foundations and the Globalization of Scientific Medicine and Public Health, eds., Benjamin B. Page and 
David A. Valone (Lanham: University Press of America, 2007), 115-124. 
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Third, liberal scholars have framed RF as an enabler of inclusive approaches to collective 
action. Liberals have argued, for example, that its provision of support to nascent health-
focused IOs such as the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) in the interwar 
period and its successor, the World Health Organization (WHO) in the wake of World War 
II (WWII), enhanced its effectiveness and provided a degree of legitimacy-through 
association that was otherwise lacking.26 
 
Moreover in response to a system of global health governance, which by the 1980s was 
deemed to be increasingly dysfunctional due to states, IOs, firms and CSOs acting without 
clear understanding of each others needs, the liberal lens has portrayed RF as a driver of 
coherence and innovation, which forged collaboration through diplomacy and an 
unwavering commitment to meeting the needs of the world’s poorest countries. This role for 
liberals is embodied in the Bellagio meetings, the first of which was held in March 1984 and 
hosted by the Foundation at its conference centre in Bellagio Italy and was focused on how 
to reinvigorate existing immunization programs.27 Subsequent gatherings saw its agenda 
broadened to the development of new models for research ensuring global pharmaceutical 
research and development met the needs of the global South, which led to RF showcasing 
public-private collaboration in the form of the product development partnership paradigm 
as a new form of global health governance.28 These meetings have been cast by liberals as 
examples of RF’s capacity for galvanizing the creation of global networks seeking policy 
reform held together by their commitment to common goals and visions for their realization. 
  
On the subject of global agricultural development, liberals assert that broad support existed 
within the political and agricultural establishments of developing countries for RF’s efforts, 
which were historically based on science-enabled innovation and the provision of advanced 
scientific training. The Mexican Agricultural Program, for example, which ran for two 
                                                                                                                                            
 
26 Martin David Dubin, ‘‘The League of Nations Health Organization,’’ in International Health Organizations and 
Movements, ed., Paul P. Weindling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 56-80.  
27 William Muraskin, The Politics of International Health: The Children’s Vaccine Initiative and the Struggle to Develop 
Vaccines for the Third World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 4-5; 31. 
28 Michael Moran, ‘‘Philanthropic Foundations and Global Health Partnership Formation: the Rockefeller 
Foundation and IAVI,’’ in Health for Some: the Political Economy of Global Health Governance, eds., Sandra J. 
MacLean, Sherri A. Brown and Pieter Fourie (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 118-129.  
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decades beginning in 1941, has been framed as a cross-cultural encounter benefiting not only 
the Mexican government and the country’s community of agricultural scientists. The 
Mexican government’s receptivity could be attributed first and foremost to immediate 
benefits such as increased yields and economic growth associated with the embrace of RF 
ideas. However for liberals, the majority of the country’s agronomists saw RF’s offer of 
technical expertise an opportunity to move beyond the land reform policies implemented in 
the 1930s under the Cardenas administration, which were unable to address persistent 
natural impediments to progress such as diseases threatening the production of staple 
crops.29  
 
Beginning in the immediate post-colonial era but continuing to the present, liberals suggest 
that developing country agronomists have wanted to be seen as scientists, not as 
revolutionaries or bureaucrats.30 The Foundation’s International Program on Rice 
Biotechnology, which was initiated in 1984 and geared towards building public sector 
capacity in rice biotechnology in low and middle-income countries through partnerships with 
established research programs in Northern countries, has been framed as a continuation of 
earlier country-specific programs.31 RF’s enduring emphasis on building technical capacity 
has thus been construed by liberal scholars as being mutually beneficial to both RF and 
developing country scientists.  
 
Moreover liberal scholars note that RF also developed frameworks intended to improve the 
interstate system’s capacity to meet the agricultural needs of low-income countries, which 
have been readily adopted. The most significant historical example of this is the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which was planned as a public 
fundraising consortium for applied agricultural research. CGIAR was readily embraced by 
states because of its informal and voluntary structure and the flexibility provided to donors 
                                                
29 Joseph Cotter, ‘‘The Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican Agricultural Project: A Cross-Cultural Encounter, 
1943-1949,’’ in Missionaries of Science: the Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America, ed., Marcos Cueto (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 98-99; 101; see also Robert Herdt, ‘‘People, Institutions and Technology: a 
Personal View of the Role of Foundations in International Agricultural Research and Development, 1960–
2010,’’ Food Policy 37 (2012): 179–190.  
30 Cotter. 
31 J. O’Toole, Gary Toenniessen, T. Murashige, R. Harris, and Robert Herdt, ‘‘The Rockefeller Foundation’s 
International Program in Rice Biotechnology,’’ in Rice Genetics IV, eds., GS Khush, DS Brar and B. Hardy (Los 
Banos: New Delhi Science Publishers Inc. and International Rice Research Institute, 2001), 39-59. 
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to set the research focus of participating centers.32 As such, liberals view RF as having 
successfully extended its education efforts from the training of individuals to training the 
society of states.33  
 
In the new millennium, liberals see the Foundation continuing to develop novel approaches 
to strengthening developing country agricultural systems, seeking the engagement of all 
relevant actors. The Foundation’s role as the chief architect of the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA) is the best example. While AGRA is a stand-alone 
organization, it was spun-off from a pre-existing RF program built on the idea that increased 
production would not be a sustainable strategy for realizing food security in Sub-Saharan 
Africa if profitability for small-scale growers could not be assured. Yet ensuring this requires 
competent local delivery systems, which in turn requires securing buy-in commercial banks, 
multinational seed companies and governments.34 For liberals, RF has been the catalyst of 
this change, thereby continuing its longstanding role as educator and enabler of cooperation 
in the global sphere, oriented towards the strengthening of public sector capacity.35  
 
2.32 Critical perspectives of RF’s contributions to global health and agricultural development 
 
While liberal perspectives tend to portray RF as a positive force in global governance, studies 
employing critical lenses typically view RF’s ability to shape public policy in a much more 
negative light. This is significant, as most analyses of RF’s influence over how public health 
and agricultural development has been approached across the global South have employed 
critical perspectives.  
 
By and large those employing critical lenses have viewed RF’s influence over global 
governance related to public health and agriculture as being discursive in nature, meaning its 
power has been rooted in its ability to successfully frame problems and solutions. Its assets, 
                                                
32 Warren C. Baum, Partners Against Hunger: The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research  
(Washington: The World Banks, 1986), 3; 25.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Gary Toenniessen, Akinwumbi Adesina and Joseph DeVries, “Building an Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, (2008), 1136: 233-242.  
35 O’Toole, Toenniessen, Murashige, Harris, and Herdt.  
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according to critical scholars, have been used to create sites of authority in health and 
agricultural research at both the national and international level that have espoused ideas 
supporting scientific rationalism and global capitalism, which have served to suppress 
competing knowledge claims. 
 
Critical historians of public health,36 were the first to call into question the motivations and 
implications of RF transnational actor status. Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Armando 
Solórzano, for example, have argued that the Foundation’s operational programs provided 
the means to embed, the same misguided “principles of scientific medicine,”37 informing the 
United States’ approach to public health education and practice in the public sectors of 
developing countries. RF’s influence has meant solidifying the role of technology across the 
South as a means of addressing inherently socio-political problems.  
 
Critical scholars have also suggested that while the Foundation provided developing 
countries with needed resources to address pressing health problems, RF’s research priorities 
were often unrepresentative of the health needs of populations where they operated. This 
became particularly problematic following RF’s introduction of the co-funding model, in 
which Southern governments became responsible for sharing the burden of Foundation-led 
initiatives. Requisite co-funding, Birn suggests, repeatedly led to a skewing of priorities in the 
countries where RF had operational public health programs and laid the basis for donor-
driven agendas that predominate today in global health research and practice.38 
 
                                                
36 See, for instance, E. Richard Brown, ‘‘Public Health Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and 
Abroad,’’ American Journal of Public Health 66, no. 9 (1976): 897-903; Marcos Cueto, ‘‘Visions of Science and 
Development: The Rockefeller Foundation's Latin American Surveys of the 1920s,’’ in Missionaries of Science: the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America, ed., Marcos Cueto (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1-22; 
and Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Marriage of Convenience: Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico 
(Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006). 
37 Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Armando Solórzano, ‘‘Health Policy Paradoxes: Science and Politics in the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Hookworm Campaign in Mexico in the 1920s,’’ Social Science and Medicine 49, no. 9 
(1999): 1197-1213.  
38 Birn, Marriage of Convenience; Paola Mejia, ‘‘Of Mice, Vaccines and Men: The Yellow Fever Research Program 
of the Rockefeller Foundation in Columbia, 1932-48,’’ in Philanthropic Foundations and the Globalization of Scientific 
Medicine and Public Health, eds., Benjamin B. Page and David A. Valone (Lanham: University Press of America, 
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Other critical scholars have gone further, suggesting that RF has effectively functioned as a 
proxy for the US government:39 that it created health programs to reduce political instability 
threatening American economic interests,40 while at the same time using the global South as 
a testing ground for disease eradication experiments.41 
 
Echoing critical health-focused appraisals, RF’s agricultural initiatives have elicited from 
critical scholars reactions ranging from inferences of naïve idealism,42 to outright hostility 
over a perceived capacity to produce irreparable social and ecological harm.43 A common 
sentiment expressed by critical scholars is that RF used its agricultural research at the 
beginning of the Cold War to provide substance to American government claims that food 
insecurity in the face of uncontrolled population growth had the potential to elicit 
communist sympathies across the developing world.44 Where critical accounts are united 
however is the pervasive sentiment that historically the Foundation attempted to use science 
to solve particular challenges–notably of hunger and poverty–that were inherently political in 
their origins, while at the same time exhibiting a liberal economic bias viewing production as 
the basis of a progressive social order. From this perspective, RF’s agency has meant the 
silencing of competing knowledge claims and the transplantation of the industrial agriculture 
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to the developing world. This transformation has resulted in millions of subsistence farmers, 
who for millennia were the backbone of agrarian economies across the global South, being 
driven out of agriculture completely.45  
 
There is clear recognition on the part of critical scholars of RF’s capacity to define what has 
been important related to development and to embed particular ideas in the societies in 
which it operated. Certainly there is little doubt that the Foundation has played a key role in 
the creation of sites of authority in international agricultural research. Like their liberal 
counterparts, critical scholars see RF as a vehicle for advancing the ideas of others, namely 
Northern, Western capitalist states. Once again, however, the implications of such are 
typically cast in a negative light.46  
 
In the first two decades of the post-war era, for example, modernization theory was the 
development paradigm traditional societies were expected to follow, premised on the idea 
that the Western liberal economy was the optimal end-point. Arriving at this end-point 
required Northern technical (i.e. scientific) expertise, which RF was more than willing to 
provide. According to Ole Jacob Sending and Iver Neumann, modernization theory 
legitimized the influence of RF across the global South.47 Through applied research 
initiatives, the Foundation was actively engaged in defining what was important for 
international public policy planners to act upon. However, because these priorities were 
shared with Northern governments, most notably the United States, critical scholars have 
questioned the notion that RF’s ideas were reached without the input of states espousing the 
same views.  
 
Critical scholars have long expressed concern over RF’s role as a framer of problems and 
solutions in agricultural development for two key reasons.  
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The first reason is a belief that its commitment to development through science has resulted 
in policy plans premised on incorrect assumptions. The substantial gains in crop yields, for 
example, resulting from RF-inspired Green Revolution in countries such as Mexico and 
India have widely been perceived by critical scholars as having been offset by the 
Foundation’s failure to see that social marginalization, rather than a lack of technology, was 
the primary impediment to food insecurity in these counties.48   
 
The second reason is that critical scholars typically come to very different conclusions 
regarding the implications of the Foundation’s ideas being implemented than those 
highlighted by the proponents of said ideas.  In addition to the displacement of countless 
small farmers, Vandana Shiva for example, has blamed the Green Revolution for 
catastrophic reductions in genetic diversity, increased vulnerability of crops to pests, soil 
erosion, water shortages, decreased soil fertility and increased micro-nutrient deficiencies 
linked to reduction of crop varieties.49 Moreover by boosting cash crop production at the 
expense of other key food crops, economic vulnerability actually increases when prices fall 
or crops fail. Finally, the embrace of RF engineered high-yielding varieties created 
dependence on foreign inputs where none previously existed, while at the same time 
marginalizing organic methods of production.50  
 
For critical scholars such as Shiva, RF’s discursive role in agricultural development has done 
far more to provide legitimacy for the expansion of Northern seeds companies in developing 
countries than it has to improving physical and economic well being of Southern small 
holders. Through the critical lens, RF’s ideas have been synonymous with scientific 
rationalism and global capitalism, which have perversely served to perpetuate North-South 
inequities. Since the Foundations have by and large been considered by the majority of 
critical scholars as being part of the transnational ruling class and, by a smaller although 
vocal minority, as proxies of American power, there is little suggestion of them enjoying any 
true autonomy in global governance. 
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2.4 The Small  But  Growing Body o f BMGF-focused Li t erature  
 
Compared to RF, far less scholarly attention has been paid to BMGF’s influence over the 
governance of global health and agricultural development. Moreover, the body of literature 
that does exist is focused almost entirely on the Foundation’s global health program and is 
predominantly critical in orientation. The overall scarcity of scholarly literature can be 
attributed to the fact that as an organization formed a mere fifteen years ago, BMGF is a 
nascent entity compared to the now centenarian RF. The emphasis on health is explained by 
the fact that its global development program, within which its agricultural initiatives are 
situated, was only established in 2006, while its global health program has existed since the 
Foundation was formed in 1999. Finally, that critical analyses account for the majority of 
studies undertaken to date is most likely due to a combination of BMGF’s heavy emphasis 
on science-enabled innovation, and its promotion of market-based solutions to overcoming 
health and development challenges. Moreover there is heightened awareness that the 
Foundation is having a considerable impact on the formulation of international public policy 
by acting as the primary backer of a litany of new global health focused PPPs. For while RF 
has played a central role in the formation and ‘‘normalization’’ of private sector participation 
in resolving historically public sector challenges,51 through unprecedented levels of 
philanthropic spending, BMGF is widely seen as the lead proponent and enabler of 
development partnerships today.52  
 
2.41 Liberal perspectives of BMGF’s contributions to global health and agricultural development 
 
Only a handful of scholarly works in existence today can be considered liberal in their 
analyses of BMGF’s influence in global governance. These works have tended to portray the 
Foundation as an effective vehicle for bringing together historically reluctant parties for the 
benefit of the world’s marginalized people.  According to Michael Moran, the Foundation’s 
positioning at the intersection of public, private and third sectors make it an effective 
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‘‘interlocutor,’’ well placed to function as a broker of partnerships and sufficiently equipped 
to provide the necessary seed capital to ensure they get off the ground.53  
 
As will be shown in chapter 6, the advent of the Foundation-led Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) saw the establishment of a global coalition of state and 
non-state actors for the first time committed to working effectively in pursuit of the shared 
goal of facilitating access to vaccines within the world’s poorest countries. The role of 
BMGF in this coalition (since re-named the GAVI Alliance) has been that of a diplomat, 
principal leverager of funds and commitments for the issue of vaccination, and a 
disciplinarian, for example, in its demands that GAVI funding be performance-based.54  In 
this light, BMGF has in the first decade of the new millennium ushered in the golden age in 
global health, with GAVI having served as the inspiration for a series of new bilateral 
initiatives (e.g. the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)) rolled out by  
Northern states who had become complacent to the health needs of the world’s poor.55 
 
To date, the Foundation’s approach to agricultural development has largely mirrored its 
approach to reducing health inequities. By taking on the role of the primary funder for the 
RF-inspired Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), for example, the liberal lens 
sees BMGF as an enabler of innovative approaches to strengthening both public and private 
sector agricultural capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa.56 Moreover, liberals credit the Foundation 
for illustrating how technology can play an important role in addressing the many 
agricultural challenges faced by both poor small-scale farmers and states in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Its ability to bring firms such as Monsanto and Pioneer, which hold valuable 
intellectual property, into partnerships with states and communities is seen as crucial for 
progress in strengthening agriculture across Sub-Saharan African to be made.57 
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2.42 - Critical perspectives of BMGF’s contributions to global health and agricultural development 
 
Critical scholars argue that BMGF exhibits the same bias held by RF for bringing 
technological solutions to bear on problems with deep socio-political determinants. This is 
most evident in their global health efforts, where the Foundation is deemed to be priming 
the technology pipeline in the face of limited public sector capacity across the global South 
to ensure product uptake and delivery, which critical scholars see as crowding out other 
viable and less resource intensive options.58  
 
Critical scholars also suggest that with the rise of BMGF, PPPs have become less about 
correcting for market failures and more about connecting people to markets, and BMGF is 
seen as embodying a market-based approach to philanthropy. Often dubbed ‘‘the new 
philanthropy’’ or ‘‘philanthrocapitalism,’’ this approach is premised on the assumption that 
applying the traditional business model to social problems will bring about positive social 
change. Critical scholars, however, see the Foundation’s embrace of this logic as indirectly 
shutting out other viable organizational models,59 while at the same time being rife with 
contradictions. For example, by maintaining an investment portfolio oriented towards 
maximising returns, the Foundation’s tax-sheltered dollars profiting from the likes of Shell’s 
socially and ecologically damaging extraction operations in the Nigerian delta are 
paradoxically seen as furthering the exploitation of those they aspire to help.60  
 
For critical scholars of food security–typically allied with the food sovereignty and anti 
globalization movements–the BMGF’s foray into agriculture means the same mistakes 
incurred  in Latin America and Asia during the original Green revolution will inevitably be 
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repeated in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because the determinants of hunger 
and poverty are from the critical perspective largely structural in nature, meaning they stem 
from the inequities of the existing rules and operational frameworks of the international 
system. Sustainable solutions are not technological; however, the partnership approach 
embodied by AGRA seeks to distract from this fact. Viewed through the critical lens, BMGF 
will be a catalyst, not of food security or poverty reduction but of heightened economic 
inequality, environmental degradation and the overall loss of Africa’s biodiversity.61  
 
While more nuanced than their analytical peers focused on global agricultural development, 
critical scholars of global health nonetheless see the growing influence of BMGF in global 
health policy as unsettling if not highly problematic.  
 
In a world characterised by a traditional scarcity of public sector research funds, the 
Foundation’s sudden infusion of capital into a few select areas determined largely by the 
interests of the Gates family has been construed by some as having a skewing effect on 
global research trajectories, prioritising particular diseases or technologies that do not reflect 
the actual global burden of disease or the needs of the poor.62 Through the Grand 
Challenges for Global Health (GCGH) initiative, for example, a granting program run out of 
the United States National Institutes of Health but funded primarily by BMGF, the 
Foundation is deemed to be shaping what is researched with minimal accountability, 
catalyzing interest in a select group of problems amongst those who address complex multi-
faceted challenges in very particular ways.63 Concerns have been expressed that a growing 
dependence on Foundation funding on the part of researchers working on the health 
problems of the global South is limiting external criticism of BMGF ideas and diminishing 
the Foundation’s own ability to engage in critical self-reflection.64 
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Critical health scholars such David McCoy and Lindsey McGoey, also call into question the 
logic of the Foundation’s expressed preference for subsidizing the development of novel, 
high-tech and high-risk solutions, as opposed to scaling up existing low-tech approaches 
proven to work, or offering direct support for strengthening the anemic public health sectors 
of the world’s poorest countries.65 Furthermore, by funding media investigations into 
particular topics of interest to the Foundation, concerns have been raised by journalists that 
BMGF’s material resources are being inappropriately used to broaden public support for the 
Foundation’s foci.66  
 
Finally, major concerns also center on BMGF’s material resources being used to advance 
single issue-focused, informal approaches to collective action, which are seen to be 
undermining the authority of WHO.67 It is now well established that BMGF endowment 
provides the Foundation with greater purchasing power than that made available by the 
world’s states to WHO.68 In light of this reality, BMGF’s expressed volition to shape 
international policy has been perceived by some, as an egregious attempt by a single 
unelected private actor,69 to usurp authority from those mandated by the world’s states to 
coordinate international efforts to strengthen agriculture and control disease: the specialised 
agencies of the UN.70 At a minimum, such critics argue, BMGF activities heighten the 
challenges of coordinating the diverse array of actors seeking to influence outcomes in the 
international policy arena, contributing to further fragmentation in the overcrowded 
international health architecture, which has experienced a dramatic proliferation of vertical 
initiatives, new actors and resources over the decade since BMGF became an active player in 
global health. At worst the Foundation is undermining the legitimacy of traditional IOs, 
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already neglected by their official members, all the while operating with comparatively 
limited transparency and accountability for the influence it exerts.71 
 
2 .5 Conc lus ion  
 
Historically, scholars examining RF’s influence in world politics have portrayed the 
Foundation as an enabler of innovation in science used to strengthen public health,72 and 
agriculture,73 and committed to building public sector capacity in these two domains,74 
across the global South. Liberals have characterized the Foundation as a global force which 
has used its resources to promote inclusivity and institutionalist principles within the society 
of states, playing a key role the realization of international organizations in, the interwar,75 
and post-war periods,76 and later alternative governance frameworks such as CGIAR that 
intended to improve and supplement the interstate system’s existing capacity to meet the 
needs of low-income countries.77 
 
In the neo-liberal era, RF’s ability to engage both civil society and industry has made the 
Foundation in the eyes of liberal scholars well placed to bring historically reluctant parties 
together,78 and these meetings have led to the forging of global networks,79 comprised of 
diverse actors whose unique strengths have been employed for the benefit of the world’s 
poorest people. 
 
The limited number of scholars which have analyzed BMGF through a liberal lens have 
posited, that like RF, BMGF occupies a unique space at the intersection of public, private 
and third sectors which has been capitalized upon to bring prospective partners together,80 
and catalyze the formation of formal partnerships, such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
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and Immunization,81 which has served as the template for a series of informal global alliances 
composed of public and private actors working for the world’s poorest people.82 
 
Liberals assert that BMGF’s entry into agricultural development has ensured the 
continuation of RF’s innovative approaches to strengthening both public and private sector 
agricultural capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa.83 Moreover, liberals suggest that its willingness to 
work directly with industry has meant that the trend of privately-held intellectual property 
being availed to aid those with limited purchasing power continues.84 
 
In sharp contrast, critical scholarly analysis of RF and BMGF has been united by a view that 
the Foundations serve as vehicles for advancing technocratic, positivist and liberal-economic 
world-views within institutions of public policy.  Historical analyses undertaken by those 
using a neo-Gramscian lens have portrayed RF as an extension of a transnational capitalist 
elite,85 whose primary function has been to provide acceptance and stability for the world’s 
historic bloc.86  In the last decade, however, a small number of researchers focusing on 
global health partnerships have begun to recognise RF and BMGF as discrete actors in 
world politics.87 Nevertheless, much of this contemporary scholarship, which is almost 
exclusively focused on BMGF, continues to employ a critical perspective in the analysis. 
While not explicitly neo-Gramscian, this emerging body of literature nonetheless shares 
many of its defining features (i.e. placing emphasis on the apparent contradictions of the 
Foundation’s origins and goals): its affiliations with Northern states and MNCs and a 
perceived unwillingness to challenge the structural determinants of the problems they seek to 
address.88  
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Indeed, the limited number of explicitly global governance scholars who have looked at the 
influence of RF and BMGF in the new millennium have done so through a critical lens, 
voicing many of the same concerns critical scholars have been expressing over the past three 
decades. These include, for example, that through PPPs, RF and BMGF are creating parallel 
elitist structures of decision-making, which challenge multilateral organizations authority, and 
that the Foundations’ efforts to legitimize the role of corporations in global governance via 
PPPs provide business interests with new avenues of influence in arenas of public policy. In 
this light, RF and BMGF continue to represent a power elite committed to embedding ideas 
into institutions of global governance that advance the interests of said elite, setting agendas 
that traditional multilateral organizations have no choice but to follow.89  
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Chapter 3: Re-organizing existing theory to explain the agency of RF and BMGF  
 
3.0 Introduc t ion  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how existing theories of private governance 
and knowledge power can be tied together in a novel way to explain the agency of the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) in global 
governance. The chapter first shows how RF and BMGF have direct relevance to the 
evolving concept of private governance due to their role in facilitating a number of 
arrangements focused on the provision of public goods, which have been crafted to include 
the participation of private actors, including but not limited to for-profit entities. I then 
show that their ideational influence has direct relevance to the social constructivism and the 
concept of knowledge power, drawing specifically on the theories of structuralism, 
functionalism, neo-functionalism, and the concept of the epistemic community.  
 
While the contributions of this study are not first and foremost theoretical in nature, the 
blending of existing theories of power nonetheless constitute a form of “disruptive 
innovation,”1 in that pre-existing materials are being used to provide a novel explanation for 
a still highly contested issue.2 The two foundations, I argue, have gained influence in the 
governance of global public health and agricultural development, through the subsidization 
of science-enabled innovation, the construction of epistemic networks, and the development 
of roadmaps for collective action built to accommodate state preferences and the 
distribution of power in prevailing world orders. By shaping how global problems are 
understood and addressed, they have attained influence that is discursive, instrumental, and 
structural.  
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3.1 The ris e  o f privat e  power in global governance   
 
As a perspective on the distribution of power in world politics, global governance has 
effectively illuminated the increasing authority conferred by states to private actors in pursuit 
of resolving complex problems.3 This rise in private power is closely linked to the 
unprecedented level of interdependence associated with the global expansion of the liberal 
economic paradigm.4  The ensuing ‘‘uncoupling’’ of territorialism has diminished individual 
state capacity to limit domestic exposure to external problems.5 To compensate for the 
shortcomings of the Westphalian model in the globalization era, states have relinquished 
long-held responsibilities to private actors, who now play key roles in establishing and 
enforcing regulatory frameworks governing whole industries, and in facilitating the provision 
of public goods.6 While still contentious, the argument that some degree of private 
participation in global governance is necessary, for collective action problems to be 
successfully resolved,7 has been widely embraced by states and international organizations 
alike. 
 
In this section, I look at how existing literature examining the means through which private 
actors have become formally involved in the construction and management of institutions of 
global governance can explain the influence of RF and BMGF in world politics. 
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Non-state actors increasingly shape the discourse and agendas of collective action, giving 
credence to James N. Rosenau’s idea of a ‘‘post-international world.’’8  Evidence of this can 
be seen in the growing body of literature examining the emergence and institutionalization of 
forms of private governance.9 Private governance arrangements typically refer to either 
sector-specific private regulatory regimes managed by firms and business associations, or 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), within which private and often for-profit entities play a 
role in the development, production or delivery of public goods—roles traditionally 
associated with public authorities, namely states and multilateral institutions.10 
 
The proliferation of these arrangements begs the question as to whether they are 
undermining the authority of states, thereby giving rise to the neo-medieval world 
envisioned by Hedley Bull.11 Certainly in the neo-liberal era, states have been purposefully 
conferring authority to firms, not because they have to, but because of an ideological 
conviction that private sector specialists are generally more efficient than public sectors at 
addressing complex problems.12 While ideological convictions have informed RF and 
BMGF’s work in health and development, both have shown a clear commitment to 
strengthening public sector authority by bringing private resources (capital, technology, 
knowledge, etc.) to bear on complex problems where such help has been, urgently needed.  
 
Much of the private governance literature has focused on regulatory authority conferred to 
firms by states.13 Private regulatory regimes occur when states allow firms to govern the 
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domains within which they themselves operate, alleviating states of the burden of developing 
and implementing standards and the day-to-day tasks of assuring private sector compliance.14 
These governance arrangements are not entirely private, in that states and to a lesser degree 
International Organizations (IOs) confer on them both legitimacy and legal status, as is the 
case with both the Forest Stewardship Council and the International Organization for 
Standardization certification.15 Nevertheless the innovative capacity of firms is a form of 
power, for it allows business to establish the parameters of what is technologically feasible 
for addressing problems they themselves have played a role in creating, as evidenced by the 
debates leading up to the Montreal Protocol on the international use of Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs).16   
 
Certainly the autonomy of firms as global governors has been questioned; should they prove 
ineffective in their assumed governance roles and/or jeopardize national interests, states 
have the capacity to constrain their actions and recall any authority ceded to them.17 
Nonetheless concerns abound within this literature that the creation of private regimes 
draws power in a unidirectional flow away from states to firms, prioritizing the interests of 
unaccountable corporate capital over the public good, while at the same time eroding the 
public-private distinction and with it public sector legitimacy.18  
 
The literature on private governance is thus overwhelmingly focused on the power of for-
profit entities, which RF and BMGF clearly are not. Relevant to this study is the fact that RF 
and BMGF, like firms, have been recognized by states for their technical expertise and 
support of science-enabled innovation oriented towards providing solutions to complex 
global problems.  In her work on non-traditional sites of authority, Susan Strange 
                                                                                                                                            
Thomas J. Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 23-40; and Phillip Pattberg, “What Role 
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(2005): 175-189.  
14 Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider, “Global Governance Through Private Organizations,’’ Governance 12, 
no. 3 (1999): 243-66; and Falkner, ‘‘Private Environmental.’’ 
15Falkner, ‘‘Private Environmental.’’ 
16 Falkner, ‘‘The Business of Ozone Layer Protection: Corporate Power in Regime Evolution,’’ in The Business of 
Global Environmental Governance, eds., David L. Levy and Peter J. Newell (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 
105-134.  
17 Louis W. Pauly, ‘‘Global Finance, Political Authority, and the Problem of Legitimation,’’ in The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance, eds., Rodey Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 76-90. 
18 Cutler, 34. 
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emphasized the importance of elites in defining the dominant discourse. In contrast to 
formal regimes and international organizations established by states, Strange noted the 
importance of ‘‘indirect authority,’’ such as economic or scientific entities, which create the 
domain-specific frameworks within which other actors, including states, are forced to work.19  
 
As will be demonstrated, both RF and BMGF embody the indirect authority outlined by 
Strange, which has been achieved through the same discursive, instrumental and structural 
power Doris Fuchs has argued firms employ to shape public policy.20  While discursive 
power refers to an ability to successfully define or ‘‘frame’’ problems and advance norms and 
ideas that in turn shape solutions, instrumental power describes the lobbying strength of 
actors dependent on others to see their goals realized. Neither RF nor BMGF possess the 
ability to create institutions and impose the rules and operational frameworks of the 
governing system, as only states have the authority to institutionalize ideas. This does not 
however preclude states inviting the Foundations or the epistemic communities they 
support, from creating rules or operational frameworks that once institutionalized others 
must follow, nor does it suggest that global research trajectories cannot be set via capital, for 
RF and BMGF have attained influence this way. Power acquired through knowledge 
construction is thus indirect and akin to the authority that firms have derived from self-
regulatory regimes sanctioned by states. Accordingly, this study builds directly on the work 
of Strange, Fuchs and others,21 illuminating the indirect authority of a not-for-profit, 
philanthropic but still very private type of actor. 
 
3.2 Privat e  power through the  provi s ion  o f  publ ic goods   
 
While less developed than the literature examining regulatory authority conferred to firms by 
states, a second body of literature on private governance exists that has focused on the 
private influence in global governance stemming from participation in PPPs: arrangements 
                                                
19 Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988); Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne, Paths to a 
Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).  
20 Fuchs; Doris Fuchs and Marcus Lederer, ‘‘The Power of Business,’’ Business and Politics 9, no. 3 (2007). 
21 Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs, “Agrifood Corporations, Global Governance and Sustainability: A 
Framework for Analysis,” Corporate Power in Global Agrifood Governance, eds., Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 3.  
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within which private actors voluntarily take on some level of responsibility for facilitating 
access to public goods. Typically this means ensuring that the necessary research and 
development, product financing and delivery, or issue-advocacy occurs. Allowing for-profit 
entities to assume these roles remains a contentious issue because traditionally they have 
been held by organizations lacking a profit motive, be they states, multilateral institutions 
and more recently Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).22 
 
There are proponents of PPPs,23 who assert that partnerships should by no means be viewed 
as mechanisms through which the private sector is replacing the public sector. Instead they 
function as a means of filling gaps created by a lack of will and/or material or technological 
capacity exhibited by public authorities.24 Northern states have therefore encouraged the 
growth of PPPs in global health and agricultural development for the same reasons they 
have sanctioned the growth of private regulatory schemes in their own backyards: to bring 
private expertise and resources to hear on the myriad of complex problems which public 
authorities–Northern aid donors, Southern aid recipients or traditional IOs changed with 
policy coordination–have failed to address themselves.25 
 
To date, much of the scholarly interest around partnerships has been critical in orientation. 
Critics have argued PPPs undermine the legitimacy of public institutions by providing firms 
with a means of profiting from the production and sale of what have historically been public 
goods and threaten the inter-state multilateralism upon which UN has been centered.26   
Arguments have been made that the rise of PPPs has led to a reduction in transparency of 
process, evidenced by the fact that while particular partnerships such as the Global Fund to 
                                                
22 Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global.’’ 
23 See, for example, Sandrine Tesner, United Nations and Business: A Partnership Revisited (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
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Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (hereafter the Global Fund) rely on public authorities such as 
the World Health Organization (WHO) for funding and administrative support, as legally 
independent not-for-profits, they are not required to have the same high levels of 
transparency or oversight as their public sector benefactors.27 Other PPPs created to raise 
and disperse large funds for specific purposes such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI) have been criticized for distorting the policy objectives of their public 
authority hosts (e.g. UNICEF), while fragmenting agencies at the operational level.28 The 
most cynical assessments suggest that PPPs constitute a misguided institutional experiment, 
which firms have strategically embraced to stifle civil society driven criticisms over their role 
in perpetuating global inequalities.29 
 
This dissertation shows that RF and BMGF have been instrumental in the evolution and 
institutionalization of the PPP as a form of global governance in public health and 
agriculture. This story is important, for the partnership paradigm is increasingly the standard 
approach being employed to address a wide variety of challenges across the development 
spectrum. The evidence presented in the thesis will show that RF has been a pioneer in 
attempting to fill gaps created by states and markets, a role BMGF has, from its inception, 
sought to emulate. The two foundations have worked to advance partnerships in the spheres 
of health and agriculture to compensate for the reduction in public sector capacity driven by 
neo-liberal ideology and the failure of the free-market to provide needed public goods.30 I 
argue that the partnership model developed by RF and expanded by BMGF is therefore an 
attempt to correct for the shortcomings of neo-liberalism, not, as critics suggest, a strategy to 
undermine the authority of public authorities in pursuit of advancing the power of market 
actors. 
 
                                                
27 Shepard Forman and Derk Segaar, ‘‘New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of 
Multilateralism,’’ Global Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 205-225. 
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Strong public-sector organizations have been pivotal for the Foundations to achieve their 
goals. As will be demonstrated, RF’s legacy has been in developing innovative approaches to 
strengthening public sector capacity to ensure the availability of public goods, wholly 
consistent with private governance as envisioned by the likes of Ruggie.31 The PPP paradigm 
is merely RF’s most recent adaptation to shifts in the character of the world order in pursuit 
of this longstanding goal. BMGF has wholeheartedly embraced the paradigm and expanded 
its application via its comparatively larger material resources. The rise of PPPs in global 
health and agricultural development serve as evidence that these two foundations are capable 
of shaping not only the ideas and norms informing collective action related to addressing 
public health and hunger, but also the rules and institutions governing the coordination of 
such action.  
 
Because the PPP paradigm rose to prominence as an approach to addressing health 
disparities, much of the early scholarship on the trend towards partnerships has been carried 
out by scholars of global health politics.32 Yet as noted by Moran,33 with a few exceptions,34 
the central roles played by RF and BMGF in the construction and institutionalization of 
global health partnerships has been largely overlooked by this community. This observation 
applies equally to the broader literature assessing how NGOs, business actors and hybrid 
models of global governance are affecting the international public policy process.35 
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3.3 Knowledge  Construc tion and Power  
 
If RF and BMGF are indeed uniquely positioned to shape global governance, then why have 
these two actors largely operated under the radar of scholars examining the rise of private 
governance arrangements? Certainly the UN classification of private philanthropic 
foundations, as non-governmental organizations,36 is not the cause of their being viewed 
largely as peripheral actors, for Multinational Corporations (MNCs)–which have attracted 
tremendous scholarly attention–are also categorized as such. Instead, I am suggesting that 
the reason RF and BMGF have not attracted more scrutiny from International Relations 
(IR) scholars has to do with the intangibility and invisibility of power attained through the 
construction of knowledge,37 which I argue has been and continues to be the basis of their 
influence in global governance.  
  
The premise that knowledge and power cannot be easily separated is by no means novel.38 In 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn convincingly demonstrated that scientific 
knowledge in particular is never neutral and can in fact serve as the basis for entry into elite 
circles.39 Certainly the World Bank’s ability to define ‘‘development,’’ and how it is 
measured,40 serves to illustrate that technical expertise can be a gateway to knowledge 
construction and influence over global public policy. Accordingly, this section examines how 
IR theory has addressed the topic of knowledge as the basis of power.  
 
3.31 Constructivism  
 
As an approach to the study of power in the world order, social constructivism posits that it 
is ideational factors, not material ones, which are most important in shaping how we 
collectively approach big problems. From this perspective, power that hinges on the ability 
                                                
36 The UN’s exceedingly broad definition of an NGO also include such diverse entities as Transnational 
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to embed ideas and beliefs is certainly less tangible than economic or military might, but it is 
in fact more important for dominant ideas to inform to what end material forces are 
employed in problem solving.41 Moreover, ontological, causal, and principled beliefs are all 
important in terms of defining for states the realm of the possible, how to achieve their 
goals, and what is right and what is wrong from a normative standpoint. Ideas and beliefs 
thus serve as ‘‘roadmaps’’ that set agendas and illuminate certain possible courses of action 
while excluding others. Furthermore, once embedded within institutions, ideas and beliefs 
become difficult to remove and may continue to influence policy formulation, long after 
their normative and causal foundations have shown to be flawed.42  In this vein, 
constructivists suggest that emphasis should be placed on looking at which ideas emerge as 
relevant and which do not, how such ideas emerge, how they become institutionalized, and 
how their institutionalization matters.43 
 
This study is constructivist in its questions related to how the formulation and dissemination 
of ideas can be a source of power, as well as in its findings that RF and BMGF’s ability to 
influence collective action resolves around the framing of debates and persuading states to 
embrace particular norms and ideas.44  
 
3.32 Structuralism  
 
While constructivists have placed emphasis on the potential power of ideas, structuralists 
have emphasized power over ideas. According to Robert L. Paarlberg, for example, the basis 
of the United States’ longstanding economic and military hegemony stems directly from its 
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fiercely guarded technological dominance in the second half of the twentieth-century. 45 Its 
ability to control access to knowledge giving rise to technological innovation is at the core of 
its longstanding dominance in world affairs. 
 
However, knowledge structures are not only about controlling access to information.  
Whereas knowledge refers to the sum total of what is known about a particular issue, in 
organizational contexts, the knowledge structure refers to how such knowledge is attained. 
Three basic schemes for ordering knowledge inform the knowledge structure of any 
particular field: (i) declarative knowledge (i.e. how and why things work the way the do; (ii) 
procedural knowledge (i.e. the required steps to address a particular challenge; and (iii) 
structural knowledge (i.e. the organizational frameworks guiding these efforts).46 
 
For Strange, the production and dissemination of knowledge was one possible pathway to 
attaining structural power in the world order,47 and this research provides evidence to 
support that argument. As Timothy Sinclair has effectively demonstrated with American 
bond-rating agencies, the capacity to determine what information is important for solving 
complex problems and what is not, or put another way, what should be kept the same and 
what should change, can provide non-state actors with tremendous authority that is not 
immediately obvious but is real nonetheless.48  
 
3.33 Functionalism and Neo-functionalism 
 
The idea that specialized knowledge alone may serve as the basis of power in international 
relations is rooted in the theory of functionalism. Emerging from the aftermath of WWII, 
functionalists correctly predicted that challenges of interdependence would increasingly be 
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addressed through cooperation between apolitical technocrats working out of IOs raising the 
influence of those organizations in world affairs.49 
 
Neo-functionalism, for example,50 broadened this thinking by correctly observing that 
technocratic influence over collective action would not be limited to those working out of 
the IOs, which functionalists anticipated as being the future centers of global governance. 
Acknowledging this extension beyond the realm of the public sphere was significant because 
it foreshadowed the relevance of non-state actors to the formation of global networks 
seeking to shape public policy. 
 
Yet ‘‘experts’’ are by no means a homogeneous group. Functionalists, for example,51 
premised their assumptions on expert consensus, which Karen Litfin has since shown, rarely 
exists on complex issues because of the discursive nature of knowledge.52 Instead, attaining 
knowledge power is contingent on demonstrating the utility of particular ways of 
understanding problems. As will be demonstrated, from its inception in the second decade 
of the twentieth-century, RF worked incessantly to build and expand networks of particular 
disciplinary scientific experts (e.g. physicians, molecular biologists, agricultural economists, 
etc.) within and across borders, which proved to be pivotal for ensuring ideas that the 
Foundation espoused came to shape policy in domestic contexts where they operated and in 
international institutions they helped create. Such epistemic expansion continues through the 
grant making of BMGF today, although the Foundation places far less emphasis on it than 
its institutional forebear, which I argue reduces its potential influence in policy arenas. 
 
3.34 Epistemic communities 
 
The epistemic community concept, closely associated with Peter Haas, builds on 
functionalism and neo-functionalism as a theory on the power implications of specialized 
knowledge. Epistemic communities are united by common sets of ideas and principled 
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beliefs, including causal beliefs to a central set of problems under scrutiny, notions of 
validity, and a commitment to common prescriptive policy enterprises.53  
 
The epistemic community concept is important to this project for two reasons. The first 
reason is that it articulates that disciplinary training plays an important role in setting 
parameters for discussions on determinants of problems, the range of solutions considered 
and ideas of who is best equipped to address challenges based on the validity of their 
knowledge. The second reason is that it highlights that shared knowledge acquired through 
experience plays a key role in shaping the normative beliefs people employ to understand the 
world around them.54 Epistemic communities are thus composed of those who share 
common worldviews, frameworks of ideas and beliefs through which individuals interpret 
and interact with the world.55 
 
As noted by Emanuel Adler and Steven Bernstein, to date, much of the work on epistemic 
communities has looked at attempts to institutionalize science-based epistemes,56 and this 
study does not deviate from this path. Despite the heterogeneity of ideas emanating from RF 
in its one hundred year old history, science-enabled innovation and the construction and 
expansion of scientific epistemic communities have been central to its influence in global 
health and agricultural development. And while BMGF has thus far not followed suit in 
epistemic community-building per say, it has placed an even stronger emphasis on science-
enabled innovation and on underwriting the development of new technologies intended to 
benefit the world’s poor and historically marginalized. 
 
This shared commitment to science as a way of understanding and responding to health and 
agricultural challenges has been a source of enduring criticism for RF and BMGF.  Many of 
their critics are united by their belief that for both foundations, science is not simply an 
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approach to understanding problems but instead the basis of a positivist worldview 
(scientism) built on the assumption that the only legitimate knowledge, or at least the most 
authoritative, is that acquired through observation and experimentation.  At the core of these 
concerns is the argument that science is a social institution that ignores socio-political 
determinants of problems.57 From this vantage point, any efforts to empower scientists and 
institutions of science will only work against progressive change by de-emphasizing the need 
to address the structural determinants of global inequality underlying the public health 
threats and agricultural challenges such technocrats are charged with resolving. 
 
Concern over the Foundations’ empowerment of epistemic communities centers on the 
argument that rational choices are subjective choices,58 for what is ‘‘rational’’ to some (e.g. 
framing food insecurity as a product of lack of access to technology or market access) is 
most irrational to others. Haas, like David Mitrany before him, premised his assumptions on 
expert consensus, which as previously noted can by no means be assumed since knowledge 
is shaped by a variety of experiences.59 Epistemic lenses can serve to limit the range of ways 
of understanding and responding to problems.  While the worldviews of RF leadership have 
been far from static, they have nonetheless played an important role in determining which 
epistemic communities the Foundation has empowered and the type of governance 
mechanisms they have created and sustained. This observation appears to have even greater 
relevance to the leadership of BMGF today.  
 
Critical constructivists, for example,60 assert that only a select few have the ability to define 
what is and what is not important, thus engaging in social construction,61 and this project 
reinforces this assertion. Certainly as selective grant-makers, RF and BMGF bring new 
meaning to Litfin’s concept of “knowledge brokers”; those government intermediaries 
positioned between sources of knowledge and institutionalizing agents who have the 
resources to advance knowledge that is framed in ways that support a particular worldview 
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or agenda.62 Due to the Foundations’ comparatively small size and the latitude often 
afforded to program officers and directors within the Foundations, RF and BMGF have 
provided individuals with structural power that is difficult to imagine in large public sector 
bureaucracies. 
 
Moreover, as networks working towards the institutionalization of specific norms or policies, 
prominent members of epistemic communities are often needed to coordinate, fund and 
spearhead global campaigns. These so-called norm or policy entrepreneurs provide both 
visibility and credibility to particular ideas up for consideration, a great benefit to their 
associated networks given the very competitive global ideational realm.63 Not only have RF 
and BMGF proven themselves as creators and sustainers of epistemic networks and 
organizations on numerous issues, high-profile employees have also played the role of norm 
entrepreneur. Bill Gates Jr. exemplifies such celebrity diplomacy, for example,64 in his 
willingness to draw on his fame to garner political support for his Foundation’s initiatives. 
 
Haas has faced criticism for limiting his conceptualization of epistemic communities to 
technocratic groups focused on shaping interstate cooperation.65 Haas’ critics are correct in 
that transnational civil society driven epistemic communities can derive power outside of the 
state/inter-state context: for example, by working at the societal level to embed new norms 
through appeals to individual emotions, thereby changing societal culture.66 This study 
differentiates itself from Haas’ work through its illumination of the relationship between the 
empowerment of epistemic communities in global governance and private, non-state forms 
of transnational authority. Having said that, the larger contribution of Haas’ work on the 
Mediterranean Action Plan was to demonstrate that epistemic communities are unable to 
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institutionalize their normative enterprises autonomously.67 To translate the ideas and norms 
they espouse into any kind of structural influence, states must grant them permission to 
retool the institutional machinery, which RF in particular has been able to take advantage of 
at various points in its history. Institutionalizing ideas and normative enterprises at the global 
level therefore requires convincing those controlling the levers of power to buy into the 
utility of the proposed ideas.68 
 
3.35 Agency Through Adaptation to Power Asymmetries 
 
If governance frameworks are to fulfill their intended purpose, they must be sufficiently 
acceptable to those with the capacity to undermine their effectiveness. RF and BMGF have 
clearly understood that knowledge structures for overcoming global health and agricultural 
challenges need to take into consideration the distribution of power in the world order. 
While states, IOs, MNCs, CSOs and communities are all ‘‘stakeholders,’’ asymmetries in 
political power mean that some stakeholders are of greater importance for the long-term 
success of the Foundations’ plans than others. For the Foundations’ strategies to be 
institutionalized, they must thus accommodate—or at least not be seen as challenging or 
undermining—the preferences of the most powerful actors operating within the contexts 
where attempts at change are being undertaken. In the context of the neo-liberal world 
order, the most powerful political and economic actors have been Northern states and 
MNCs. 
 
According to David Mosse, an organization can maintain its definition of a problem, 
provided that groups of actors with vested interests in seeing the dominant narrative 
maintained exist to justify its definition of the problem.69 RF and BMGF have required such 
“interpretive communities” to advance their ideas—whether those of Northern and 
Southern states, firms, or IOs—and their strategies have reflected this need. This has meant 
for example not openly questioning the development priorities of many low-income 
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countries where they have operated, despite there being good reason do so. This has also 
meant not openly contesting the rules of a liberal economic order,70 despite evidence that 
those rules (e.g. governing access to intellectual property) have exacerbated the vast 
disparities in the global distribution of resources and wealth. While the promotion of 
strategies deemed beneficial to marginalized populations is integral to their character as 
political actors, with a few exceptions, activism is not. For RF and BMGF to influence 
outcomes, they need more powerful actors within their network to buy into their framing of 
problems, adopt their solutions, and in some instances, confer rule-making authority—in 
effect, granting them the privilege of private governorship. 
 
The changes in RF’s knowledge structures for global health and agricultural development 
over time, I argue, are reflective of the organization’s ability and willingness to adapt to shifts 
in externally imposed parameters. While a commitment to science-enabled innovation has 
remained constant, for example, with the rise of neo-liberalism, RF’s emphasis on epistemic 
expansion waned to adapt to cuts in public sector expenditures resulting from the imposition 
of structural adjustment policies. While operational programs and country level initiatives 
were reduced, the Foundation began to actively solicit corporate involvement in collective 
action and develop governance models around such participation.  
 
This does not mean however that RF has simply worked to support the status quo. In fact, 
this dissertation makes the opposite argument. Certainly partnerships have given firms 
agenda-setting power in global governance. Yet they have also been vehicles for embedding 
new norms within corporate culture regarding the roles and responsibilities of firms in 
society, and catalysts for bringing new resources to bear on challenges in need of resources. 
Yet as will be demonstrated, the PPP paradigm is just the latest example of RF’s capacity to 
adapt to changes in the world order, for their policy influence pre-dates the era of embedded 
liberalism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
70 Ruggie, Constructing the World. 
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3.4 Conc lus ion 
 
The purpose of this conclusion is to tie together the approaches introduced throughout the 
chapter to create a novel framework that explains the unique power of the Rockefeller and 
Gates Foundations in the governance of global health and agricultural development. 
 
To begin, constructivists and structuralists alike have emphasized that the capacity to 
construct and disseminate knowledge is an important although often overlooked pathway to 
power in world politics. As will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters, RF and BMGF 
embody the non-state technocratic influence shaping debates over collective action 
anticipated by neo-functionalists and the indirect authority described by Strange. 
 
This dissertation will show that throughout the twentieth-century, the RF has been a discrete 
source and vehicle for advancing new ideas and norms within the world order and has 
repeatedly generated the requisite political will to address, however imperfectly, global 
disparities. It has accomplished this by fostering epistemic communities within and across 
states, building support for their unifying ideas through demonstrations of their 
effectiveness. Indeed, constructing epistemic communities has been critical to the norms and 
ideas guiding RF’s work in attaining credibility in both domestic and international policy 
making arenas.  
 
Science-enabled innovation and epistemic expansion have provided the Foundations and 
their associated epistemic communities with discursive and instrumental power within policy-
making settings, and with structural power in their able to orient global research trajectories. 
This power is also displayed by the fact that states have repeatedly embrace RF’s ideational 
blueprints for novel global strategies oriented towards addressing complex problems.  
 
The knowledge structures which RF, and more recently BMGF have developed—which 
feature so prominently in how we collectively address complex health and development 
challenges today—have been accepted by the dominant powers where they operate because 
they have been adapted to accommodate prevailing distributions of power.  
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In any given context, the distribution of political and economic power is always unequally 
distributed. The empirical evidence that will be presented in this dissertation shows that RF’s 
longevity as an actor of influence in global governance is rooted in its ability to successfully 
adapt its strategies to be sufficiently palatable to the dominant political establishment 
without compromising its end goals. By not contesting the legitimacy of the overall system, 
RF has been afforded opportunities to affect changes to the norms and institutions guiding 
that system.  
 
This willingness to innovate around political and economic power disparities has meant that 
time and time again, sets of ideas emanating from these private actors have become the 
institutional frameworks of public organizations within which the same communities of 
experts and their associated assumptions and approaches become embedded and 
perpetuated. Accordingly their preference for accommodation over contestation has been 
instrumental to the Foundations attaining power in the governance of global health and 
development.  
 
Litfin has agued that the major caveat on power acquired through expert knowledge is that 
experts cannot replace the existing political process.71 Yet this argument does not diminish 
the fact that by developing alternative governance frameworks deemed to be sufficiently 
palatable to those with the power to institutionalize ideas at the international level (e.g. 
states), both RF and BMGF have demonstrated themselves to be catalysts of innovation in 
governance. Innovation in science, coupled with innovation in governance, has provided RF 
and BMGF and their associated epistemic communities with discursive, instrumental and 
structural power, which the epistemic communities literature has not yet taken note of. 
 
Moreover, in recent years, considerable weight has been placed on the ability of actors to 
work within an informal and decentralized network structure, for example,72 for meaningful 
influence in global governance to be achieved.73 The Foundations’ willingness to engage with 
                                                
71 Litfin, 31. 
 
72 Manuel Castells, ‘‘Global Governance and Global Politics,’’ Political Science and States 38 (2005): 9-16.  
73 See, for example, Keck and Sikkink; Slaughter; and Jan Martin Witte, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, and Thorsten 
Benner, ‘‘Beyond Multilateralism: Global Policy Networks,’’ International Politics and Society 2 (2000): 176-88. 
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all relevant actors needed to solve complex problems embodied by the PPP paradigm, 
demonstrating that RF and BMGF have an established capacity for creating and sustaining 
decentralized and non-hierarchical global policy networks. This capacity for network-
building and informal diplomacy, and willingness to work around the preferences of the 
most powerful actors, underlies their enabling role of semi-private governance arrangements 
focused increasing access to public goods that fulfill their purpose in the neo-liberal era. 
 
These arguments lend credence to critical constructivists’ claims that powerful groups play a 
privileged role in the process of social (knowledge) construction.74 That the Foundations’ 
ideas are a product of their historical context is in fact consistent with critical theory as an 
approach to understanding structural change, as is this project’s goal of providing 
explanation for how particular structures of power arise and change over time.75 Having said 
that, little evidence has been found to support an argument that the Foundations’ 
institutional progeny serve as ‘‘ideational structures of domination,’’ which critical 
constructivist theory might otherwise suggest.76 Furthermore, as will be shown in the coming 
chapters, the evidence gathered does not support the historical materialist argument that the 
dominant ideas and norms shaping global governance first and foremost reflect the interests 
of, and provide legitimacy to, the capitalist class.77 Instead, it will be demonstrated that the 
institutional innovations advanced by the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations have been 
designed to compensate for governance gaps created by states and markets in both the 
North and the South, and as such constitute examples of agency through adaptation. 
 
                                                
74 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘‘Taking Stock.’’ 
75 Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal, 4; Robert W. Cox, ‘‘Globalization, Multilateralism, and Democracy,’’  
(The ACUNS 1992 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture, Providence, 1992), 3. Accessed: June 15, 2013 
http://acuns.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/WebpageCox_GlobalizationMultilateralismandDemocracy.pdf 
 
76 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘‘Taking Stock’’; Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure 
and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1979). 
 
77 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987); Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal, 13-14. 
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Chapter 4: RF and The Progression To Global Health Governance 
 
4.0 Introduc t ion   
 
This chapter provides an overview of the Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF’s) efforts to shape 
the organization of efforts to promote and protect population health1 in developing 
countries since its establishment a century ago. I argue that the Foundation’s strategies to 
influence health governance have consistently been crafted with consideration for the 
preferences of the dominant actors operating within the political and temporal contexts 
where it has sought to catalyze change. As an organization, RF achieved longevity as an 
agent of change because of its capacity to adapt and stay relevant across three very different 
world orders. 
 
The chapter first examines the Foundation’s emergence as a child of the progressive era, 
when its initial network and institution building efforts within and across the global South 
(from 1910 to the 1930s) was focused on individual developing country states in the process 
of emerging from the clutches of colonialism. In this context, RF’s effective illumination of 
the potential of science to address longstanding public health challenges served as one of 
two gateways through the Foundation attained policy-making influence at the country-level. 
 
Examples of such science-enabled innovation included the first yellow fever vaccine, 
developed by Max Theiler at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York 
city, as well as the successful eradication of the world’s most competent malaria vector, 
Anopheles gambiae, from Brazil in the 1930s. Much of the Foundation’s efforts in science-
enabled innovation in this era embodied a biomedical view of public health and emphasized 
the embrace of new technologies. Nevertheless, the health unit model developed in Sri 
Lanka, which focused on population health research, primary care and preventative 
medicine, serves to illustrate that RF was by no means a monolithic entity in this period. 
 
                                                
1 Richard Dodgson, Kelly Lee, and Nick Drager, Global Health Governance: a Conceptual Review (Geneva: WHO, 
2002), accessed May 11, 2009. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2002/a85727_eng.pdf 
 67 
The second gateway to policy influence occurred through the construction of epistemic 
communities in the public sectors through the provision of advanced training. The chapter 
shows that the immediate post-colonial period was the golden era of RF’s efforts to forge 
epistemic communities in public health at the country-level. This was accomplished by 
creating post-secondary schools of public health in over sixty countries and providing 
thousand of fellowships for physicians and scientists to pursue graduate degrees at North 
American institutions.  
 
In the immediate post-colonial period, RF capitalized on individual developing country 
governments’ expressed volition to strengthen indigenous capacity to protect public health. 
By demonstrating how science-enabled innovation could be employed to address 
longstanding public health challenges, and offering to subsidize and in many cases oversee 
advanced training to the future public health elite of individual countries, RF was able to 
ensure its ideas for improving public health were embraced within national policy making 
arenas. 
 
I subsequently show that during the broadening of state support for international 
cooperation (1930s to 1970s), RF played a key role in enabling the creation of specialized 
International Organizations (IOs) yet continued to identify and fill new gaps, thereby 
ensuring sustained relevance. This ranged, for example, from serving as the primary 
benefactor for the League of Nation’s Health Organization (LNHO), the short-lived 
predecessor of the World Health Organization (WHO), to orchestrating and underwriting 
informal public sector networks such as the International Clinical Epidemiology Network 
(INCLEN). 
 
The chapter then turns to the neo-liberal era (1980s to present), where I show how RF has 
been a global innovator in governance at the private-public interface. RF’s diplomatic 
initiatives, I argue, have provided opportunities for informal dialogue between relevant 
although often distrustful stakeholders. It has nurtured the construction of novel strategies 
and institutional frameworks such as the Children’s Vaccine Initiative (CVI), designed to 
address state and market failures disproportionately affecting the world’s marginalised. It was 
an early champion of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) geared towards product 
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development. Beginning with the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) in 1996, 
PPPs have become the dominant strategy for closing state-market gaps in the face of 
reductions in public sector financing and multi-lateral aid and the rising policy influence of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs). The PPP approach, I argue, works to accommodate 
countries such as the United States that have worked to globalize neo-liberal ideology 
because of their capacity to derail global initiatives seen as threatening their interests. 
 
While chapter 4 and 5 draw heavily from the existing RF historiography, key informant 
interviews with individuals closely associated with the Foundation provide new perspectives 
on the ideas guiding the Foundation’s work and the strategies employed to advance those 
ideas across the three different temporal periods. The principal contribution of this chapter 
(and that of chapter 5) is to provide a generalizable explanation of RF’s sustained agency in 
the governance of public health and agricultural development from its inception to the 
present. For while RF’s focus has shifted over time from individual nation states, to the 
society of states, to most recently the power structure of a global society, this chapter 
demonstrates that RF’s initial commitment to strengthening public sector capacity to 
promote and protect public health has remained unchanged. 
 
4.1 The Progress i ve  Era - the  Immediat e  Post -Colon ial  Era  
 
The early twentieth-century was for RF a period of determining and illuminating how 
science-enabled innovation could help overcome longstanding public challenges in poor 
countries, and of forging epistemic communities in the countries where they worked. 
Through building institutions of higher education across the developing world, the 
Foundation was largely successful in its attempt to reproduce within developing countries a 
group of scientific and medical elite guided by the same progressive era thinking that was 
reshaping how public health was conceptualized and practiced within the United States, 
where the Foundation was born. 
 
RF was a child of the progressive era, a period of cultural and social reform in the United 
States, which lasted from approximately from 1890 until the late 1930s. Progressives 
included many prominent industrialists, educators, political leaders and scientists, who 
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expressed a commitment to the eradication of corruption, minimizing physical and monetary 
waste, advancing the entrepreneurial spirit, increasing opportunity for education in the 
applied sciences, and embracing technology for the betterment of societal welfare.2 
 
John Davison Rockefeller (JDR), the founder, President and major shareholder of the 
Standard Oil Company, which at its peak controlled 90 percent of the United States’ oil 
refining capacity, was one of these individuals. Two events are credited with triggering 
Rockefeller’s transition from business leader to philanthropist. The first was his reading of 
steel magnate Andrew Carnegie’s 1889 essay, The Gospel of Wealth. In his essay, Carnegie, who 
himself gave away over US$350 million for the construction of universities, libraries and 
hospitals, sought to dissuade America’s business elites from passing on their wealth to their 
offspring through inheritance, or giving it away through open-ended donations to charitable 
organizations. Instead, Carnegie believed entrepreneurs should instead reinvest their 
accumulated capital for the common good through targeted philanthropy while maintaining 
control over how their monies were spent.3 Rockefeller’s first philanthropic undertaking 
occurred that same year as the first of series of contributions that would eventually total $35 
million supporting the establishment of the University of Chicago.4  
 
The second trigger of the Rockefeller revolution was Standard Oil’s forced break in 1906, 
after being deemed in violation of a series of anti-trust acts introduced in the 1890s to limit 
the scope and holding companies assets. While no longer America’s Captain of industry, 
Rockefeller was nonetheless the world’s wealthiest individual, with a net worth of 
approximately US$900 million, equal at that time to two percent of the United States GDP.5 
 
Rockefeller’s interest in subsidizing Science Enabled Innovation (SEI) was spurred by 
Frederick T. Gates, a former Baptist Minister, who in 1891 became JDR’s principal aide and 
advisor.6 Gates espoused a deep and unwavering faith in the capacity of medical science to 
                                                
2 R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: from Bryan to FDR (New York: Knopf, 1955). 
3 David Rothkopf, Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 2008), 100-102. 
4 Ron Chernow, Titan: the Life of John D. Rockefeller Sr. (New York: Warner Books, 1998), 121.   
5 Rothkopf, 101-110.  
6 John Farley, To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913-
1951) (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3. 
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overcome disease,7 which he viewed as “the main source of almost all other human ills–
poverty, crime, ignorance, vice, inefficiency, hereditary taint, and many other evils.”8 
 
For Gates, improvements in public health were predicated upon sustaining the revolutionary 
advances in clinical medicine (i.e. anatomy, physiology, chemistry and bacteriology) and 
therapeutic options (e.g. morphine)9 driven by the likes of Pasteur, Koch and Lister in the 
late 19th century.10 This would mean, in Gates’ view, adopting the German model of medical 
education, with its standardized curriculum delivered by full-time faculty members 
integrating laboratory-based research into formal medical education.11 
 
Gates’ fervent belief in the capacity of medical science to improve public health is significant 
because it contrasted sharply with evidence accrued during the industrial revolution that 
improvements in the health of populations were being driven not by clinical or technological 
innovation but by improvements to social conditions (e.g. improved housing, hygiene, 
nutrition and education) made possible by economic growth and the redistribution of 
income.12 By systematically investigating and mapping the sources of mortality, assuring 
access to services such as the provision of safe drinking water and waste collection, and 
collecting public health data in the form of vital statistics,13 governments in Western Europe 
and North America were demonstrating in practice the veracity of Rudolph Virchow’s claim 
that “Medicine is a social science, and politics is nothing else but medicine on a large scale.”14 
 
Gates’ interest in improving health however lay not in social reform but in medicine, which 
led him to seek out medical educators, such as William Welch of John Hopkins Medical 
                                                
7 Qiusha Ma, ‘‘The Peking Union Medical College and the Rockefeller Foundation’s Medical Program’s in 
China,’’ in Rockefeller Philanthropy and Modern Biomedicine: International Initiatives from World War I to the Cold War, 
ed., William H. Schneider (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2002), 162. 
8 Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 23-24.  
9 Amy Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health 
Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2006), 123. 
10 Il’ia Il’ich Mechnikov, The Founders of Modern Medicine: Pasteur, Koch, Lister (New York: Walden, 1939).  
11 Staples, 125. 
12 Kelley Lee, The World Health Organization (WHO) (Routledge: New York, 2009), 6. 
13 See, for example, Anthony Brundage, The English Poor Laws, 1700-1930 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002); William 
Coleman, Death is a Social Disease: Public Health and Political Economy in Early Industrial France (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1982); George Rosen, A History of Public Health (New York: MD Publications, 1958). 
14 L. Eisenberg, ‘‘Rudolf Virchow: the Physician as Politician,’’ Medicine and War 2, no.4 (1986): 243–250. 
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School,15 and Simon Flexner, from the University of Pennsylvania,16 to help advance his 
agenda of strengthening the United States’ capacity for medical research, in large part by 
increasing the number of trained experts and institutions of research. Gates’ emphasis on 
expertise as the gateway to improved health, links him to the ‘‘efficiency movement,’’ a 
particular ideological byproduct of the progressive era. Its adherents firmly believed that 
‘‘experts’’ were, by virtue of their expertise, better equipped than generalist bureaucrats to 
effectively manage large societal problems such as hunger and disease, and as a consequence 
should have greater responsibility in the overall management of such problems.17  
 
With JDR as benefactor, John D. Rockefeller Jr. as committed heir, and Gates as architect, a 
century of “scientific giving” was initiated under the Rockefeller banner. Their primary foci 
were on enabling scientific innovation to be applied to intractable problems and the 
expansion of a technocratic elite to carry out this work.18 The Rockefeller philanthropic 
organizations that would have a profound impact on the practice of public health both in the 
United States and internationally included the General Education Board (GEB) established 
in 1903, the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (RSC) in 1909, the actual RF in 1913 and the 
International Health Commission and China Medical Board (CMB), which were established 
in 1914.19 Because of their overlapping mandates, the majority of the Foundation’s sibling-
organizations were eventually consolidated under RF banner.20 However all of the associated 
Rockefeller organizations have been defined by their commitment to innovation in science, 
                                                
15 Marilyn Baily Ogilvie, ‘‘The Rockefeller Foundation, China, Western Medicine, and PUMC,’’ in Philanthropy 
and Cultural Context: Western Philanthropy in South, East, and Southwest Asia in the 20th Century, eds., Soma Hewa and 
Philo Hove (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997). 
16 E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979). 
17 Samule P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement 1890-1920 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
18 Lilly E. Kay, The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 8, 17; Kenneth Prewitt, ‘‘American Foundations: What Justifies Their 
Unique Privileges and Powers,’’ in The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations: United States and European Perspectives, 
eds., Kenneth Prewitt, Mattei Dogan, Steven Hydermann, and Stefan Toepler (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2006), 29.  
19 Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 
20 Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 243. For a group of individuals committed to efficiency, this was a particularly inefficient 
arrangement. Accordingly, between 1925 and 1928 the Rockefeller philanthropies were re-structured, with the 
CMB spun off into a stand alone entity and GEB merged into RF resulting in a single entity comprised of five 
divisions: 1) Medical Science; 2) the International Health Division (IHD); 3) Natural Sciences; 4) Social 
Sciences; and 5) the Humanities.  
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the advancement of science, and associated institutional and individual capacity building.21 
 
The first initiative displaying this commitment to innovation through science was the 
creation of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research (RMIR), established in 1901.22 
Renamed Rockefeller University in 1965,23 RIMR is widely seen as the paragon upon which 
the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH) was modeled.24  
 
RIMR was followed by the launch of the GEB in 1903. The GEB’s initial focus was on 
facilitating access to and improving higher education in the United States and is credited by 
critics and proponents alike with catalyzing the transformation of country’s approach to 
medical education within a decade of its establishment.  
 
In 1910, educator Abraham Flexner’s highly influential report, commissioned by the 
Carnegie Foundation, was released. ‘‘The Flexner Report’’ called for systematic reforms to 
how medicine and public health were taught in American universities and associated research 
conducted. Specifically, Flexner advocated standardizing admission criteria and the duration 
of studies, hiring salaried professional instructors with individual research portfolios, and 
incorporating schools of medicine into established universities.25 In 1913 Flexner was 
appointed to RF’s board and to that of the GEB the following year. Acting on Flexner’s 
recommendation, the first US$1.5 million of what would eventually total US$10 million was 
granted to establish full-time teaching positions at the Johns Hopkins Medical School, the 
model upon which all other schools would be compared.26 Subsequent grants were made to 
institutions across the United States and around the world on the condition of their 
embracing the Hopkins template.27  
 
                                                
21 Anonymous interviewee 1, November 19, 2010. 
22 Ogilvie, 24. 
23 Farley, 3. 
24 Anonymous interviewee 2, January 18, 2011 
25 Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report to the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin No. 4 (New York City: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, 1910). 
26 William H. Schneider, Rockefeller Philanthropy and Modern Biomedicine: International Initiatives from World War I to the 
Cold War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 9; Ogilvie, 24. 
 
27 Anonymous interviewee 2, January 18, 2011. 
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In 1906, Gates began to advocate that JDR establish an actual foundation. This advice was 
acted upon three years later when Rockefeller authorized the transfer of 73,000 shares of 
Standard Oil stock to the his son John Rockefeller Junior, Gates and Harold McCormick: 
RF’s first trustees. Valued at US$50 million, JDR’s initial contribution was intended to be the 
first installment of an eventual US$100 million endowment.28 
 
Initially, a federal charter was sought for the Foundation. However distrust over 
Rockefeller’s intentions stemming from Standard Oil’s monopolistic practices led the United 
States government to impose limitations on the Foundation’s potential (e.g. that its 
endowment must never exceed 100 million) before its actual birth, which were ultimately 
deemed unacceptable. Consequently, a New York state charter was sought and granted in 
1913.29  The Rockefeller Foundation was established to promote “the well-being of mankind 
throughout the world,” which its trustees envisioned would be accomplished through ‘‘the 
spread of the knowledge of scientific medicine,”30 and in this regard, its impact was felt 
immediately. Within two decades of its inception, RF would become the single largest 
funding source for biomedical research and the development of public health programs in 
the world.31 
 
4.11 Hookworm 
 
The Foundation was quick to embark on influencing the practice of public health beyond 
the United States by building on the successes of the Sanitary Commission, which sought to 
eradicate hookworm from the southern United States through a combination of education, 
pharmaceuticals and improved sanitation. Long considered by states to be a critical 
                                                
28 Chernow, 563-566. 
29 Concerns over the material influence of private American Foundations are not new. RF was established in an 
era in which concern over the concentration of wealth among a small minority of individuals and firms was 
widespread. These concerns served as the basis of a series of Senate hearings (The Walsh Commission, held 
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to whether private Foundations served to distract from it (Prewitt, ‘‘Foundations,’’). See also Nielsen. 
30 Fosdick, 156-57. RF’s reticence to directly engage the social and political determinants of problems under its 
scrutiny is often linked to an event that occurred in the year of its founding. In 1913, the National Guard killed 
40 striking labourers at a Rockefeller controlled company (Colorado Fuel and Iron), which led to a US 
commission investigation over Rockefeller complicity with the use of force in order to end the labour dispute 
(Nielsen, 53-4; Farley, 220). 
31 Brown, Rockefeller Medicine, 104. 
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impediment to economic development,32 hookworm is caused by a parasitic nematode that 
resides on the small intestine of its mammalian host. While typically not the cause of death in 
those infected, infections often result in anemia from loss of blood, which for pregnant 
women can lead to low birth weights and impede cognitive and physical development in 
children. Most infections are transmitted through the skin when individuals walk barefoot on 
warm soil contaminated with parasite-containing fecal matter. Hookworm is easily prevented 
by the construction of public sanitation systems, and where this does not exist by educating 
people to wear shoes and implementing community-based de-worming programs.33 
 
RSC’s hookworm eradication efforts began in Virginia in 1910 and consisted of surveys to 
assess the prevalence of infection, treatment of infected individuals with thymol or 
chenopodium administered at local dispensaries, and demonstration programs showing the 
proper method of constructing outdoor privies.34 Spearheaded by RSC director and educator 
Wycliffe Rose of University of Nashville, the program initially did not conform to the 
biomedical model envisioned by Gates, in that it was largely centered on education and 
sought to include all relevant stakeholders (i.e. physicians, public health, school and church 
health officials, and members of the business community and media).35 The program’s 
achievements are notable. Within four years across eleven states, over one million individual 
examinations had been conducted. Over forty percent of those examined were found 
infected and treated, and through education and improvements to sanitation, countless 
infections prevented.36 
 
RF’s first health initiative outside of the United States was the establishment in 1914 of an 
International Health Commission (IHC),37 which was intended as a vehicle for replicating 
                                                
32 Anonymous interviewee 3, December 6, 2010. 
33 James Chin, ed., Control Of Communicable Diseases Manual, 17th ed. (Washington: American Public Health 
Association, 2000), 265-268. 
34 Farley, 29-33; Steven Palmer, ‘‘Toward Responsibility in International Health: Death following Treatment in 
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35 Farley, 29. 
36 Ibid. 
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RSC’s hookworm eradication efforts in other countries,38 and taking on the task of 
controlling additional diseases.39 That RSC was the template for IHC is significant because 
the Foundation has long been criticized for relying on technology to achieve positive change, 
and the Sanitary Commission’s approach was by no means one-dimensional. While the 
program increasingly relied on antihelminthics over the five years it operated,40 one of the 
most dominant ideas that came to inform RF’s work was that technology is both a pre-
condition for progressive change and the basis or justification for why change should occur 
but is not an end in itself.41  
 
Concerns were raised early within the GEB about the sustainability of the hookworm 
eradication campaign; if the target population–poor rural agriculturalists–remained poor, 
then their poverty, if not addressed, translated into a weak tax-base, which hampered state 
government’s abilities to pay for services such as public health and education.42 This 
contradiction spurred the GEB to initiate an agricultural program credited with catalyzing 
agricultural modernization in American South, which will be examined in detail in chapter 5.  
The biomedical paradigm would come to inform the majority of RF’s public health 
initiatives in the first three decades of its existence, evidenced by the fact that four diseases 
(hookworm, yellow fever, malaria and TB accounted for ninety percent of IHD disease 
budget.43 Yet despite the foundation’s commitment to SEI that was conceived out of 
ideological fervour, from its inception considerable heterogeneity in how public health 
challenges could be approached was displayed in its operations, which critics have largely 
ignored. 
 
It would appear IHC’s efforts were, at first, largely unsolicited. As noted by Benjamin Page, 
RF’s second President George Vincent aspired to export the Flexner model, thereby 
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institutionalizing scientific medicine in recipient countries despite a lack of official requests 
from prospective beneficiaries or studies demonstrating such a need.44 Officially however 
IHC would only work in partnership with national governments after being invited to do so 
on the basis that public health protection was the responsibility of the state, meaning their 
operations in countries would be intended to catalyze public sector capacity strengthening 
and, to avoid creating situations of dependence, be of a limited duration.45 
 
The standard approach when such assistance was requested consisted of undertaking 
country-level health surveys and making recommendations on the needs of the population, 
underwriting post-graduate training of government health officials personnel in schools of 
hygiene the health division had helped create, and providing the template and seed funding 
for re-organizing national systems of public health.46 As noted by Marcos Cueto, while such 
preliminary surveys provided valuable information to partner governments, it also served to 
strengthen RF’s case of the need to re-structure how their public health systems were 
organized,47 illustrating that science was integral to RF’s discursive influence. 
 
In the wake of RSC’s successes, RF’s first international hookworm eradication campaigns 
targeted societies administered by colonial governments, specifically British Guyana, Egypt, 
India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the Malay states.48 The campaigns were initiated in a period of 
optimism concerning the feasibility of the end-goal. By that time the epidemiology and life-
cycle of the parasite was well understood, and the disease was proven to be both preventable 
(through education and the use of latrines) and relatively simple to treat given the existence 
of two effective antihelmintic drugs that were simple to administer,49 though not without risk 
to recipients.50  
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Despite these realities, all of these efforts ended in failure. Wycliffe Rose, who had 
transitioned from directing the Sanitary Commission to become IHC’s inaugural director, 
had viewed hookworm as a device through which the Foundation could transform health 
systems.51 However as noted by Farley, Rose did not anticipate the unwillingness of the 
colonial governments to take on fiscal responsibility for the programs or develop the 
necessary infrastructure to curtail the spread of infection.52 
 
Similarly in India and Ceylon, where migrant labourers living in squalid conditions were 
deemed to be the primary vectors of the disease, plantation owners balked at incurring any 
financial costs associated with hookworm prevention, given the unlimited supply of cheap 
labour.53 Consequently, the Foundation shifted its attention to independent states with 
expressed volitions for investing in their public health systems. 
 
In total RF’s global hookworm eradication campaign would involve sixty-two countries on 
six continents.54 Yet, with a few exceptions, its goal of eliminating hookworm in these 
environments would remain elusive. This was due in no small part to the logistical challenges 
associated with maintaining standards of practice at the local level.55 More importantly 
however was the pervasive systemic poverty limiting access to essential preventative 
measures such as shoes and latrines, which ensured the continuation of the cycle of 
infection. RF’s lack of control over these crucial factors provided credence to the argument 
espoused by some within RF, including Rose’s successor Paul Russell, that the Foundation 
should limit the scope of its disease control efforts to science-enabled innovation,56 where it 
held a comparative advantage over other actors; with this in mind, it turned its attention to 
two additional diseases of global significance: yellow fever and malaria. 
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4.12 Yellow Fever & Malaria 
 
Ironically it was Rose, the proponent of public health through educational and social reform, 
who initiated RF’s technology-centered yellow fever and malaria programs. As noted by 
Farley, the challenge of controlling these diseases was far more daunting than that of 
hookworm, given effective therapeutic agents were lacking for both.57 Moreover while 
Cuban physician Carlos Finlay had demonstrated thirty years prior that transmission of the 
disease could be arrested if the mosquito vector (Aedes. aegypti) was eliminated,58 the actual 
causative agent had yet to be determined.59 
 
RF’s yellow fever program was initiated in 1916. Over the course of its thirty-four year 
lifespan, it involved seventy-six staff at a total cost of US$14 million, more than three times 
what was spent on any other disease by the international health division, which included the 
cost of constructing a dedicated laboratory at the RMIR in 1928.60 
 
The program led to a number of scientific breakthroughs, beginning with the first isolation 
of the yellow fever virus from a Ghanaian patient in 1927. At the RMIR South African 
microbiologist Max Theiler developed what became known as the Mouse Protection test, 
whereby antibodies identified in human sera conferred protective immunity to mice 
inoculated with the yellow fever virus intra-cerebrally, which allowed for retrospective 
diagnosis of yellow fever in humans and a means to map endemic areas.61 
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Following extensive serological testing in the subsequent decade,62 the first effective vaccine 
was developed in 1937 at the RMIR by Theiler, and initially produced by the Foundation 
itself having previously developed the capacity to produce influenza vaccine.63 Since its 
development, over 400 million doses have been distributed, and amazingly this almost 
eighty-year old technology is still in use today.64 
 
Moreover, the yellow fever program led to the understanding that there were three distinct 
epidemiological cycles of the disease, one of which (the sylvatic cycle) meant that eradication 
was not possible.65  The knowledge was not generated without mistakes made by RF, 
however, mistakes which undeniably cost lives. The Foundation’s initial approach to 
controlling yellow fever, in Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Mexico and Brazil,66 was predicated 
on the erroneous assumption that the disease was transmitted solely by competent mosquito 
vectors–notably Aedes aegypti–in urban centres where outbreaks typically occurred. RF field 
staff, who assumed responsibility for vector control from public authorities, emphasized 
reducing the breeding sources of these mosquitoes.67 Yet when RMIR bacteriologist Hideyo 
Noguchi incorrectly identified the bacterium Leptopira iceteroides as the causative agent, the 
Foundation reduced its source reduction efforts to compensate for heightened lab-intensive 
work, leading to an increase in the population of urban vectors.68 Following a large yellow 
fever epidemic in 1928 in Brazil, and the discovery in 1930 that their initial assumptions were 
incorrect,69 relations between governments and the Foundation became strained and public 
support for the Foundation’s role in public health protection diminished.70 Despite these 
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errors, RF’s role in the advancement of knowledge regarding the control of yellow fever 
cannot be understated. 
 
In contrast to RF developing and illuminating a viable generalizable strategy for developing 
countries to control yellow fever, the Foundation’s efforts to improve government capacity 
to control malaria did prove to be unsustainable. As per hookworm, the Foundation’s 
malaria eradication efforts were based on a template established within the United States in 
1915, when the Sanitary Commission began working with the United States Public Service 
and state and local governments on malaria prevention demonstration projects across the 
Southern states.72 In the United States context, the approach was three-pronged, comprised 
of vector eradication in urban areas through mechanical spraying of chemical larvicides, 
promoting the screening of windows and doors, and in rural areas where vector eradication 
was impossible, distributing quinine.71  
 
The first operational program was initiated in 1925 in Argentina in partnership with 
Argentina’s National Department of Hygiene on the condition that it establish and operate a 
Bureau of Studies and Demonstrations in Malaria,72 which quickly expanded to several other 
countries.  The adoption of screening and use of quinine proved impractical in that it 
required compliance on the part of the target population which field staff could not ensure, 
while quinine would ultimately prove ineffective as a malaria prophylactic.73 Very quickly 
RF’s malaria control program became entirely contingent on vector eradication via 
pesticides.74 
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Events in Brazil initially provided reason for optimism over the Foundation’s approach. In 
1930, one the world’s most effective malaria vectors A. gambiae–inadvertently imported by 
ship from West Africa–was discovered in the state of Rio Grande do Norte in the country’s 
North-East. Despite driving a series of epidemics, including in 1938 the largest ever 
documented in the Americas with over one hundred thousand cases and over fourteen 
thousand deaths,75 A. gambiae was successfully eradicated in Brazil by 1940 under the 
direction of RF’s Fred L. Soper.76 
 
Yet the eradication of A. gambiae proved to be false hope in the Foundation’s larger bid to 
eliminate malaria in the countries where they operated solely through vector control.  Both 
the social factors (e.g. illiteracy, poverty and poor quality land) and ecological factors (e.g. 
sheer variety of vectors and associated traits) underpinning disease transmission proved 
insurmountable for RF and their state partners.77 Unfortunately for the world, the 
Foundation’s successes with yellow fever would not be replicated with malaria. 
 
4.13 – Building Epistemic Communities At the Country-Level 
 
RF’s limited ability to successfully control particular diseases in the first three decades of its 
existence distracts from its ability to establish through training communities of experts 
sharing common ways of conceptualizing and addressing particular problems within all of 
the countries where they operated. It is significant that partner governments readily accepted 
RF’s offers to subsidize advanced training of civil servants because of a common volition for 
strengthening public sector capacities in public health (and later in agricultural science). This 
is because the Foundation’s ability to successfully define or ‘‘frame’’ problems (i.e. their 
discursive power) relied not only on its record of science-enabled innovation but also its 
ability to forge like-minded epistemic communities within the countries where it operated. 
Moreover its instrumental power revolved around the fostering of epistemic communities at 
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the country-level, for community members became decision-makers, who repeatedly 
embraced and institutionalized those frameworks being advanced by the Foundation. 
  
Anne-Emanuelle Birn described RF’s thirty year partnership with the Mexican government’s 
Department of Public Health (DSP) as a “marriage of convenience,” a marriage that united 
the Foundation’s vision of improving human well-being via SEI with the Mexican 
government’s goal of modernizing its country.78 Yet the marriage of convenience is an apt 
descriptor for RF’s partnerships in all of the countries where it operated.  
 
By way of IHD’s disease control initiatives, the Foundation provided more than six 
thousand fellowships between 1917 and 1950 for physicians and scientists to pursue 
graduate degrees at North American institutions modeled on the Johns Hopkins template,79 
and through operational programs within countries, advanced training for thousands of 
additional healthcare workers and engineers.80 Over IHD’s thirty-eight year lifespan, almost 
US$100 million was spent on public health education and the creation of schools of public 
health in sixty-two countries.81 As noted by Farley, the basic premise of RF’s epistemic 
expansion was that by endowing copies of the John Hopkins model across the global South, 
biomedical expertise and the research it would spurn would invariably strengthen both 
public health outcomes and public sector capacity to ensure such outcomes could be 
sustained.82  
 
By convincing partner governments to institutionalize the dominant American approach to 
public health and facilitating the training of both partner countries’ future biomedical elite 
and front-line workers,83 IHD served as a vehicle to embed an epistemic lens in both 
national public policy making apparati and at the local level where public health 
professionals shaped public opinion and practice. Such epistemic expansions afforded the 
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Foundation both discursive and instrumental power which many have been critical given the 
shortcomings of particular ideas or approaches taken. However in spite of numerous short-
term failures, RF’s public capacity building also laid the groundwork for future gains which 
critics such as Birn and Cueto seem hesitant to acknowledge. 
 
As noted by Soma Hewa, RF’s hookworm program in Sri Lanka focused on Indian migrant 
workers–while unable to curtail the transmission of hookworm–it nonetheless provided a 
template that became the model for the public health system that today provides care for the 
majority of the country’s population.84 RF developed the country’s local health unit model, a 
team-based model intended to serve approximately 80,000 people involving health 
inspectors, nurses, midwives, administrative staff and a primary care physician, also offering 
occasional dental, surgical and specialty coverage from staff based out of district hospitals. 
The units conducted the surveys which determined local needs and kept a record of vital 
statistics; allowed local communities and government participation in program planning; and 
through emphasis on sanitation, hygiene, vaccination, education, nutrition, maternal and 
child health, brought a preventative approach to public health that employed local resources 
to address local challenges.85 While the national government was responsible for the 
construction and operating costs individual units, RF provided the template for a national 
training facility that become the National Institute of Health Sciences, and initially all 
training of the human resources, not only in Sri Lanka but also in India, Malaya and Burma.86 
For Hewa, the Health Unit Program of the IHB provided a template for how to achieve in 
practice, the future theoretical vision of ‘‘Health for All’’ through primary care articulated at 
Alma-Ata, and is inseparable from Sri Lanka having one of the strongest public health care 
systems in the global South today.87 
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4.14 RF and public health from the progressive to the immediate post-colonial era: final thoughts 
 
RF’s initial health program was driven by the new science of germ theory, and the advances 
of Koch and Pasteur, which led many to believe that disease eradication was finally feasible. 
RF cultivated this belief and placed an emphasis on creating the means to do so through a 
network of institutions training health professionals and using a common curriculum 
informed by this cutting edge science. This was the basis of the Flexner revolution in the 
United States, which the Foundation’s IHD, GEB, and the China Medical Board sought to 
replicate internationally.88 As noted by Steven Wheatley, the re-organization of 1924 to 1928 
marked the end of the Frederick T. Gates era, during which medical research was the 
number one priority and biomedical science was viewed as the gold standard for solving all 
complex health problems. The Foundation’s initial paternalistic attitude towards the 
countries of the global South diminished and individual country governments came to 
viewed as equal partners.89 Moreover with the initial leadership cohort largely gone, more 
influence was granted to directors of the individual divisions.90 This is not to say that an 
emphasis on facilitating partner countries’ capacity to engage in SEI was diminished, only 
that preventive medicine and health systems strengthening were increasingly viewed as 
central to the achievement of both partners’ long-term goals. As noted by James Coleman, 
these two seemingly competing norm complexes that were reflected in RF’s operational 
programs continued to guide the Foundation’s health initiatives long after the end of the 
progressive era within which they were forged.91 
 
4.2 The Rise  o f  Col le ct i ve  Consc iousness  
 
In the wake of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a wave of liberal institutionalism swept 
over the world, embodied in the establishment of the first IO, the League of Nations (LN).92 
RF readily adapted to this rise in collective consciousness. From the onset of the 
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international era, RF was as an important benefactor to formal institutions, such as the 
League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) and continuing with the WHO, mandated 
by the world’s states to disseminate new knowledge oriented towards reducing health 
disparities in the global South. Once the specialized agencies of the UN system were in 
place, RF’s efforts became focused on sustaining both private organizations such as the 
Population Council and public sector networks such as the INCLEN, sharing with the 
Foundation similar aims. Through its support for such international institutions, Foundation 
continued its expansion of epistemic communities which served to advance particular ideas, 
for example, global malaria eradication within international policy making arenas.  
 
In this internationalist era, the RF’s roadmaps for collective action were purposefully 
adapted to opportunities created by state expressed preferences for addressing complex 
problems collectively through formal multilateral organizations and later through informal 
international networks, both of which RF readily supported. This agency through adaptation 
was on full display via its enabling of both the LNHO and INCLEN. 
 
4.21 The League of Nations Health Organization  
 
RF demonstrated an early commitment to the development of multilateral institutions 
intended to facilitate international cooperation on health issues. The end of World War I 
(WWI) saw the rise of a liberal idealism exemplified by the establishment of the LN, which 
RF capitalized on and helped nurture. In this period RF was the largest contributor to the 
LNHO, accounting for one third to one half of its budget.93 
When it was established in 1921, LNHO was an attempt to consolidate pre-existing regional 
and international health organizations competing for policy influence. Its lineage can be 
traced back the first International Sanitary Conference that took place in Paris in 1851, one 
of four such conferences over a fifty-two year period that aimed at controlling through 
cooperation communicable diseases such as cholera adversely impacting maritime trade.94 In 
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1902, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) was launched by Western Hemisphere 
countries concerned that communicable diseases of regional importance were not to being 
sufficiently addressed by what were viewed as meetings informed by Eurocentric agendas. 
The intended purpose of PASB was thus to function as a clearing-house for information on 
yellow fever and malaria.95 Four years later, the Office International D’hygiene Publique 
(OIHP) was established in Paris to perform a similar function,96 demonstrating a common 
volition on the part of states to move beyond conventions to independent IOs.97 
 
In the wake of WWI, attempts were made to establish a single IO to unify and advance the 
ideas of the public health community. While RF strongly supported the concept of the LN 
and LNHO in particular,98 the latter was strongly opposed by the United States government, 
over concerns that it would lose the significant influence it enjoyed within PASB.99 
 
Yet the purpose of the Geneva based LNHO was broader than that of PASB. While it too 
was intended to collate and disseminate research findings and best practices and provide 
technical assistance to governments seeking such help, it also for example investigated and 
compiled information on diseases that were not of relevance to international trade, 
established international standards for the production of vaccines and other biologicals, and 
promoted public health through social reform.100 
In 1922 RF provided LNHO with its first grant, US$ 492,000 of seed money to be spent 
over five years. Subsequent grants were made to establish an epidemiological intelligence 
service (US$350,000), to enable international exchanges for an estimated 600 national health 
officials to study approaches employed in other countries to strengthen public health 
(US$1.2 million), and to establish a LN library (US$2 million).101 However the Foundation’s 
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role in facilitating this push for the internationalization of public health was not simply a 
material one. 
 
As noted by Martin David Dubin, RF aided in staff recruitment, many of whom were trained 
in programs established by Foundation grants. Moreover RF advised on government 
requests for technical assistance and the formation of advisory bodies, periodically seconding 
its own staff for these purposes.102 
 
This is not to say that there was never tension between LNHO and its principal benefactor 
over strategies informing collective action on health.  Whereas for example 
Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) was the mainstay of IHD malaria control efforts, 
League officials were committed to the idea that malaria control could only be sustained 
through a broader approach to rural development,103 a concept that RF would years later 
embrace itself. Yet however misguided, RF’s political and material autonomy allowed the 
Foundation to continue its malaria control efforts throughout World War II (WWII), when 
international discord effectively shut down the LN and with it LNHO’s Malaria 
Commission.104  Despite such ideational divergence, however, RF’s role in the interwar 
period to establish an international public health episteme informed by the same ideas and 
norms guiding its own programs is beyond refute.105 
 
4.22 The World Health Organization   
 
WHO was established in 1946, the final UN specialized agency created in the WWII era. 
Amy Staples has suggested that OIHP, PASB and LNHO all served to inform WHO, which 
in her words was marked by “a professional ideology and the apolitical standards of 
science.”106  Yet as previously noted by Birn, RF’s deep imprint on the nascent health 
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organization was quite evident, both in terms how particular diseases were approached and 
the individuals involved in leading these efforts.  
 
There is a general consensus amongst historians that the WHO executive board drew 
inspiration from IHD’s malaria program in its 1948 commitment to curb the spread of 
malaria via DDT.107 This should not be surprising, however, for two of IHD’s most 
prominent malariologists–Paul Russell and Fred Soper–had by this point left RF to take 
leadership positions within WHO and PASB: Russell as head of WHO’s malaria expert 
committee, and Soper as Director of PASB which was renamed the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO) in 1947 before its absorption into WHO as a regional office in 
1949.108 
 
At the time of WHO’s founding, malaria was a significant public health threat in much of 
the world with approximately 750 million annual infections giving rise to some seven and 
half million deaths, which accounted for ten percent of all infant mortality.109 Despite the 
fact that IHD teams in Sicily ultimately failed to control the spread of malaria via indoor 
DDT spraying, and resistance in vectors first recorded in 1951,110 WHO’s Global Malaria 
Eradication Program (MEP) headed by Paul Russell adopted the same strategy, which was 
actively supported by Dr. Marcolino-Candau, WHO’s Director General from 1953 to 1973 
and a former RF partner during IHD’s A. gambiae eradication efforts.111 An astounding total 
sum of approximately US$5.6 billion was spent by WHO, the United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and national governments on MEP,112 in hindsight a 
reckless undertaking given DDT’s questionable track record as a primary means of 
prevention, the anemic health systems of most developing country partners, and the lack of a 
vaccine, which all contributed to the program being declared a failure in 1964.113 
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Despite RF’s role in the costly failure of MEPs, of greater long-term significance for public 
sector capacity in developing countries was WHO’s emulation of RF’s country-level 
epistemic expansions. By 1951 when it was shut down, IHD staff had worked in over 80 
countries,114 and had trained tens of thousands of heath professionals in those countries. 
However in the first twenty years of its existence, WHO provided some two thousand 
fellowships to fund advanced public health training for developing country professionals, in-
country training to tens of thousands, whilst advising national ministries of health on disease 
prevention and control.115 
 
While IHD served to inform many of WHO’s initiatives, through the creation of UN the 
developing world found a new voice in global affairs which grew louder as a result of 
decolonization. What was formerly tropical medicine was re-baptized as international health; 
and with the emergence of other IOs such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, which gradually gained an interest in public health, and with the rise of official 
development assistance, the whole modus operandi of international health changed. The 
space became more crowded and a more organic concept of health emerged that expanded 
beyond the parameters of the biomedical paradigm RF had helped to foster through its 
country level epistemic expansions in the first three decades of the twentieth-century.116 
Indeed RF itself was increasingly deviating from its own model as the Sri Lankan health unit 
model illustrates. At the same time, states–particularly Northern states–were increasingly 
concerned with new issues, most notably over-population linked to poverty. Yet, with a few 
exceptions, Northern states would remain largely disinterested in developing countries’ most 
pressing health issues, issues that would prove in many instances to be beyond the capacity 
of both individual fledgling national public health systems and the IOs charged with 
managing international responses to public health crises. Once again, RF successfully 
adapted its strategies for advancing ideas in policy-making arenas, choosing to reinvent itself 
in this context,117 by carving out new niches within which it could act as a catalyst of change. 
These included family planning, clinical epidemiology and global health diplomacy. 
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4.23 The ‘Population Problem’: Demography and Family Planning 
 
As noted by John Perkins, in the aftermath of WWII, the leadership of RF began to exhibit a 
neo-Malthusian view of the population growth in the global South consistent with the views 
espoused by ecologist William Vogt, whose 1948 book Road to Survival called attention to the 
perils of ignoring a finite global carrying capacity.118 For Voght–who in 1951 was appointed 
director of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America–unrestrained population growth 
globally would lead to scarcity and starvation globally. Scarcity and famine would in turn lead 
to increases in global conflict.119 This narrative would be used repeatedly as justification for 
American attempts to thwart the expansion of communism during the Cold War era.  
 
While developing country mortality rates began to decline in the post-war era, the limited 
demographic data that existed showed fertility rates remaining largely static.120 Projected 
population increases across the global South were viewed by Western donor states as threats 
to such developing countries achieving what American demographer Frank Notestein had a 
decade prior referred to as the “demographic transition,” the necessary reductions in both 
fertility and mortality rates required to attain industrial economy status.121 Yet as shown by 
Judith Nagelberg, neither the specialized agencies of UN or Western donor countries were 
willing to develop the contraceptive options required for reductions in developing country 
birth rates to be achieved.122 
 
In 1952, John D. Rockefeller III established the Population Council (PC) as a stand-alone 
not-for-profit entity to support the maturation of demography as a discipline,123 and to 
develop contraceptive options that would be accepted for use in developing countries.124 
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This knowledge and product availability, it was hoped, would catalyze interest within 
national and international policy forums for the need to formulate policy responses to the 
threats posed by overpopulation.125 
 
While not formally affiliated with RF, PC nonetheless embraced the Foundation’s country-
level epistemic expansion template in its efforts to persuade governments of the need to 
embrace family planning as a core pillar of economic development. Between 1953 and 1968, 
PC provided over 500 fellowships for individuals from over twenty countries to undertake 
advanced study in demography at American universities. Of these almost three quarters went 
to individuals from developing countries.126 Moreover by the mid-1960s, RF, in conjunction 
with the Ford Foundation (FF) and the then nascent United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), had became principal financial backers of international family 
initiatives including the work of PC.127 
 
RF was able to maintain its discursive and instrumental power in the post-war era, in part by 
supporting the establishment of new organizations like PC, which would go on to fill 
important gaps created by restrictions imposed on WHO by its member states. The 
Foundation still maintained over one hundred field staff in this time period,128 and 
spearheaded the construction of physical institutions, such the network of public 
laboratories developed in partnership with the governments of Brazil, Columbia, Egypt, 
India, Nigeria, South Africa, Trinidad and the United Kingdom that focused on identifying 
novel pathogenic viruses and developing new diagnostic techniques.129 Nevertheless, by the 
1970s, when it was committing approximately two thirds of its total expenditures to public 
health, population and agricultural development related initiatives in developing countries, it 
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had to be selective in where it applied its resources and ensure that those ventures it 
supported could eventually be sustained without its continual support.130 
 
4.24 Transnational networks to build public sector capacity: The case of INCLEN 
 
An excellent example of RF-driven sustainable philanthropy is the International Clinical 
Epidemiology Network (INCLEN), established in 1980 by RF’s Dr. Kerr White as a global 
forum to help clinicians and health scientists learn from and engage in the application of 
population health research methodologies to clinical medicine.131 The end goal of RF was 
that INCLEN would provide medical decision makers–particularly those in low and middle-
income countries but also within IOs and Northern advisory bodies (e.g. the US Institutes of 
Medicine)–the best available evidence with which to make difficult decisions, such as 
concerning rationale drug use.132 
 
While RF invested more than $75 million in INCLEN over its first two decades,133 the 
initiative was spun off into an independent non-profit organization in 1988 and, as of 2006, 
was comprised of over 1,400 individual members in forty-one countries.134 By creating 
advanced training centres within existing public sector institutions, INCLEN has established 
clinical epidemiology and related disciplines (e.g. biostatistics, pharmacoepidemiology and 
clinical economics) in much of developing world. For a Foundation, INCLEN represents 
the ideal investment: one that is low-risk, yields a high-return, and ultimately proves to be 
self-sufficient.135 For RF in particular, INCLEN has proven to be a cost-effective vehicle 
with which to create and expand a truly global community of experts sharing a common way 
of problematizing and measuring health challenges, while concurrently building public sector 
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capacity building. Through INCLEN, RF demonstrated that epistemic expansions oriented 
towards shaping the formation of public policy could still occur through informal channels, 
which foreshadowed its utility as a global health governor in a neo-liberal world order, when 
the United States initiated a trend of privileging informal self-selective organizations over 
formal established IOs including but not limited to WHO. 
 
4.25 (Private) International Health Diplomacy: anticipating the neo-liberal world order 
 
In the late 1970s, two issues diminished WHO’s authority setting the stage for RF to assume 
a new role in the shift from international to global health: that is, the role of diplomat. The 
first was its conflict with the United States and multinational pharmaceutical companies over 
the concept of essential medicines leading to the organization’s financial wings being clipped; 
the second was its push for a global health policy framework that was ultimately rejected by 
its primary benefactors. 
 
In 1977 WHO published for the first time its Action Program on Essential Drugs (APED). This 
list of safe and effective medicines was deemed to be critical for the treatment of both 
communicable and non-communicable diseases (NCDs), and in the following year, “access 
to essential medicines” became of one of the Alma Ata Declaration’s eight core pillars.136 
These actions had significant implications for firms, for in the eyes of the world’s foremost 
health authority, any drugs listed could be excluded from proprietary protection to ensure 
states had at their disposal the fundamental tools for protecting public health.137 WHO’s 
support for the 1981 International Code on Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes,138 (a policy 
framework intended in part to restrict firms from marketing the adoption of formula as a 
safe replacement for breast feeding)139 increased the ire of both industry and the United 
States government, as the majority of the world’s large pharmaceutical and food and 
beverage companies were then United States-based. However while the United States 
                                                
136 World Health Organization, Declaration of Alma-Ata International Conference on Primary Health Care (Alma-Ata: 
WHO, September 6-12, 1978). 
137 Kelly Lee, 90-91. 
138 Gill Walt, Neil Spicer, and Kent Buse, ‘‘Mapping the Global Health Architecture,’’ in Making Sense of Global 
Health Governance: A Policy Perspective, eds., Kent Buse, Wolfgang Hein and Nick Drager (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 50. 
139 Katherine Sikkink, ‘‘Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: the Case of WHO/UNICEF Code,’’ 
International Organization 40, no. 4 (1996): 814-40.  
 94 
government was successful in freezing WHO’s 1982 budget and delaying what were 
supposed to be mandatory contributions in subsequent years, it was ultimately unable to 
force the organization to retract its list due to its willingness to speak truth to power in 
support of its most vulnerable members’ needs.140 
 
WHO inherited the same biomedical view of public health that had shaped much of IHD’s 
initiatives in the first half of the twentieth-century. However by the late 1970s under the 
leadership of Halfdan Mahler, it increasingly sought to call attention to the structural and 
social determinants of the health challenges it was mandated to address.141 Its stated goal of 
“Health for All,” by 2000 at the Alma Ata conference,142 was intended to be achieved not 
through advanced technology but through an emphasis on Primary Health Care (PHC) 
coupled with improved nutrition, access to clean water, and empowering historically 
marginalized populations shouldering a disproportionate proportion of the global disease 
burden.143 
 
Correctly anticipating a lack of political will within key donor states to support such broad 
goals, RF assumed the role of private diplomat through its proposed alternative to PHC, 
termed Selective-Primary Health Care (Selective-PHC),144 and sponsored a meeting on the 
topic which was held at its conference facilities in Bellagio, Italy. Instead of the structural 
changes advocated by WHO, Selective-PHC emphasized that states and IOs should embrace 
a standard group of strategies proven to be both efficacious and cost-effective in reducing 
morbidity and mortality (e.g. breast feeding, immunizations, and Oral Re-hydration Therapy 
(ORT).145 UNICEF’s ultimate adoption of the Selective-PHC template was a political blow 
to WHO, which became increasingly isolated politically in the dawn of the neo-liberal era.146 
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Much of WHO’s diminished influence was externally imposed. Yet the organization also 
hobbled itself in its unwillingness to acknowledge the increasing relevance of non-state 
actors to the resolution of complex health problems.147As noted by Virginia Berridge, Kelly 
Loughlin, and Rachel Herring, Alma-Ata was premised on states being the primary 
facilitators of health protection. This was in many instances inconsistent with the realities on 
the ground,148 and WHO was slow to engage with either Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
or firms in formulating new approaches to what had become global health challenges, such 
as a lack of access to essential medicines.149 In this context, RF once again proved itself as an 
innovator by presenting the PPP model as a form of global governance adapted to an era of 
fiscal austerity and an increasing number of actors seeking policy influence over how global 
health disparities could be most effectively overcome.  
 
4 .3 The Neo-l iberal  World Order  
 
The primary role of RF in the neo-liberal era has been that of ‘‘private diplomat.’’ It has 
convened meetings and presented novel frameworks oriented towards providing public 
goods to vulnerable populations in developing countries when public sector authorities 
mandated to fill this role have been unable to do so. Moreover it has sought to 
 bridge gaps between discordant parties, such as MNCs, IOs and civil society groups, which 
all play key roles in the development and provision of health technologies in developing 
countries. Its principal strategy for achieving these two broad goals has been designing, 
enabling and championing product development oriented PPPs such as IAVI and the TB 
Alliance, which have been embraced by the principal state and non-state proponents and 
beneficiaries of neo-liberal ideology. This embrace, I argue, has provided the Foundation 
with continuing discursive, instrumental and structural power in the governance of global 
health. 
 
PPPs refer to initiatives within which private entities assume some degree of responsibility 
for the provision of goods and services long considered the sole responsibility of 
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governments. In the context of international development, RF presented the PPP model in 
the early 1990s as an approach for developing new health technologies for diseases such as 
malaria and dengue ignored by pharmaceutical companies because of low profit margins. 
Now employed across the development spectrum for product development, financing, issue 
advocacy and delivery, PPPs are controversial because they institutionalize the voice of 
private actors, including for-profit entities, within the collective decision-making process at 
the global level.150 
 
A defining feature of health governance in the neo-liberal era has been the explosion of 
global PPPs across a range of sectors informed by the narrative that the innovative capacity 
of the private sector must be tapped if new health technologies and therapeutics targeting 
diseases disproportionately affecting the world’s poor are to be developed.151 Traditionally, 
the raison d’etre of corporations has been to make profits for shareholders, a purpose often 
seen as fundamentally distinctive, even in opposition to the production of public goods. Yet 
in little more than a decade through the PPP paradigm, corporations have paradoxically 
become equal partners with public sector institutions in the creation of public goods.152 
While the motivations of participating corporations may be questioned, this does not 
diminish the fact that states now rely on corporations for the development of public goods 
(e.g. vaccines) that public sectors once produced on their own.  
 
PPPs have been defined by their specificity of purpose, their partners’ commonality of 
interest, and the willingness of PPPs to allocate resources and clearly commit to add value.153 
Because the strategies of PPPs are generally formed through consensus,154 their spread has 
increased the influence of for-profit entities in how public health challenges are approached 
at the global level. As a consequence, multinational pharmaceutical companies now have 
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greater formal influence over strategies informing collective action intended to address the 
health effects of global poverty and inequality than ever before.155 
 
4.31 Product Development Partnerships 
 
RF has played a leading role in the PPP template being applied to product development 
within the health sector. Yet as will be shown below, the original push for what are 
commonly referred to as Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) was not a result of a 
pre-determined preference for markets over public sector institutions in pursuit of health as 
a public good. Instead, as will be demonstrated, it was a pragmatic adjustment on the part of 
RF to the dominance of the larger political landscape that created a need for such a template.  
Within free market economies, public sectors typically have to involve themselves where 
markets are weak but do not always do so, giving rise to state-market gaps. The first health-
oriented PDPs centered on the development of new contraceptive technologies were forged 
in the early 1970s in the United States to circumvent the consumer hostility that constrained 
both government and industry from responding to a pressing public need. By way of RF’s 
Population Division, as well as FF and RF support for organizations such as the PC and 
CONRAD, RF seed money catalyzed the development of new contraceptive options, 
including the Copper T Intrauterine Device (IUD) and Norplant, that upon demonstrating 
their efficacy, gained the support of public sector financing. In less than two decades PC 
alone registered seven products with the US Food and Drug Administration.156 
 
One organization that would prove to play a seminal role in the realization of the PDP 
template driven by RF in 1990s was actually created with FF money. With an initial FF grant 
of approximately $250,000, the non-profit Program for the Introduction and Adaptation of 
Contraceptive Technology (PIACT) was established in 1977 by former Ford employees to 
bridge the gap between the scientists at organizations such as PC that were developing 
contraceptive options, firms that would ultimately produce these technologies, family 
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planning programs, and intended consumers mostly in the developing world.157 PIACT’s 
purpose was thus to ensure that products made it from the research phase into widespread 
public use after it became evident that existing research-oriented organizations such as PC 
and public sector entities sponsoring such research institutions lacked the capacity or 
volition to ensure either production or the necessary marketing required for widespread 
adoption. Within two years of PIACT’s founding, it became apparent that while this vacuum 
was particularly relevant to contraception because of the social stigma surrounding it, it also 
existed for many other aspects of primary health care, which saw the scope of the 
organizations’ work expand, resulting in the change to its present nam-e Program for 
Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH).158  
 
From its establishment, PATH was focused on looking for problems untouched by other 
actors and providing solutions to them. The vaccine vial-monitor–one of the first 
technologies developed with funding from the United States International Development 
Agency–serves to illustrate the importance of an actor capable to bridging public and private 
sectors in pursuit of solving complex technical problems. Vaccines depended–and still 
depend in several instances–on the maintenance of a cold chain to ensure they are not 
rendered ineffective by heat exposure. The inability to maintain the cold chain has been and 
continues to be major problem in developing countries. Prior to the invention of vial-
monitors, vaccines rendered ineffective by warming were often still administered because 
there was no indicator of their potency. PATH staff learned about a chemical called PTS 
manufactured by a chemical synthesis company in Alberta, Canada licensed to the former 
Allied Chemical Corporation that changed colour with exposure to heat over time and 
incorporated it onto a label of the measles vaccine as an indicator of viability. This particular 
application of PTS led to the establishment of a new spin-off company in New Jersey called 
Temptime that has since developed a number of markers that parallel the degradation of 
several vaccines currently in use. More importantly, vaccine vial-monitors are now on almost 
every vial of vaccine distributed by UNICEF and WHO and have become a standard that 
health care workers all understand. The minor cost (adding about three cents to each vial of 
vaccine produced) has saved an estimated thirty percent of vaccine previously wasted 
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through heat exposure. Interestingly, vial monitors were not adopted by WHO and 
UNICEF for 15 years due to their concerns over the long-term financial viability of the 
producing firms and costs. In contrast, PATH took 5 years to develop it and get it out into 
public use.159  
 
While PATH would remain a small organization for another twenty years, a critical shift in 
the character of the world order set in motion shortly after its establishment ensured the 
future relevance of organizations capable of bridging public and private sectors to produce 
needed public goods to the overall governance of global health. The rise of neo-liberalism 
and the end of the Cold War created significant challenges for development-oriented 
organizations dependent on public funds and focused on attaining their goals through the 
strengthening of the innovative capacity of public sector organizations. More specifically, 
after the perceived defeat of socialism, universal health care was not a political option in the 
United States, where a push for small government and a greater role for markets in the 
production of public goods was whole-heartedly embraced. WHO suffered greatly from this 
ideology as the Reagan administration viewed it and the Alma-Ata declaration as being 
inherently socialist in nature, while the World Bank, which embodied the shift towards neo-
liberalism, was now in a comparatively much stronger position to influence international 
health governance.160 
 
Paralleling these shifts, the international harmonization of quality assurance standards for the 
production of pharmaceuticals set by WHO drove up the costs of bringing new therapeutics 
and vaccines to market. As a consequence of this combination ideological diffusion and 
increased costs, national governments in both industrialized and developing countries were 
increasingly ceding the responsibility of developing and producing essential medicines and 
preventative technologies to firms, which were better positioned to shoulder the financial 
burden of conducting clinical trials and meeting such international quality assurance 
standards.161  
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This is not say that public sectors (i.e. national research institutes or universities) do not 
engage in clinical research relevant to the needs of the world’s poor. The first phases in 
clinical trials (0/1) is that of target validation and discovery (e.g. determining pathogenesis, 
inhibitors etc.), an innovative phase which public institutions tend to be good at and which 
public granting councils often fund. However the process of establishing safety, testing 
protocols, conducting clinical trials is expensive, industrial, and beyond the budget of 
national grant-making agencies. Moreover applicants proposing to undertake this kind of 
research in Northern states compete for funding from a pool of funds informed by national 
priorities where neglected tropical diseases have little direct relevance.162 
 
By the early 1990s, with few exceptions, only large pharmaceutical companies had the 
resources to take drugs and vaccines from the target validation and discovery phase, to phase 
three trials under current international regulatory standards set by WHO. Yet concerns over 
the financial risks of actually doing so meant that these firms had also been shying away 
from investing in the needs of the world’s poor for several decades. The reality of 
pharmaceutical research is that for every eureka moment in the lab, there are many failures; 
drugs intended for those with limited purchasing power typically offer low returns on 
investment; and even when sales are guaranteed, there is a short period to recoup the high 
costs of research and development, given the natural process of drug resistance which is 
accelerated by sub-optimal usage.163 
 
For some this begs the question as to whether the Good Manufacturing and Laboratory 
Practice Standards–the regime set by WHO stipulating the criteria that new drugs and 
vaccines must meet before they can be licensed–might be loosened to enable such research 
and development intended to benefit countries where established private pharmaceutical 
sectors are limited. In low and middle-income countries, local innovation for local needs 
usually produces products that are not high technology. Consequently, regulatory regimes in 
such contexts are typically not as strenuous as their analogues in high-income countries, for 
example the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In the eyes of some 
developing country scientists, the harmonization of rigid universal standards can be an 
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impediment to local innovation, for if such products do not cause harm and the local criteria 
are met, there should be allowances for such products to enter local markets.164 
 
In the mid-1990s for example, RF was working with a Chinese company in the production 
of a safe and effective yet inexpensive Hepatitis B vaccine.  The product, however, did not 
meet WHO quality standards, which meant that donor funding could not be used to 
purchase the vaccine for use outside of China. While RF ended up helping the Chinese 
develop an approved production process, it resulted in a more expensive vaccine.165 
 
Yet from WHO’s perspective, allowing for two different quality standards would imply that 
poor people cannot have the same quality of drugs as people living in wealthy countries, 
which is deemed completely unacceptable from the standpoint of organizations working 
towards global health equity. While greater regulatory scrutiny has increased the cost and 
timelines of getting approvals for new therapeutics and vaccines, the overall increase in 
stringency resulting from the global harmonization of quality standards is deemed to be a net 
benefit. This is because poor quality of any product undermines confidence in that product 
class, which is why WHO pays such close attention to adverse events.166 
 
Clearly there is an element of truth in both viewpoints and it comes down to what is deemed 
to be sufficient oversight, what is practical and how much risk societies are willing to accept 
to get the products they want.167 The reality that RF was forced to work around in the 
context of the early 1990s was that most public sector institutions lack the development or 
manufacturing capacity to bring product to market,168 meaning that firms had to be engaged 
if new drugs and vaccines for the world’s poor were to be created, a situation which remains 
largely unchanged today.169 
 
Certainly for states, the appeal of the PPP model in product development was that the 
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private sector would take on the costs and risks of developing and delivering in a timely 
manner, end products which public sectors lacked the capacity to produce on their own.170 
By taking the view held by some of RF’s critics that states should not have involved 
themselves with firms in the pursuit of strengthening public health, half of all available 
research funding would automatically be removed from the equation, as would access to 
cutting-edge technology. To attain access to the best possible science, RF was willing to 
partner with businesses.171 The PDP paradigm established by PATH offered a neat solution 
to the seemingly intractable problem posed by the lack of resources being committed by 
either public and private authorities for research and developing preventative and therapeutic 
options for important diseases of the poor, the so-called “neglected diseases.” Consequently, 
through seed funding and diplomacy, RF began leveraging private sector resources, public 
sector capital and commitments working towards a common goal to enable to the creation 
of needed technologies for the public good that public sectors were no longer capable of 
producing on their own. 
 
4.32 The Children’s Vaccine Initiative 
 
This enablement began in 1984 when the Task Force for Child Survival (TFCS) was struck 
to address the subject of vaccines for neglected diseases. A neutral expert-advisory body 
convened by WHO, UNICEF, RF, World Bank, and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), TFCS was intended to serve as a Secretariat and the coordinating body 
for the member organizations’ collaborative immunization efforts tasked with developing a 
system of immunization that would function across the various WHO regions. While the 
resulting template was credited with dramatically improving global immunization rates within 
a five-year period, this proved to be a temporary success, as the system ultimately fell apart 
in its infancy following changes to the leadership of the participating IOs that produced 
discordant views on the utility of the approach, and on WHO ceding authority to an external 
body.172 This brief success and ensuing collapse illustrates well the challenges of sustaining a 
common commitment to ideational forms of governance.  
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 Over a period of six years RF–playing the role of private diplomat–sponsored a series of 
conferences intended to increase dialogue related to TFCS ideas. The CVI grew out of these 
efforts. Established in 1990 by the same aforementioned partners, CVI was created as a 
stand-alone entity for the initial purpose of coordinating the development of an inexpensive 
heat-stable vaccine intended specifically for children that would confer immunity to multiple 
pathogens through a single oral dose. However during the course of exploring how CVI 
could function, it became clear that ensuring the sustainable supply of vaccines was a more 
pressing problem that deserved attention. 173 In his 2005 book on the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation’s (BMGF’s) Children’s Vaccine Program and birth of the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), William Muraskin illustrates that what began as 
coalition committed to the realization of a particular product morphed into an attempt to 
‘‘rationalize’’ the entire chain of immunization–from the discovery stage, to product 
development and production, to delivery of the end product–when it became apparent that 
the various contributors (e.g. academic scientists, industry, states and NGOs) were operating 
with very little understanding or consideration of each other’s needs, giving rise to a 
fragmented system that ultimately compromised global immunization efforts.174 CVI sought 
to enhance funding for procurement by adding additional vaccines such as Hepatitis B to the 
list of vaccines subsidized by WHO and UNICEF, but this effort was resisted by the two 
agencies.175 In the eyes of its proponents, CVI failed because the participating UN agencies 
were unwilling to cede agenda-setting power for the greater good.176 
 
While CVI did not fulfill its stated goal, it nonetheless effectively illuminated the challenges 
within the vaccine sector undermining the push for ensuring the availability of ‘‘essential 
medicines’’ being made by proponents of a human rights approach to public health.177 More 
broadly, it foreshadowed the trend of a shift from brick and mortar institutions formulating 
global health policy to diverse networks held together by a commitment to a common goal 
and vision for achieving that goal.  
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In the wake of CVI’s establishment in 1990, RF began canvassing support from individual 
firms and public sector agencies for partnerships oriented towards producing new drugs and 
vaccines needed to prevent and treat diseases of poverty. While the foundation was not the 
source of the PPP template, it was instrumental in its rise to prominence as the dominant 
strategy for creating new health related technologies intended to benefit the world’s poor. 
 
4.33 The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative and the beginning of a trend 
 
RF’s initial product development partnership began in the early 1990s when the Foundation 
undertook a feasibility study focused on creating a viable AIDS vaccine, for which PATH 
served as the template.178 This meant assessing the state of the current immunological 
research related to HIV and identifying relevant prospective public and private sector 
partners with whom consultations were held to rally support for the concept and to assess 
individual needs.179 A 1994 Bellagio meeting convened by RF’s Seth Berkley led to consensus 
on the need for the organization to have a clear purpose, close cooperation between 
industry, national government, public sector research agencies and IO partners, while being 
reflective of their individual needs.180 This consensus led to the creation in 1996 of the 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) as an independent not-for-profit organization, 
led by Berkley on an interim and then permanent basis. Since its creation, IAVI has grown 
has coordinated 24 HIV separate trial vaccine candidates in twenty-five countries.181 
 
RF would rely on PATH template in its all of its subsequent partnerships focused on 
developing new drugs and vaccines for neglected diseases including TB, malaria and 
dengue.182 Indeed all of RF’s PDPs have been guided by the principle that good research and 
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development will ensure that products are developed with consideration for what the 
intended beneficiaries can afford to both purchase and deliver. This is significant because if 
governments attempt to integrate the end-products of PDPs into their current health 
systems without being able to afford them, there is a real danger that such products will 
crowd out other less expensive but still viable options.183  
 
The TB Alliance, for example, epitomizes this thinking. Established in 2000, the TB Alliance 
was built around the goal of developing a drug that can reduce the duration of necessary 
treatment, which would make a significant positive impact in TB control efforts. However, 
to be viewed a success, the deliverable needs to be as inexpensive or less expensive than the 
current standard because if it is unaffordable for those who need it, then there is no utility in 
developing it.184 Under the leadership of Ariel-Pablos Mendez, former Director of Health 
Equity at RF and the current Assistant Administrator of Global Health at USAID, the PPP 
approach became a stand-alone model giving rise to the first global PDPs, including IAVI, 
TB Alliance, Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) and the Global Campaign for 
Microbicides.185  
 
The PPP paradigm has become the defining feature of global health governance in the neo-
liberal era, and RF’s role has become first and foremost that of global health diplomat, 
wholly consistent with its historical legacy, and given the private shift in global governance, 
fitting for an actor situated at the interaction of the public, private and third sectors.  The 
Foundation’s contemporary role as an intermediary between the increasingly large number of 
players shaping global health outcomes and an “honest broker” in the face of global power 
inequities was displayed in 1996, when the Foundation convened an informal meeting of 
some thirty individuals, including but not limited to officials from WHO, World Bank, 
UNICEF and the United Nations Development Program,186 at the original Rockefeller 
estate. Labeled the ‘‘the Pocantico group,’’ the majority of those present were from 
Northern countries and representative of a traditional bio-medical background espousing an 
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expectation of continued United States dominance in agenda setting. Yet for the first time 
RF called for a broader approach to global health governance, more inclusive of the diversity 
of actors seeking to influence outcomes.187 
  
RF has not been the sole driver of the new paradigm, but it has certainly been faster than 
other non-state actors at understanding the implications for public health in the changing 
political landscape. The diffusion of neo-liberal ideology greatly constrained the operational 
capacity and policy influence of health-focused IOs such as the WHO, and inferred that the 
only two actors of importance were states and markets. PDPs were intended as a band-aid 
for a crack that appeared, the pharmacological needs of the poor which these two actors 
were not addressing through neo-liberal policies. That said, the emergence of civil society as 
a political movement in this same period has–from RF’s perspective–has been far more 
important than PPPs to improving the overall health and wealth of marginalized populations 
and has been integral to the success of PDPs, given civil society’s instrumental role in 
ensuring health products reach their intended beneficiaries.188 
 
The entrenchment of the PPP paradigm–a market-based approach to development–reflects 
that we live in much more of a market-based world then any other period in the post-war era 
because of the spread of capitalism in all its variations. The result is an approach to 
strengthening health and emphasizing the potential of science that works within the 
dominant market-liberal economic paradigm, while seeking to correct for any of its 
deficiencies. The purpose of PDPs has not been to provide new ways for large corporations 
to profit, as the critical lens would suggest. Instead, it has been to subsidize risk-taking by 
those with the capacity to make meaningful contributions to understanding complex 
problems such as HIV adversely impacting the health and wealth developing countries, with 
the end goal of creating elusive solutions (e.g. vaccines) to said problems.  
 
Yet liberal descriptions of the Foundations as mere supporters of states also does not 
capture the significance of RF’s institutional innovations. While the nation state remains the 
most important actor in a sea of actors seeking to shape the governance of global health, 
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effective collective action is no longer something states are capable or are willing to 
orchestrate themselves, meaning that the PPP model as an approach to collective action will 
likely remain relevant for the foreseeable future. Moreover PPPs in global health (also 
referred to as Global Health Partnerships (GHPs)) now exist for a variety of reasons beyond 
compensating for market failure, including (i) financing (exemplified by the Global Fund for 
AIDS, TB and malaria, hereafter referred to as the Global Fund); (ii) product delivery and 
technical assistance (such as Merck’s Mectizan Donation Program (MDP) for the treatment 
of onchocerciasis; (iii) issue advocacy (for example the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) partnership; 
and (iv) knowledge mobilization for improved policy (for example the Health Metrics 
Network).189 
 
4.34 The International Association of Public Health Institutes 
 
Yet while RF has been a catalyst for models of governance beyond the interstate system in 
the context of public health, it also evident the Foundation has remained committed to 
direct public sector capacity strengthening in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-
century. Funding the creation of the International Association of Public Health Institutes 
(IANPHI) is one such illustration. 
 
IANPHI is the brainchild of Jeffrey Koplan, who as Director of the United States Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from 1998 to 2002, saw the value of having 
analogues to CDC elsewhere. There was significant international interest in the concept, 
which Koplan agreed to initiate in partnership with Pekka Puska, the current Director 
General of Finland’s National Institute of Public Health and Welfare. Continuing RF’s role 
as private diplomat and tradition of epistemic expansion, Timothy Evans of RF offered to 
sponsor and organize the initial meeting on the concept at Bellagio, which was intended to 
convene in October of 2001; however the September 2011 attacks led to this meeting being 
postponed for one year. RF provided logistical support for the initial 2002 meeting, which 
was attended by representatives from approximately two dozen countries. Furthermore, 
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Evans stayed involved during his transition from RF to WHO, where as an Assistant 
Director General for Evidence, Information, Research and Policy, he served as WHO’s 
point-person for the fledgling association.190 
 
By 2007, Foundation President Judith Rodin was questioning the utility of the health 
program. Yet the global financial crisis greatly diminished the credibility of neo-liberalism as 
a policy paradigm by demonstrating that markets can fail, thus heightening the perceived 
need for greater state involvement in global governance and creating new opportunities for 
an organization seeking a stronger role for states in the maintenance of population health. 
Once again RF was quick to adapt to shifts in the preferences of government, in this case 
changing regulatory appetites which provided an opportunity for health governance reform 
which the Foundation capitalized upon by spearheading a joint-learning network on the 
payment systems underpinning universal health coverage.191 
 
The rationale for dialogue on universal health coverage was that Northern states are 
spending more and more of their money on health care and government health spending will 
soon triple. Ironically, up until this point, the people who control capital flows related to 
health care delivery in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada 
have never had a voice in the global health arena. RF brought these people together to learn 
important universally relevant lessons about each other’s experiences.192 According to one 
former Director of RF’s Health Equity program, the most important of these lessons is that 
states such as Canada, which currently refuse to entertain the idea of a private sector role in 
care delivery, are in fact being disingenuous by failing to acknowledge the existence of an 
already active private health sector in their midst. The unofficial status of these private 
sectors is creating distortions as to how much money is actually being spent on health care. 
From the perspective of this former RF director, private care is where these states can 
attempt to control the total spent while still ensuring universal access.193 Some might 
interpret this message as RF’s endorsement for an American-style system of health care. 
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However a 2009 RF report demonstrated that the benefits of universal care systems 
outweigh the costs in most countries. While the report stopped short of explicitly criticizing 
the American health-care model, its findings nevertheless further diminished its credibility.194 
 
4.4 Conc lus ion  
 
Upon reviewing some of RF’s more prominent attempts to strengthen public health in 
developing countries over its one hundred year history, it is apparent that the Foundation 
has relied on three principal strategies to advance its ideas, which have changed over time in 
response to larger changes in the global political economy. 
The first such strategy–one that has remained a constant throughout its history–has been to 
illuminate the potential of SEI to address longstanding public health challenges, as illustrated 
by the development of the first yellow fever vaccine. While the biomedical lens reigned 
supreme within the Foundation for at the least first forty years of its existence, alternative 
visions of how science can and should be used to advance its goals have long existed within 
the organization and been reflected in its programs, yet such heterogeneity has been ignored 
by its most vocal critics.  
 
The second such strategy has been facilitating country-level epistemic expansions through 
grants and operational programs and creating post-secondary institutions that educated 
countries policy elite. While this strategy appears to have waned over time, some of the most 
enduring investments in the history of public health and medical research, such as the Johns 
Hopkins School of Public Health, Rockefeller University, Peking Union Medical College, 
and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, which created spaces for the 
dissemination of new science and the expansion of knowledge bases, were the direct result 
of RF grant-making and diplomatic efforts in the first decade of its existence.195  
 
Moreover while the Foundation has increasingly shifted its attention from the national to the 
international scale, its capacity to consolidate epistemic networks and create spaces for the 
unifying ideas to be tested has remained. This is significant for while global governance 
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certainly infers the creation of rules and institutions, it also implies the existence of informal 
decentralized networks that create and advocate norms informing acceptable behavior. 
 
Third, as more actors have sought policy influence in both national and international arenas, 
the Foundation’s capacity to facilitate informal dialogue between relevant although often 
distrustful stakeholders has proven effective for overcoming impediments to cooperation. 
RF has nurtured the construction of novel strategies and institutional frameworks designed 
to address state and market failures disproportionately affecting the world’s marginalised 
while still accommodating the preferences of those states promoting neoliberalsm to ensure 
that they support as opposed to derail the Foundation’s initiatives. Consequently RF has 
displayed a unique capacity for private diplomacy and adaptation in governance that is 
epitomized by the product development partnership approach.  
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Chapter 5: RF & the Governance of Global Agricultural Development 
 
5.0 Introduc t ion  
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF’s) role 
in global agricultural development and the framing of food security debates, from the 
Progressive to the Neoliberal era. The chapter demonstrates that RF has played a critical role 
in shaping how agricultural development has been approached in both individual developing 
countries and international policy making arenas focused on the needs of the world’s poor, 
and that it has done so by employing the same strategies used in its public health initiatives. 
 
The chapter begins by examining how the Foundation effectively demonstrated how 
advances in agricultural science could solve longstanding food security-related challenges. 
The transition from supporting government efforts in the United States in the first decade of 
the twentieth-century through applied education, to managing operational programs across 
the developing world is examined by way of the Foundation’s initiatives in Mexico in the 
1940s. RF’s work in Mexico provided the most notable example of the how Science Enabled 
Innovation (SEI) has been a gateway to policy influence. There, RF plant breeders developed 
the high-yielding varieties of wheat that were embraced by governments throughout Latin 
America and Asia, giving rise to what is now known as the Green Revolution. 
 
The second strategy for advancing ideas in policy arenas that the chapter examines has been 
RF’s efforts to construct epistemic communities in agriculture within and across states. Over 
a fifty-year period beginning in the 1930s in China, I show how RF facilitated the training of 
scores of developing country agronomists, agricultural economists and molecular biologists. 
Training initiatives such as the Mexican and Indian agricultural programs and the 
International Rice Biotechnology Program, I argue, produced scientific epistemic 
communities, which ensured that particular ways of approaching and addressing agricultural 
development and food security were embedded within the public sectors of the countries 
where the Foundation sought to catalyze change.  
 
The third and final strategy the chapter examines has been RF’s private diplomacy, meaning 
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its provision opportunities for policy makers to converge and consider ideational blueprints 
for facilitating global cooperation on agricultural challenges intended to benefit the world’s 
poorest people. One such RF roadmap that was embraced by states was the International 
Agricultural Research Centre (IARC) mode, beginning with the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) in 1960. The IARC model, I argue, serves to illustrate RF’s shift away from 
country-specific initiatives in favour of an international approach to agricultural 
development. The establishment in 1971 of the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which now governs those centres, built on this 
internationalist approach. 
 
Finally, the Foundation’s adaptation to the shift from international to global governance 
brought on by the end of the Cold War and the rise of neo-liberalism is looked at through 
the application of the Product Development Partnership (PDP) template to agriculture. The 
framework that embodies this shift is the experimental framework that served as the 
blueprint for the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), an independent 
organization that presently coordinates much of the global collaboration geared towards 
agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The combination of the promotion of SEI, the construction of scientific epistemic 
communities, and private diplomacy and institutional innovation have provided the 
Foundation with direct influence over how agriculture is practiced and taught, how related 
research is funded and coordinated, and how markets and technologies have been made 
accessible to impoverished farmers. Perceived success in these areas has afforded the 
Foundation power to shape the dominant discourse related to the determinants of global 
food insecurity, to orient research trajectories directed at solving said problems, and to 
establish institutional legacies within which those specific ideas and strategies became 
embedded and perpetuated. 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter supports the larger argument that from its 
inception, the Foundation’s capacity to adjust its approach to fit the political context where 
it has sought to influence outcomes, coupled with its unwavering commitment to 
strengthening of indigenous scientific capacity, has informed both the successes and 
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shortcomings of its country-level and transnational programs’ attempts to reduce hunger 
across the global South. While much of the empirical evidence informing these arguments 
was drawn from pre-existing works, this chapter nonetheless contributes to the existing 
literature on the Foundation through the provision of new insights on the formation of 
PDPs such as the African Agricultural Technology Foundation, and the template upon 
which AGRA is modeled. 
 
5 .1 A Driver o f  s tate -backed agri cu l tural modern izat ion in the progress i ve  e ra  
 
The Foundation’s initial foray into international agricultural development was informed by 
the premise that combining cutting-edge science, with the efficiency of modern industrial 
technologies and management practices that had dramatically increased productivity on 
American farms, would have the same effect in other countries if implemented there.1 
As per its efforts to strengthen public health in this time period, RF’s efforts in agricultural 
development in the immediate post-colonial era were focused on generating science-enabled 
innovation and building public sector capacity in agricultural sciences via the provision of 
advanced training in select disciplines to nationals of the countries within which the 
foundation operated. Credibility gained via breakthroughs in science and the construction 
and expansion of epistemic communities sympathetic to the foundation’s ideas continued to 
be vehicles for the Foundation to attain policy influence at the county level. 
 
Over a fifty-year period commencing in the mid-nineteenth-century, a series of United States 
congressional acts built on progressive principles laid the groundwork for the modernization 
of commercial agriculture in the United States. The first–the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 
1861–earmarked federal funding for the establishment of agricultural colleges in each state 
with the purpose of increasing the number of formally trained agronomists engaged in 
teaching and applied research. The following year saw the establishment of a new federal 
agency, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), to coordinate the distribution 
of funding and to promote on a national scale the uptake of scientific advances and new 
technologies among American farmers. In 1887 the Hatch Act served to strengthen the 
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capacity of the emerging land-grant colleges by providing funding for the development of 
state-run experimental research stations focusing on areas such as plant breeding, irrigation, 
soil management, pest control and later nutrition and economics. Finally, the Adams Act of 
1906 and the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 provided additional funds for research and increasing 
farmers’ access to ongoing technical innovation.2 
 
In 1902, the USDA initiated a farm demonstration program geared towards increasing 
farmers’ exposure to and adoption of advances in agricultural sciences. Led by Seaman 
Knapp, a co-author of the Hatch Act, the demonstrations were funded by the USDA in 
cotton-growing states adversely affected by a widespread boll weevil infestation.3 General 
Education Board (GEB) monies filled a gap by ensuring that instruction on improved 
farming techniques and information about of the benefits of adopting new seed varieties, 
mechanization, irrigation methods, and the application of chemical fertilizers reached 
farmers in Southern regions ineligible for USDA funds.4 The GEB’s farm demonstration 
program, which ran from 1906 until 1932, is credited with playing a critical role in the 
spectacular increase in crop yields in states where it was active, particularly in maize, which 
made commercial farming in the southern states a profitable enterprise. Because of its 
success, the education program became the template for the USDA’s own extension 
program that was applied throughout the American South and West.5 RF’s preference for 
investing in people as opposed to physical infrastructure and its long-term commitments 
with ambitious end-goals would prove to be hallmarks of the Foundation’s work.6 
 
In the 1920s, via the International Education Board, RF extended the promotion of 
agricultural modernization outside of the United States for the first time, again through farm 
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demonstrations in several European countries including Denmark, Norway, Hungary and 
Bulgaria. A second foray into international agriculture occurred from 1935 to 1937 as part of 
a rural reconstruction program in China initiated by the China Medical Board (CMB). There 
the Foundation provided support for what was already considered to be the premier 
agricultural post-secondary institutions–the University of Nanjing–which trained the 
majority of Chinese agronomists, while actively promoting the land-grant model by 
encouraging the strengthening of linkages between university and government research 
programs.7  
 
From the mid-1930s onwards beginning with China, the Foundations’ focus on capacity 
building in agriculture was focused solely on the developing world. The Foundation’s 
leadership assumed that that archaic methods were constraining production across the global 
South, but by establishing new national centers of excellence in agricultural research 
committed to training scientists and educating farmers on the benefits of adopting new 
approaches and technologies, overall yields would increase leading to increased incomes for 
farmers, and overall reductions in rural poverty and hunger.8  
 
5.11 The Mexican Agricultural Program: The operational template for the Green Revolution 
 
This same logic informed the foundation’s first operational agricultural-specific programs, 
beginning with the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) in 1941, the first of a series of 
initiatives that would drive dramatic social and environmental changes across much of Latin 
America and Asia. In what would be later be termed the Green Revolution, newly developed 
high-yielding varieties replaced traditional cultivars to increase national yields of cereal crops, 
primarily wheat and rice. While this rapid transition produced many long-term ecological, 
health and social challenges, the principal goals of the Green Revolution’s architects and 
partner governments–strengthening national capacities in agricultural science and the 
widespread adoption by farmers of new seed varieties and associated inputs to increase 
overall yields–were ultimately achieved. 
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As per its experience in the American South, RF agricultural program in Mexico evolved out 
of a pre-existing public health partnership established in 1921 between the Mexican Ministry 
of Health and the International Health Board (IHB) within which RF had provided 
fellowships to Mexican trainees who returned to take up leadership positions within the 
Mexican public health system. As in the American South, the Foundation was increasingly 
concerned that limited economic growth would undermine any population health gains 
made in Mexico through improved indigenous expertise.9 Discussion within the foundation 
of potential involvement in agricultural development as a means to stimulate economic 
growth in Mexico began in 1933, but with the initiation of land redistribution efforts 
undertaken by President Lazaro Cardenas’ government beginning in 1934, the Mexican 
political climate was deemed to be unreceptive to RF’s ideas. However, with the election of 
President Manuel Avila Camacho in 1940, a conservative committed to expanding Mexico’s 
industrial base, dialogue between RF and the Mexican government on the subject of 
agricultural modernization was once again deemed viable.10 
 
RF received further encouragement that same year from American Vice-President elect 
Henry Wallace, who had become concerned with what he also perceived to be a correlation 
between widespread Mexican poverty and anachronistic agricultural methods constraining 
production. Wallace’s views were invariably influenced by his own experience as a farmer 
and the co-founder of the Hi-Bred Company. Established in 1926 to produce the new 
hybrid corn varieties that would dramatically increase yields in the United States, Hi-Bred 
would later evolve into Pioneer Hi-Bred, the largest producer of hybrid seeds in the United 
States. Described by Bruce Jennings as the ‘‘father of industrialized agriculture’’ and the 
‘‘arch-typical progressive,’’ Wallace’s views on agriculture effectively complimented those of 
RF leadership.11 
 
While the United States government as a whole initially expressed little interest in this issue, 
Wallace did persuade RF President Raymond Fosdick, Regional Director of Public Health 
                                                
9 Bruce Jennings, Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1988): 45-46. 
10 Jennings; Joseph Cotter, ‘‘The Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican Agricultural Project: A Cross-Cultural 
Encounter, 1943-1949,’’ in Missionaries of Science: the Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America, ed., Marcos Cueto 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 97-98. 
11 Jennings, 47; Perkins. 
 117 
John Ferrel, and Director of the Natural Science Program Warren Weaver to explore ways in 
which the foundation could help Mexican farmers. RF assembled an initial survey team 
comprised of a geneticist, soil specialist and plant pathologist to assess Mexico’s needs for a 
future RF project. The group toured Mexico in 1941 and recommended that RF establish an 
advisory group to the Mexican Dept of Agriculture with expertise in agronomy and soil 
science, plant breeding, plant pathology, entomology and animal husbandry.12 
 
Mexico’s twenty-year experiment with land reform had failed to solve the county’s food 
security woes. As illustrated by Joseph Cotter, while the country temporarily attained self-
sufficiency in maize production by the mid-1930s, government scientists could not offset 
repeated pest and climate-related challenges, diminishing enthusiasm for the land reform 
paradigm within the Mexican agricultural science community. In this context, President 
Camacho and the Foundation entered into a partnership in 1943 with the establishment of 
the Office of Special Studies (OSS), formally associated with the Mexican Ministry of 
Agriculture and housed within the National Agricultural College at Chapingo.13 
 
 The professionals whom RF selected to study, plan and carry out MAP were all products of 
the land-grant system and, as noted by Deborah Fitzgerald had only one plausible model to 
refer to for creating a modern commercial agricultural sector: the American experience. OSS 
was modeled on the state agricultural research station concept and was purposefully 
partnered with a university to provide an onsite training facility for research fellows.14 As 
argued by Edward Oasa and Bruce Jennings, the major difference between RF’s role in the 
United States and that of Mexico and subsequent country programs was that with the 
establishment of MAP, the Foundation shifted from being a mere philanthropic agency in 
the field of agriculture to being a manager of the research it promoted.15 
 
Yet the American template for increasing food production faced a very significant challenge 
in Mexico: the majority of Mexicans engaged in cultivation were doing so on a small-scale 
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and for subsistence purposes. Mexico’s social fabric challenged the core assumptions of RF 
embedded staff, in that farmers did not attempt make use of their full productive capacity or 
market their produce commercially.16 Up until that point, no government, let alone a non-
state actor, had attempted to create a scientific infrastructure in a non-industrialized country 
devoted to improving food crops.17  
 
To address these concerns, RF recruited Carl Sauer, a geographer from UC Berkeley with 
many years of experience in Latin America known for his emphasis of social studies as a 
means of understanding economic problems, to advise on the planning of MAP. Sauer 
suggested that Mexican peasants’ traditional food choices were nutritionally sufficient and 
were undermined only by financial constraints. According to Sauer’s analysis, hunger’s 
determinants in Mexico were not technological in nature but instead the result of political 
and economic inequities, which nutritional studies conducted by the foundation’s own IHD 
between 1942 and 1945 confirmed.18 Accordingly, Sauer and another consulting scientist, 
paleo-botanist Edgar Anderson from the University of Washington, cautioned the 
Foundation that applying the American model of standardizing a few commercial crops 
would upset the native economy and culture while diminishing genetic diversity and instead 
emphasized building on the knowledge of the peasantry.19  
 
The Foundation’s approach to agricultural development would evolve to incorporate the 
ideas advocated by the likes of Sauer, yet at that time such advice was not heeded. Instead, 
RF embraced the thinking of Herrell De Graff, the Head of the Social Science Division 
within the Foundation, who advised focusing on commercial farms as they were more 
similar to the American model and the required inputs would be less foreign.20 
 
Nick Cullather makes the case and since Mexico was not truly challenged by insufficient 
production, the country was not in need of agricultural modernization. MAP’s true purpose, 
he argues, was to bring the country into line with the industrial model dominant in the 
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United States (i.e. reducing the number of varieties grown) to function as a producer of food 
products for the American market. Cullather also argues that MAP served as a template for 
subverting communism that could be sold to Third World countries under the auspices of 
averting hunger.21 As noted by Oasa and Jennings,22 at least one internal Foundation 
memorandum illustrates that some RF staff were indeed supportive of such a strategy, given 
that “Communism makes attractive promises to underfed people.”23 Evidence that such sentiment 
existed within the Foundation has been used effectively to advance the argument that RF 
functioned as a proxy of American capitalism, with limited autonomy of its own.  
 
MAP was comprised of two main research programs: the first focused on maize, the second 
on wheat.  Both were oriented towards developing varieties that would allow farmers to 
increase their overall yields without undermining the traditional reuse or trading of seeds.24 
In this regard, both programs achieved success with the development of high yielding yet 
true breeding varieties, which were the result of hybridization but, as is often incorrectly 
stated, were not true hybrids.25 Indeed both programs illustrate well how the foundation 
used science-enabled innovation so effectively in this era to attain credibility with 
development country governments. 
 
Wheat production, for example, increased from an average of 700kg per hectare to over 
2000kg per hectare.26 However, because maize was grown predominantly by small-holders 
on subsistence farms averaging three hectares throughout the country, the economics of 
scale and the proportionately high costs of required complimentary inputs (namely water, 
fertilizer, and pesticides) ensured a low rate of adoption of the maize varieties, despite seed 
being freely available.27 The wheat program, in contrast, led by future Nobel laureate 
Norman Borlaug, was a resounding success from the foundation’s perspective, based on the 
ninety percent overall adoption-rate by wheat farmers of the High Yielding Varieites (HYV) 
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and the overall increases in national yields. Unlike the smallholder maize growers, wheat was 
grown primarily by established commercial farmers on plots averaging seventeen hectares. 
While certainly a minority of the country’s agriculturalists, these farmers were far better 
positioned to access credit arrangements and adopt the necessary inputs and associated 
mechanized production tools and took full advantage of the opportunity to do so.28 
 
RF extension program, comprised of farm demonstrations and technical bulletins, also 
ended up conferring minimal advantage for the majority of Mexico’s farmers, again for 
entirely social reasons. For the predominantly illiterate peasant population, technical bulletins 
proved to be of little help. At the same time, the Mexican government acting out of 
concern that in the post-revolutionary era, the wider public would view the program as 
evidence of foreign interference in the country’s education system purposefully limited 
access to farm-based education programs.29 
 
Moreover, while the development of the HYV are generally viewed as being MAP’s greatest 
success given the spectacular increase in yields that their introduction to several Asian 
countries resulted in, it was the OSS training program that left the greatest long-term impact 
on the overall management of Mexican agriculture. The program provided an estimated 700 
Mexican scientists with training in advanced agricultural techniques, and through fellowships 
the opportunity for over 200 trainees to attend one of the US land grant institutions for 
additional training. In doing so the program not only greatly expanded Mexico’s agricultural 
technocratic elite, it ensured that a particular set of ideas related to how agriculture 
challenges are best addressed which had become dominant in the United States, were now 
firmly embedded and perpetuated within Mexico’s national agricultural bureaucracy. 
Consequently, MAP illustrates how RF used the construction of epistemic communities to 
gain policy influence within the countries where it operated during this time period. At the 
time of MAP’s dissolution in 1961, OSS became an entirely Mexican entity, re-branded as 
the now defunct National Institute for Agricultural Investigations (INIA).30  
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Furthermore, once the template for MAP was established, RF entered into a series of similar 
collaborative partnerships with ministries of agriculture in several states across Latin 
America, Asia and Africa. By 1960, in addition to Mexico, RF staff were working in 
operational programs or advisory roles related to agriculture in Columbia, Chile, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Panama, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan and India.31  
 
One remarkable aspect of the Foundation’s history has been the degree to which core-staff 
have moved from program to program, taking on leadership roles and ensuring consistency 
in approach across a wide range of political and social contexts. At the request of the Indian 
government for example, RF initiated the Indian Agricultural Program (IAP) in 1952, which 
for its first decade was directed by Ralph Cummings Sr., a former manager of North 
Carolina’s Agricultural Research Station.32 As in Mexico, IAP’s research program initially 
focused on establishing national centres of excellence for the improvement of two crops: 
maize and wheat. The maize hybridization program was initiated in 1955 and directed by U.J. 
Grant, formerly of the foundation’s Columbian program, while the wheat program was 
established in 1962 by Norman Borlaug, who came to India from Mexico at the personal 
invitation of B.P. Pal, Director of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI),33 and 
went on to advise on other national wheat improvement programs in Pakistan and 
Morocco.34 Ignacio Naravaez, who trained under inaugural MAP Director and future RF 
President George Harrar, became the principal adviser to Pakistan’s wheat program, helping 
the country attain self-sufficiency in wheat production by 1968.35  
 
Invitations from other governments seeking the perceived benefits accrued by Mexico thus 
provided RF with opportunities to replicate its model and embed within the public service of 
partner governments, members of what were quickly becoming an international epistemic 
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community. 
 
5 .2 Innovat ion in the IO era: The International Agri cu l tural Research Centres  
 
Beginning in the early 1950s, RF began looking at how to strengthen agriculture and food 
security from a regional perspective, initially focusing its attention on Asia. Capitalizing on 
the widespread support which existed in this period for the establishment of International 
Organizations (IOs), RF advanced a proposal in 1954 for an international rice research 
institute which would focus on fundamental physiological, biochemical and genetic 
problems. The model change meant moving away from country-specific operation programs 
constrained by political and geographical boundaries and foreshadowed the eventual bio-
molecular revolution, which would again begin to change the face of agricultural 
development three decades later.36 
 
In 1958 the Ford Foundation (FF), motivated by the potential socio-economic gains 
associated with agricultural development, entered into a 15-year partnership with RF to fund 
the development and operation of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). While 
FF contributions would be limited to being largely monetary in nature, RF’s primary 
responsibility was to provide the necessary expertise to lead a facility with a complex and 
novel mandate. The Foundations were attracted to the Philippines because of its perceived 
political stability and robust post-secondary infrastructure and had engaged in preliminary 
discussions with the national government about situating the institute on lands bordering the 
University of the Philippines’ College of Agriculture at Los Banos. In 1960 IRRI was 
formally established at this location through a national act that provided it with perpetual tax 
immunity. The initial US$ 7,510,000 cost of constructing IRRI was paid for via FF grants, 
although by 1964 the Foundations had agreed to divide costs equally, with RF assuming 
responsibility for the its operations and staffing.37 
 
IRRI was expected to engage in adaptive research to meet regional needs as well as provide 
technical assistance to countries for specific projects upon request. Training would also be 
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an important aspect of its work, and IRRI and all subsequent International Agricultural 
Centers (IARCs) would be affiliated with a university to facilitate this.38 IRRI’s success 
would be measured in terms of its applications and quickly produced important innovations, 
including the rice variety IR8, developed from germplasm originating in China, Taiwan, and 
Indonesia and dubbed ‘‘miracle rice’’ for its associated high yields.39  
 
It has been suggested that because the United States government was so determined to see 
Vietnam’s rice production increased to thwart any potential sympathy for communism 
arising from hunger, it was willfully blind to the fact that the inputs required to sustain these 
high-yielding rice varieties were not available for South Asia’s smallholders.40 This does 
detract however from the argument that through IRRI, the Foundation was once again and 
this time on a larger scale actively engaged in creating governance structures which shaped 
how agricultural challenges and food security were understood and addressed by 
governments. At the same time, a means of ensuring that those specific ideas and strategies 
were perpetuated within educational institutions intended to serve those same governments 
was also devised. 
 
Between 1963 and 1969, three additional IARCs would be established and RF would be the 
driving force behind each one. After visiting IRRI in 1962, Mexico’s President Lopez Mateos 
expressed an interest in seeing a similar research centre specifically focused on maize and 
wheat improvement, situated on Mexican soil.41 RF’s initial attempt in 1963 to create the 
International Corn and Wheat Research Institute in partnership with the government of 
Mexico never got off the ground. This was due in part to the Mexican government’s 
hesitancy to devote resources to a research organization intended to benefit other countries, 
and RF reservations of sharing administrative responsibilities with political appointees as 
opposed to technical experts. The proposal ultimately fell through when, according to 
Jennings, unnamed prospective donors expressed reservations about a single government 
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having a formal role in the management of what was intended to be an international 
institution.42 
 
The arrangement between RF and Mexico was re-structured in 1966, with the International 
Centre for the Improvement of Corn and Wheat (hereafter referred to by its Spanish 
acronym CIMMYT for Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo), 
reformulated as a private corporation that was eligible to receive unlimited funds from any 
source. While initially housed at the former MAP facilities in Chapingo, the centre was 
relocated to its present site of El Batan on lands provided by the government, with 
additional facilities made available in the states of Vera Cruz and Mexico. Moreover the 
initial staff compliment was comprised of former MAP employees including Borlaug, and 
the former head of the maize program, Edwin J. Wellhausen, who became CIMMYT’s 
inaugural Director-General.43 
 
The third IARC created was the Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) mandated to focus 
on improving crops associated with the humid low-level tropics (ie. cow-peas, yams, sweet 
potatoes and cassava) and to develop solutions to relevant ecological challenges. IITA was 
from the start, a joint RF-FF venture, and with minimal involvement from Nigeria’s 
government, which was pre-occupied with the country’s civil war. The institute was formally 
established through governmental decree in 1967 and situated on government land beside 
the University of Ibadan with no expectation of rent on the condition that the Foundations 
supported its operation for fourteen years. RF once again assuming responsibility for staffing 
the institute and appointed University of Minnesota Dean Will M. Myers (who would later 
become RF Vice-President) as the inaugural IITA director.44 
 
The International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) was the fourth and final IARC 
launched solely by exclusively private funding, evolving out of cooperative program between 
RF and the Columbian government that had been initiated in 1950. The centre was 
mandated with providing research and training services for the lowland tropical regions of 
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the Americas, which were hampered by highly acidic soils and ecologically fragile 
environments. While RF initially provided all capital and operating costs, FF became an 
equal partner in 1969. CIAT’s initial staff cohort including Ulysses Grant, who was 
appointed the inaugural Director was once again drawn largely from RF’s pre-existing in-
country agricultural program.45 
 
The IARCs have demonstrated that public sector capacity to innovate though science plays 
an important role in helping smallholders ensure their harvest in the face of ecological 
adversity. Beginning in late 1970s for example, the spread of the Cassava Mealy Bug 
(Phenacoccus manihoti) threatened cassava farming across the continent. In the early 1980s, 
IITA coordinated what proved to be successful efforts to control the pest via controlled 
releases of an imported wasp parasitoid, which is now a classic example of effective 
biological pest control.46 Likewise, ground-breaking research relevant to producing rice, peas, 
sweet potato and the highly relevant drought-tolerant maize tailored to the varied conditions 
of Africa has been carried out by the West African Rice Development Association 
(WARDA), the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT), the International Potato Center (CIP) and CYMMIT respectively.47 
 
Perhaps the more important lesson however is that with establishment of the IARCs, the RF 
succeeded in enabling the development of an international institutional framework for 
agricultural development which it itself devised, and which was initially led by former 
members of its staff and the epistemic communities it supported.  
 
5.21 From International to Global Governance: Private Diplomacy and the Establishment of the CGAIR 
 
By 1968, it was apparent that RF and FF’s annual financial commitments of up to US$ 
750,000 per year from a designated pool of US$ 30 million would be inadequate to sustain 
the centres’ needs and a decision to seek public funds was made. The idea of a consultative 
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group, according to Warren Baum “was conceived as an informal, voluntary association of 
donors that reviews the centres’ programs and budgets, provides their funding, and sets 
priorities for future research and action.”48 
 
Initial meetings were held at RF’s New York offices between the Presidents of RF and FF, 
the heads of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. The meetings 
expanded to include representatives from American, Canadian, Swedish and British 
development agencies, and several regional development banks at four successive 
conferences held at RF’s Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy between 1969 and December of 
1970. Those attending shared a common concern over perceived limitations in the 
productive capacities of agricultural sectors in regions of the world marked by high 
population growth rates.49 
 
Internationalist technocrat and then-World Bank President Robert McNamara played a key 
role in lobbying the World Bank, UNDP and FAO to support the proposal for a 
consultative group by acting as its co-sponsors. Despite an eventual budget comparable to 
that of WHO and FAO with a greater number of employees and a broad mandate to review 
and coordinate the provision of funds for maintaining a global system of agricultural 
research, from its founding until the first decade of the twenty-first-century, the CGIAR 
remained an informal network with no legal status or formal voting process.50 While the 
group’s chairman would be appointed by the World Bank, CGIAR purposefully avoided the 
exclusionary structure of traditional IOs by not placing restrictions on membership, so long 
as organizations could pay the minimum half million-dollar membership fee. 
 
The informality of the system also allowed IARC autonomy to be preserved. Maintaining 
their own individual boards of trustees and scientific staff, the centers were nonetheless 
united in their overall mandates, that being to provide research and development, 
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information dissemination and specialized training to developing countries with the ultimate 
goal of increasing the production of agricultural crops across the developing world.51 
 
In 1967, RF and FF had committed themselves to providing US$ 750,000 per year to each of 
the four centres, which was soon after determined inadequate. A solution to this funding 
challenge was reached the following year when the Foundations were successful in 
leveraging more significant commitments from other wealthier donors, such as the United 
States, Canada and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Despite maintaining representation on 
the CGIAR’s board of directors, both Foundations began to scale back their contributions 
by the mid-1970s. However as noted by Baum, RF continued to serve as CGIAR’s 
intellectual guide.52 
 
The first four IARCs were projects that were initiated by private actors for the expressed 
benefit of the public good. With the advent of CGIAR, however, the lion’s share of the 
funding burden was assumed by public actors (Northern states and development banks). 
Consequently, it is fair to say that IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and CIAT, and the initial CGAIR 
structure were all born of a private vision of the public good, which was embraced by both 
the eventual benefactor and beneficiary states.  
 
CGIAR is a clear example of RF’s early use of private diplomacy to facilitate the realization 
of an international framework focused on the provision of public goods. Moreover with this 
passing of the baton, the system as a whole became a part of the public sector, even though–
as will be clearly demonstrated in chapter 7–private actors continue to be instrumental to its 
operations. 
 
5.22 Discursive, Instrumental and Structural Power via the CGIAR  
 
CGIAR provided RF with agenda-setting power in the governance of global agricultural 
development that was indirect but real nonetheless. Through its country-level operations and 
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the establishment of the first four IARCs, the Foundation had already facilitated the creation 
of an epistemic community that was leading international agricultural research. Through the 
CGIAR, the Foundation provided an institutional template within which that same epistemic 
community was granted an agenda-setting role, which was embraced with minimal alteration 
by donor states and their IOs’ states. Consequently, RF attained discursive and instrumental 
power by-proxy, which for an organization that strives for apolitical status is clearly 
preferable to any kind of formal authority.  
 
This structural power by-proxy is exemplified in the role played by the Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) within CGIAR from its establishment in 1971 until the mid-1990s, when 
externally imposed changes to how the organization was funded diminished its agenda-
setting role.  In the twenty-five years preceding this change, a small group of agricultural 
scientists drawn from the leadership ranks of IARCs wielded tremendous influence, as the 
following discussion serves to illustrate.  
 
In the lead up to CGIAR’s formation, Robert McNamara made clear that he shared RF’s 
longstanding belief that bureaucrats made poor decisions and supported the idea that 
specialists as opposed to political representatives should be allowed to shape CGIAR’s 
overall research agenda. This decision was not challenged because of the CGIAR's broad 
parameters, decentralized governance structure, and funding scheme provided a high degree 
of flexibility for both donors and researchers.53  
 
Two types of funding were established: (i) Core Unrestricted Contributions, which centers 
could spend as they saw fit; and (ii) Special Project Funds, which were time-bound from 
individual donors for projects specific to the specialties of individual centres. TAC would 
develop five-year plans with each of the centres. Independent centers could then choose 
their projects, while independent donors could choose which centres they wanted to fund. 
The World Bank in turn acted as the donor of last resort by providing sixty to seventy 
percent of core funding and twenty-five percent of unrestricted funding for the centres’ 
programs, ensuring that any imbalances were corrected so that all centers received the 
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required funds.  If donors, for example, wanted to fund IRRI’s plan in its entirety, then 
IRRI’s core World Bank funding would go to other centres whose programs did not attract 
sufficient donor contributions. Under this scheme, the bilateral donor’s preferences were 
met, while centres were permitted to pursue their work, only being subject to review every 
five years by TAC.54 
 
However in the mid-1990s the World Bank ceased functioning as the donor of last resort 
and donors’ commitment to core funding was gradually reduced to twenty to thirty percent, 
fundamentally changing the model and greatly reducing the influence of TAC. The changes 
meant for example that TAC approving a five-year plan did not necessarily mean that the 
money would be there to fund it. The centres had to find funding to cover the core funding 
shortfall on their own, which meant increasingly adjusting research plans to accommodate 
donor interests, and that some centres had substantially more funds to work with than 
others.55  
 
In the original system engineered by RF, TAC determined research agendas and ensured the 
requisite funds for each centre by evenly distributing donor funding and filling in gaps with 
supplemental funding from the World Bank. When that system changed, it greatly reduced 
the power of the TAC. The Independent Science and Partnership Committee, TAC’s 
successor, has minimal influence today whereas donors have a significant amount of 
influence.56 
 
However, while the system lasted, TAC had agenda-setting power, a model laid out by RF in 
the planning of CGIAR, which ensured that decisions over long-term international 
agricultural research trajectories were determined by the same group of scientists whom the 
Foundation provided training for and were united by a common set of ideas related to the 
determinants of and solutions to agricultural challenges and a lack of food security in 
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developing countries. While this was accomplished indirectly, power that hinges on the 
ability to embed ideas and beliefs is power nonetheless.57 
 
5.3 Adaptat ion  in  the  Neo-Liberal Era: Innovating Around an Expanding 
Biot e chnology  Industry   
 
With many well established national research programs and a well-funded network of 
specialist regional research centers now in place, RF made the eventual decision to end 
operational programs in the 1980s.58 This is not to say that RF staff felt public sector 
agricultural research institutes would not need to partner with industry in the neo-liberal era. 
As in public health, changes in the global economy would soon make agricultural 
development-oriented Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) a necessity although for very 
different reasons. Whereas governments purposefully ceded responsibility for the 
development of essential medicines and vaccines to the private sector to reduce costs, a 
robust network of public sector research institutes existed in the form of IARCs to innovate 
agriculture for the world’s poor. Yet the birth of molecular biology as a discipline and 
alterations to US patent law were fundamentally changing the private sector’s role in 
delivering products to the farmer on a global scale.59 
 
The industrial side of modern agriculture has always been a private sector affair. In the era of 
MAP, the only way firms could make money in agriculture was through the sale of hybrid 
seeds,60 and associated chemical inputs. Most of the plant breeding at that time however was 
being done in the public sector, and once promising candidates were identified, they were 
turned over to the private sector for multiplication and production.61 
 
Yet the emergence the biotechnology industry and legal frameworks created to assure the 
global dominance of Northern and particularly American firms was effectively already 
working against the capacities of public sector research entities to employ cutting edge 
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molecular technologies to improve crop varieties used by poor farmers, and threatening to 
constrain the public agricultural research systems RF had helped enable. 
  
As articulated by Susan Wright, the basis for a viable biotechnology industry came in 1974 
when the University of California, San Francisco’s Herbert Boyer and Stanford’s Stanley 
Cohen demonstrated for the first time that genes from markedly different species could be 
combined to produce novel organisms.62 Applied to agriculture, recombinant DNA 
(rDNA)63 technology would eventually mean the development of cultivars modified to 
express traits unattainable via conventional breeding methods, including but not limited to 
resistance to pesticides, insects or microbial pests, and accelerated growth.64 
 
It is important to note that this industry emerged within the United States and was driven by 
the United States government. As noted by Wright, by the late 1970s the country was quickly 
losing its long held competitive advantages in the textile and automotive industries, at the 
same time that the price of foreign oil was increasing.65 In this context, the fledgling biotech 
industry was afforded considerable political protection through amendments to American 
laws. This began with the passing of the United States Plant Protection Law in 1972, which 
fundamentally changed the role of the private sector in agricultural development by allowing 
for the patenting of plants,66 and was dramatically accelerated in 1979 when Congress 
loosened statutory controls governing genetic engineering-related research.  
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1980, however, would prove a defining year for what had up until that point been an area of 
research advanced predominantly by public funds. A critical legal precedent was established 
in that year by the US Supreme Court in Diamond vs Chakrabarty through its ruling that novel 
organisms created by recombinant methods could be patented.  Significantly The Patent 
Trademark Amendment Act (more commonly known as the Bayh–Dole Act) was passed to 
promote the uptake and commercialization of federally funded research within universities, 
small businesses, and not-for-profit organizations.67 The logic of Baye-Dole was that 
restricting access to those willing to pay would provide a new means of measuring the utility 
of public sector innovation.68 However the larger ramifications were that many end products 
and enabling technologies created with public funding were effectively no longer ‘‘public 
goods,’’ but instead the proprietary technology of for-profit entities made available at their 
discretion only through restrictive conditions spelled out in Material Transfer Agreements 
(MTAs).69 
 
While large, primarily American Multinational Corporations (MNCs) from the oil, 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical sectors began to aggressively acquire biotechnology start-
ups, the National Science Foundation began offering incentives in the form of grants and tax 
shelters for university-industry partnerships focused on rDNA research. Relatively small 
investments provided firms with access to state of the art knowledge and worldwide rights to 
market and produce products, thus protecting their market share and controlling the sector’s 
research agenda.70 
 
The rise of the biotechnology industry presented RF with several new cultural hurdles to 
work around. One of these was a normative shift among scientists away from sharing a 
common purpose of creating and disseminating  public knowledge and goods informed by 
advances in science. In the same way that Intellectual Property (IP) rights are in total 
contrast to the history of subsistence and rural agriculture, where farmers traditionally share 
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seeds and knowledge, a shift towards privatization and profit within molecular biology was 
contradicting the traditional academic principles of sharing information to advance 
knowledge.  
 
The migration of numerous molecular biologists and scientists from the public to the private 
sector marked a normative shift for RF, which had spent decades constructing an 
international community of agricultural scientists committed to SEI in public sector arenas. 
As illustrated by Wright, the commercialization of rDNA technology had a profound impact 
on the culture of an entire academic discipline. Prior to the rDNA revolution, molecular 
biology subscribed to the same general academic principles as other scientific disciplines: an 
ethos of cooperative effort for the purpose of knowledge generation and dissemination. Yet 
following the Stanford patent applications in 1974, the ethos of communal sharing for the 
advancement of knowledge was rapidly displaced by privatization and profit as the dominant 
norm in molecular biology. By the late 1970s, with its strong links to business at both at the 
personal and institutional level, and little criticism coming from within the discipline, 
molecular biology as a whole was heavily invested in biotechnology industry.71 
 
5.31 Maintaining public sector capacity in agricultural science: The International Program on Rice 
Biotechnology 
 
Despite RF’s catalytic role, the research that had driven the Green Revolution was carried 
out within the public domain and was funded predominantly by public monies for the 
benefit of the public good. While public sectors supported the emergence of rDNA 
technology, the biotechnology industry has been from its inception inherently market-driven, 
with the goal of maximizing returns for those investing in its development.72 
 
The structural power afforded to the industry in the form of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) posed a challenge for the IARCs, which were mandated with developing improved 
crop varieties of little interest to firms and for those with limited purchasing power.73 The 
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centres were still fulfilling their intended purpose as evidenced by the over 8000 crop 
varieties developed between 1960 and 2000 being grown in over one hundred countries.74 
Their impact has been particularly important to Asia, where these varieties are planted in 
approximately seventy-five percent of cultivated land farmed predominantly by small-holder 
farmers, and where the proportion of the population suffering from chronic hunger 
decreased from forty percent to less than twenty percent in this time period.75 
 
RF has long pushed for keeping IP that is relevant to its development goals within the public 
domain.76 Applied to agriculture, this has meant expressing support for the Plant Variety 
Protection model, which previously allowed breeders to modify existing varieties without 
having to paying royalties while still recognizing innovators’ rights to market their products.77 
 
The globalization of a patent-based system in plant breeding was a key reason that upon 
ceasing its country specific programs, RF’s agricultural focus began focusing on broadening 
the agricultural applications of biotechnology geared towards the needs of the global South, 
and increasing the number of Asian and African public sector scientists trained in advanced 
molecular techniques via RF fellowships.78 The cornerstone of this effort was the 
International Program on Rice Biotechnology (IPRB), which over its seventeen-year lifespan 
beginning in 1984 focused on building public sector capacity in advanced molecular 
techniques in low and middle-income countries by linking fledgling national developing 
country programs with established rice biotechnology programs in United States, Japan, 
Europe and Australia, and sponsoring path-breaking genomic research on rice, which laid 
the groundwork for later innovations such as Golden Rice.79 Through this model of 
epistemic expansion on a global scale, advanced biotech-related training was provided to an 
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estimated 400 African, Asian and Latin American scientists, and advances were made that 
have benefited millions of farmers and hundreds of millions if not billions of individuals.80 
 
IPRB’s utility has been reinforced by the fact that since the first transgenic crops were 
commercialized in 1996,81 other than maize, wheat, soybeans, and rice with their proven 
profit margins, the big seed companies have demonstrated little interest in modifying the 
crops traditionally grown by poor, rural, or subsistence farmers in developing countries, such 
as cassava, millet, sorghum, yams and legumes.82 While private sectors are emerging in 
countries such as Brazil, China, and India,83 which are showing an interest in filling some of 
these gaps,84 the commercial interests of big seed companies remain restricted to globally 
traded crops because this is where their profits lie.85 
 
5.32 Adapting to the Privatization of Knowledge: Innovating Around Intellectual Property Rights 
 
The global diffusion of IPRs has been an exercise in American coercion that has enabled the 
country’s biotechnology companies to attain market dominance. IPRs are significant because 
they allow creators or inventors to exclude others from copying or using their work or 
invention without permission or payment. Their proponents argue that they provide 
incentive and reward for innovation;86 however in the context of commercial agriculture 
where maximizing profit works against crop diversification, their critics suggest that the 
opposite is in fact true.87 Others have argued that IPRs are akin to new form of feudalism, by 
denying farmers the right to re-use, lend, share or give away seed. Furthermore, because 
applying for, contesting or upholding patents is a time consuming and expensive process, 
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those countries lacking significant financial resources are excluded from the rule-setting 
process.88 
 
At the international level, there are now three conventions that relate to IPRs,89 each of 
which is informed by different norms and governed by different rules.90 The framework that 
has proven the greatest challenge for science-enabled innovators working within CGIAR 
system and endowed corporations with tremendous power over what technologies are made 
available for humanitarian purposes is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  
 
The concept of TRIPS originated within a small number of developed states and handful of 
MNCs with the United States being its strongest proponent.91 Negotiated during the 
Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, TRIPS came into force as 
part of the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  The agreement 
demands that WTO members the majority of the world’s states provide a minimum level 
of protection for the IP of corporations, with non-compliance bringing the risk of economic 
sanction. Developing countries had until 2006 to comply with TRIPs,92 and those such as 
Zambia, which attempted to restrict the importation of transgenic cultivars on the basis that 
IPRs limit access to affordable food and threaten a loss of livelihood and income,93 have 
seen their arguments dismissed by WTO on the grounds that such restrictions represents 
unjustifiable trade barriers.94  
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The rights of developing countries to self determination has been undermined by changes in 
international law related to IPRs, and the United States and MNCs have been the driving 
force behind these changes. One of the RF’s successes in agriculture-related private 
diplomacy in the neo-liberal era has been to convince prospective corporate partners to 
consider how their choices impact the smallholders of poor countries and more importantly 
make their intellectual property available for the greater good in poor countries.  
Biotechnology-based crop improvement revolves around having this access, for increasingly 
even the molecular tools commonly employed in innovating through science are under 
patent. RF has championed the PDP approach in agriculture because the only alternative for 
prospective innovators is that change in the international rules governing the use of 
intellectual property be made, which the Foundation and its intended beneficiaries are in no 
position to undertake themselves. Via the enablement of PDPs, RF’s primary contribution to 
global governance specifically focused on agricultural development has been a capacity to 
catalyse institutional innovation that has benefited historically marginalized populations in 
the absence of structural changes to the dominant global power structure. 
 
Diplomatic efforts preceded formal partnership construction in RF’s efforts to engage the 
private sector in pursuit of facilitating access to proprietary technology to strengthen 
agricultural sectors in developing countries. One of the more notable examples of this 
private diplomacy related to the application of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies 
(GURT), which were first patented in 1994 by Monsanto and labeled terminator seeds 
because of the sterility of the end products. In fact by 1998 the technology had expanded to 
include control over numerous aspects of gene expression in patented plants, the viability of 
which would be contingent on the application of proprietary inputs, which was characterized 
by critics as equating to ‘‘bio-serfdom.’’95 
 
In June of 1999, British agro-ecologist Gordon Conway, who the previous year had been 
appointed RF President, was invited to speak to the Monsanto board. Conway leveraged the 
opportunity to advocate that Monsanto embrace a host of new progressive policies.  These 
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included acceptance of regulatory demands such as the adoption of labeling genetically 
modified organisms, phasing out the use of antibiotic resistance markers, granting free 
exchanges of germ plasm to and from the IARCs, allowing for tiered pricing to reflect 
variation in global capital availability and granting free licensing of existing patents to poor 
countries in order ensure such states had the capacities feed their citizens. Moreover Conway 
explicitly suggested that Monsanto had a role to play in reducing global economic inequality 
and called for the company to disavow the use of GURT:96 
 
Trying to ensure a future that includes the poor and excluded is not only a huge job, 
it is, you may say, not Monsanto's job. Monsanto's job is to provide a decent return 
to your shareholders by running a sustainable, innovative and responsible enterprise. 
But the future of the poor and excluded is an important part of the context in which 
you do your job. We all need to take it on as a shared goal-a shared problem. It is a 
problem requiring collective action and decision making, without a clear process, 
without clearly defined interests, without a model of how to do it, and without any 
one entity in charge. We must all play our part….The agricultural seed industry must 
disavow use of the terminator technology to produce seed sterility. Astra Zeneca has 
apparently already promised to do so (in a letter to Action Aid, the British charity). 
You have said that you will not exploit these patents until there has been a full, 
independent review of the impact of the technology but I believe you should now 
follow Astra Zeneca's example.97 
 
While Monsanto ultimately did not adopt the majority of these suggestions, three months 
after Conway’s speech Monsanto President Robert Shapiro committed the company to 
abandon its plans to commercialize GURT, a decision that surprised and dismayed the 
USDA, which publicly urged them to reconsider their change in policy, albeit to no avail.98 
 
RF has understood that as a rule, shareholders’ interests inform corporate policies. 
Consequently, the private sector is not interested in developing products where there is no 
clear potential for profit. Small-scale farmers and many of the crops that they grow, not only 
in the South but also the North (e.g. rice, potatoes and tomatoes), are not attractive markets 
for seed companies given their small profit margins and the limited volumes grown. 
Accordingly, there remains a very important role for the public sector and particularly 
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universities in developing specialty crops for farmers that are not of interest to big 
corporations, for example strawberries with a longer shelf life.99 Unfortunately many public 
sector institutions do not have the IP portfolios or financial ability to get such crops through 
the process of regulatory approval. Mirroring the harmonized regulation of pharmaceuticals, 
industry, and unwittingly NGOs, have promoted the internationalization of very costly 
regulatory processes, which often works against the realization of innovation and the 
production of public goods relevant to both health and agriculture.100 
 
Consequently, from RF’s perspective, cooperation with industry is essential not simply to 
bring the innovative capacity of the private sector to bear on creating health or agriculture-
related public goods intended for use in the developing world, but also to help public sector 
institutions overcome IPR-related constraints impeding their ability to innovate 
autonomously. RF’s partnering with industry in health preceded that of agriculture, only 
because the first patentable agricultural products were developed some fifteen years after the 
commercial applications of biotechnology began to be realized in public health and 
medicine. Yet once this began to be a factor, the Foundation wasted little time in helping 
enable through grants the creation of three entities focused on facilitating farmer’s access to 
proprietary technology.101 
 
The first of these three organizations was The Public Intellectual Property Resource for 
Agriculture (PIPRA), a public consortium launched with funding from the Rockfeller and 
McKnight Foundations comprised of over twenty land-grant institutions focused on keeping 
the fruits of research undertaken in public sector universities within the public domain.  At 
the time, the consortium members were being constrained from fulfilling their mandates by 
exclusive licensing agreements they had entered into with firms into order to commercialize 
their research. Run out of the University of California at Davis, the consortium was 
organized around a shared commitment to setting up licensing agreements for future 
technologies that would allow a pooling of IP and partial ownership, so that technologies 
could be available for small-scale commercial and humanitarian purposes while still ensuring 
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profit realization for both public and private IP holders.102 The two other organizations–the 
African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) and the Africa Harvest Biotech 
Foundation International (AHBFI)–are also focused on fostering biotechnology-driven 
product development through cooperation with industry but are exclusively focused on 
meeting the needs of African smallholder farmers.103  
 
5 .4 Agency through adaptat ion  in  a negle c ted region : A focus  on Sub-Saharan Afri ca  
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, RF began to shift its agricultural resources from Asia to Sub-
Saharan Africa, where a majority of the population’s livelihood and overall food security 
remained wedded to low input, rain-fed, shifting-cultivation farming. On a continent-wide 
scale, the ability to address longstanding biological, ecological and technological 
impediments to agricultural development was being constrained by poor governance. 
Longstanding government apathy towards agriculture, entrenched corruption and weak 
political leadership–exacerbated by crippling externally-imposed austerity measures and 
declining aid budgets–had allowed pests, disease, drought, nutrient poor soils, a lack of 
mechanization and above all widespread entrenched rural poverty to stagnate agricultural 
growth for over two decades, effectively making farming in Africa an economic trap.104 
 
Conway’s book, The Doubly Green Revolution, encapsulated the shift in approach through its 
advocacy of a new Green Revolution specific to Sub-Saharan Africa, premised on contextual 
specificity, ecological sustainability and equity. Accordingly, new technologies would, from 
Conway’s perspective, have to be built around local conditions and needs and be supported 
by local institutions, both governmental and non-governmental.105 While the Foundation 
had worked in Africa since the 1960s, the continent now became the primary focus for its 
efforts in agricultural development. Yet unlike previous country and region specific 
initiatives, RF’s emphasis on Africa extended beyond research and training to also attempt to 
address broader market and governance determinants of weak agricultural systems and food 
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insecurity. This has meant devising governance schemes, which bring together all relevant 
actors, including for-profit entities. 
 
From the perspective of several former RF staffers, one of the sad ironies of corporate 
control of biotechnology is that transnational corporations and their supporter states have 
priced what should be a relatively inexpensive technology out of the reach of the world’s 
poor.106 According to RF’s Managing Director Gary Toenniessen, establishing and staffing a 
biotechnology program is a relatively inexpensive proposition, approximately half a million 
dollars, if an organization already has a strong conventional breeding program, which RF 
effectively demonstrated with rice across Asia through IPRB.  All biotechnology does is 
produce additional traits that still have to be incorporated into the breeding process. But 
even with this capacity, research organizations still have to pay for patents and go through an 
expensive regulatory process.107  
 
Transnational chemical companies prefer to sell inputs (e.g. pesticides) over seeds, as the 
former have proven utility. Moreover, pesticide production, as per other very hazardous 
industries, is increasingly concentrated in developing countries with have less strict 
environmental regulations than the Northern countries where such firms originated, thereby 
increasing profit margins.108 However large chemical corporations have also actively bought 
up seed companies, biotechnology patents and start-ups to protect their markets from 
competition regardless of whether the technology proves commercially viable. In doing so, 
however, they have captured technology that has the potential to overcome intractable 
agricultural problems such as drought and disease. Monsanto is in fact the only MNC that 
made a major early commitment to developing new forms of biotechnology.109 
 
To compensate for this reality, RF facilitated the creation of the AATF and the AHBFI as 
African-based organizations focused on facilitating technology transfer for the benefit of 
African agriculture. AATF is facilitator of partnerships, pairing African innovators with 
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Northern firms whose IP is used to create new products for African markets which the 
original patent holders would have no interest in accessing, without the African innovators 
having to pay royalties or licensing fees. The organization also aids African states by carrying 
out biosafety testing, facilitating seed distribution and helping to create local markets.110  
AHBFI in contrast is an IP consortium that is actively involved in developing new 
agricultural products such as nutritionally enhanced sorghum, yet like AATF, AHBFI also 
revolves around partnering with Northern firms such as Pioneer Hi-Bred and Dupont to 
gain access to their intellectual property.111 
 
Through PIPRA, AATF and AHBFI, the RF has been an enabler of public goods in an era 
characterized by legal frameworks designed to constrain access to the enabling tools of such 
goods. Admittedly the end products of the partnerships that the Foundation has enabled do 
not meet the criteria of the classical definition of a public good,112 in that they limit access to 
certain groups and tiered pricing means the technologies are still not free. However from the 
vantage point of Toenniessen, a partial public good that reaches half the people in need is 
still better than no public good at all,113 which encapsulates RF’s longstanding pragmatism 
and willingness to work around the preferences of the prevailing world order’s most 
powerful actors in order to meet the Foundation’s main end goal: providing public goods to 
vulnerable populations in developing countries when public sector authorities mandated to 
fill this role have been unable to do so autonomously. 
 
5.41 The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa: Facilitating a global alliance for regional improvement 
 
Despite placing increased emphasis on partnering with firms, RF’s commitments to 
strengthening the capacity of public authorities has remained constant, and AGRA template 
illustrates this duel focus. Paralleling the creation of AATF and AHBFI, the Foundation 
began lobbying African governments to ensure that technical capacities exist within national 
agricultural research centres in both conventional and molecular breeding techniques so that 
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the traits capable of addressing pressing biological and ecological constraints and meeting 
consumer and farmer preferences could be identified and incorporated into local varieties. 
At the same time, participatory research networks linking farmers with breeders were 
developed so that experimental varieties could be grown in real world conditions, creating a 
horizontal research framework that provided farmers with a continuous role in the process 
of crop improvement.114 
 
On the market side of RF model, small-scale experimentation was initiated to develop local 
networks of agro-extension dealers, typically comprised of small ‘‘mom and pop’’ retailers to 
ensure that subsidized seeds and associated inputs–first and foremost chemical fertilizers–
were available to farmers on demand in relevant quantities. For if farmers are expected to 
purchase such varieties, then they have to able to make a profit. Doubling yields are of little 
utility if farmers are bankrupted by their inability to pay for the required inputs. Hence 
AGRA’s market program is premised on the idea that increasing production alone is not a 
sustainable strategy unless profitability is assured, requiring competent local delivery 
systems.115 
 
Two more ambitious goals–contingent on the buy-in of national governments which the 
Foundation began to actively lobby for–were the establishment of technical and in-kind 
incentives to nurture the growth of private indigenous seed sectors and regulatory reforms 
related to biosafety and quality assurance.  
 
Regarding the first point, the Foundation assumed that greater numbers of seed companies 
embracing participatory approaches would ensure an increase in the number of varieties 
available to farmers in regions marked by great cultural and ecological diversity. The 
historical lack of competition in African seed markets, the low incomes of most farmers, and 
a general preference for open-pollinated non-commercial varieties meant that transnational 
seed companies would continue to show little interest in meeting the needs of poor farmers. 
At the same time, a small number of previously parastatal monopolistic firms would 
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continue to market as few products as possible to the largest number, despite the fact that 
seed-sector de-regulation had generally occurred by the early 1990s. Competition among 
African firms, the Foundation reasoned, could meet the needs of small holders and 
consumers, but such private seed sectors were limited because investors were lacking.116 
 
Second, RF argued that regulatory modernization was needed to ensure confidence in the 
quality of seeds produced, and that the requisite biosafety frameworks be in place to regulate 
products increasingly being created via biotechnology and specifically genetic engineering. At 
the same time, a pervasive sentiment among the Foundation’s staff has been that genetic 
modification is largely unnecessary in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. This was due to 
what was perceived to be the tremendous untapped potential of conventional breeding 
methods to improve staple crops grown for both subsistence and commercial purposes.117 
 
By attempting to correct for both private and public sector deficiencies, more than ever 
before the Foundation was explicitly seeking to illuminate the socio-political determinants of 
the agricultural challenges under scrutiny, including the contradictions of the globalized 
liberal economic paradigm. Yet, despite these deficiencies and contradictions, the 
Foundation remained committed to adapting its ideas and finding solutions that would work 
within that same dominant liberal economic paradigm, while expanding both the 
applications of science and technology to address challenges of agriculture and the overall 
influence within the policy process of those individuals generating that knowledge. 
 
RF’s approach for a new Green Revolution in Africa differentiates itself from its former  
approaches to agricultural development, based on its premise that indigenous private  
sector involvement is critical to rejuvenating agricultural sectors across Africa.  This could be  
interpreted as evidence of the Foundation’s liberal economic bias. However, the logic  
informing this theory is that agriculture is generally a private sector function. Either for  
personal consumption or for sale, farming is a business; although proponents of AGRA note  
that historically it had not been treated that way by the  development community from a  
policy perspective. According to Catherine Bertini, a former Executive Director of the  
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United Nations World Food Program (WFP), the general consensus within the larger 
international development policy community is that not only has neo-liberal austerity hurt  
Sub-Saharan African public sector research capacities, but Sub-Saharan African  
governments themselves have not paid sufficient attention to agriculture specifically because  
it is a private sector problem. Optimism over AGRA relates to the fact that it was the first  
entity that frames agriculture as a private sector issue. A focus on guaranteeing loans that  
banks might not otherwise make and helping to establish training opportunities for people 
who are going to sell to farmers, extension agents, who in turn require loans, all illustrate 
that agriculture is a big circle of activities carried out predominantly in the private domain.118 
 
At the same time, RF clearly understands the critical importance of the state in African 
agricultural development, which provides the overall delivery system that ensures that 
improved varieties actually benefit farmers.119 Much of the criticism RF has faced regarding 
its efforts to strengthen agriculture in Africa relates to its promotion of biotechnology, and 
specifically genetic engineering.120 RF scientists however have been of the opinion that more 
than any form of advanced science, gains will be made on adequate prices, infrastructure, 
roads, marketing, financial services, and developing regional approaches to soil and water 
management, illustrating how integral states remain for agricultural sectors to be 
successful.121 
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5.5 Conc lus ion 
 
 
Since former President of the University of Pennsylvania Judith Rodin was appointed 
President of the RF in 2005, there has been a drastic contraction of RF programs and a 
reduction in its staff, which has greatly reduced the scope and impact of the agricultural 
program.122 Yet any future uncertainty cannot diminish the tremendous legacy RF has 
attained as an innovator in science and governance oriented towards strengthening 
agricultural systems in the global South.  
 
Beginning in the 1930s the Foundation began underwriting high-impacting research in areas 
such as plant genetics and pathology leading to new and improved regionally specific 
varieties of staple crops that have proven resistant to devastating diseases such as wheat rust.  
As longstanding force in science-enabled innovation, the Foundation has gained credibility 
in policy circles by presenting tangible solutions to longstanding agricultural problems. 
Yet the Foundation’s success as a seller of ideas in the context of twentieth-century 
agricultural development has also hinged largely on its ability to create, expand and embed 
within decision-making bodies, communities of experts united in their common set of 
assumptions regarding determinants of and solutions to pressing agricultural problems. Via 
its training country-specific training programs, RF has been instrumental in forging and 
linking agricultural science epistemic communities across the global South. Moreover via the 
CGIAR and AGRA, the RF has strengthened the role of natural scientists in the governance 
of agricultural and food security challenges. Consequently, the Foundation’s work in 
agricultural development has helped ensure that particular ways of understanding and 
addressing complex societal challenges related to hunger have become dominant within 
national policy making arenas and mechanisms of global governance.  
 
At the same time, RF has demonstrated that it is by no means ideationally static. While the 
principles, causal beliefs, and notions of validity that informed the foundation’s initial 
approach to agricultural development were forged in the progressive era and informed by 
the American experience of agricultural modernization, RF steadily adapted its country-level 
                                                
122 Anonymous interviewee 20, June 8, 2011. 
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and regional training programs to meet the needs of its beneficiaries, situated in unique 
social and ecological environments.  
 
Finally, RF’s use of private diplomacy to facilitate cooperation for the public good displayed 
in the domain of public health has also been prominent in its agricultural affairs. Its early 
partnerships with national governments illustrated this well, as did the formation of the 
CGIAR to the establishment of the first agricultural PDPs.  Its attempts to compensate for 
the United States government’s allowance for firms to take ownership of publicly funded 
research in pursuit of international market dominance demonstrates that it is no mere proxy.  
 
Since the broad potential of biotechnology became clear, RF has never shied away from 
promoting its many applications to agriculture, taking the position it is an agro-ecological 
approach as it reduces pesticide loads; potentially increases yields, incomes and food 
availability; reduces the need for mechanized tillage, pesticides, and fertilizers; and 
overcomes soil fatigue, drought, flooding, salinity and aluminum toxicity.123 Yet the 
Foundation has also acknowledged that such altruistic goals are fundamentally undermined 
by norms (i.e. profit motivation, secrecy, and protectionism) that have come to define the 
transnational biotechnology industry and the institutional and regulatory structures that have 
been created to support it.124 Its adaptation to the constraints on SEI posed by international 
laws governing intellectual property has been to engage with firms and states to gain their 
support for organizations such as PIPRA, AATF, and AHBF that are focused on facilitating 
developing country scientists to access proprietary technology for the benefit of the world’s 
poor.  
 
Critical scholars may portray these initiatives as evidence of RF functioning as a stabilizer of 
the status quo. By not contesting the injustices propagated by the international intellectual 
property rights regime, it may seem logical to ask whether the foundation is not working to 
reinforce unjust rules of the world imposed upon poor states, which ultimately work against 
their interests. I argue however that this is not the case.  In instances whereby IP held by 
firms has been instrumental in creating new plant varieties, RF-enabled PDPs employ 
                                                
123 Anonymous interviewee 19, November 29, 2010.  
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strategies such as free licensing and tiered pricing to circumvent the constraints of the 
existing IR regime. These arrangements are not structured to provide new opportunities for 
participating firms to profit from their IP portfolios. Rather, these legally binding agreements 
allow those innovating through science for a beneficiary population with limited purchasing 
power access to proprietary technology, without having to continually appeal to the 
charitable sentiment of the firm holding the needed IP. In this regard the Foundation’s 
capacity for institutional innovation has created new opportunities in science-enabled 
innovation oriented towards developing new public goods for the world’s poorest people 
without having to contest the larger system.  
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Chapter 6: BMGF’s Influence over Global Health Governance 
 
6.0 Introduc t ion  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s (BMGF’s) 
efforts undertaken to date to improve the health of the world’s poor. As outlined in chapter 
4, throughout the twentieth-century, the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) maintained 
tremendous influence over how states responded to health challenges: how public health was 
conceptualized and taught, how clinical medicine was practiced, and how vaccines were 
produced and prevention and control programs operationalized. Despite being inspired by 
and in many ways modeled on the Rockefeller template, I argue that BMGF has not yet 
achieved the broad policy influence attained by RF. In part this is because its primary focus 
has been to date comparatively quite narrow, by and large limited to underwriting product 
development. At the same time, it is important to remember that despite being by far the 
world’s largest philanthropic Foundation in existence today, BMGF is still very much a 
nascent entity.  
 
“Guided by the belief that every life has equal value” the BMGF was created around the goal of 
“helping all people lead healthy, productive lives [emphasis added]”1 While ambitious to say the least, 
this commitment is certainly being taken seriously by the Foundation’s leadership, for in its 
short life, it has attained an endowment of US$ 36 billion and granted over US$ 18 billion 
through its Global Health and Development programs.2 Moreover, BMGF has been willing–
perhaps even more than RF–to work within the structural parameters established by the 
neoliberal order’s most powerful actors–states and firms–in pursuit of its goals.  
 
The chapter begins by surveying some of the first grants made by the Foundation’s Global 
Health Program under the leadership of Gordon Perkin, the co-founder of the Seattle-based 
Program for Appropriate Technologies in Health (PATH). Grants such as that which 
underwrote the Meningitis Vaccine Project (MVP) embodied the Foundation’s early 
                                                
1 BMGF, “Global Health: Strategy Overview” (September 2010) Accessed: Nov 2, 2010 
https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/Documents/global-health-strategy-overview.pdf 
 
2 BMGF, ‘‘The Gates Foundation Fact Sheet,’’ Accessed February 14, 2013 
http://www.gatesFoundation.org/about/Pages/Foundation-fact-sheet.aspx  
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commitment to facilitating the development of new technologies and particularly vaccines 
specifically geared to the needs of the world’s poor, and foretold PATH’s importance for 
BMGF as a vehicle to operationalize its ideas. Another key initiative of the Perkin years to be 
examined is the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), which I argue 
represents a watershed in global health governance. GAVI’s significance, I argue, lay in its 
success in bringing together as equals states, International Organizations (IOs), civil society 
groups and the pharmaceutical industry working towards the common goal of increasing 
access among the world’s poor to the protection conferred by immunization. 
 
The chapter then turns to examine changes in the inner workings of the Foundation itself, 
chronicling how the decision making structure informing the Global Health Program has 
evolved in its short fifteen year history. Drawing heavily on interviews with current and 
former senior staff members, the chapter provides unique insights into how and why what 
began as a small team of generalists relying heavily on external experts to guide their 
substantial grant making has morphed into to a large group and an increasing number of in-
house issue-experts placing heavy emphasis on metrics.  
 
Three recurring criticisms of BMGF’s involvement in global health provide an opportunity 
to compare it to RF’s one hundred year legacy in this domain. The first is that it has 
maintained a too narrowly defined niche in new technologies geared towards communicable 
disease control, which critics argue should be broadened to include general health systems 
strengthening and investing in human resources at the country level. The second recurring 
criticism relates to a perceived gap between the Foundation’s stated ambitions and realities 
on the ground in the contexts where it seeks to catalyze change, which has been attributed in 
large part to its lack of operational programs. The third major criticism examined is that 
BMGF places too much emphasis on market-based solutions for what are seen by its critics 
as inherently political problems. 
 
Key informants within the Foundation suggest that the future of the BMGF’s global health 
program will see a continuing emphasis on enabling new technologies and working closely 
with the private sector to achieve this, but they will increasingly see the handoff of 
responsibility for delivering said health technologies to the intended beneficiaries shift to the 
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Foundation’s Global Development program now left by former PATH Chief Executive 
Officer Chris Elias. 
 
The chapter concludes with the suggestion that the degree to which BMGF widens the 
scope of its initiatives and is able to adapt to future shifts in the global distribution of power 
has yet to be determined. Consequently I suggest that the Foundation has not yet likely lived 
up to its full potential as an agent of change and the significance of its contributions to 
global governance and the implications of its agency can only be appraised based on the first 
twenty years of its existence. 
 
6.1 The Perkin Years :  Bui lding on PATH Approach 
 
The William H. Gates Foundation was created in 1994 by American billionaires Bill and 
Melinda Gates with US$94 million in Microsoft shares, and renamed the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (BMGF) in 1999.3 From the beginning, health was the Foundation’s 
primary focus and there are multiple reasons for this. The 1993 World Bank report, 
‘‘Investing in Health,’’ reportedly piqued Bill Gates’ interest in public health,4 and Warren 
Buffett recommended that Gates consider working philanthropically in family planning.  
Gates Sr. assumed initial responsibility for the direction of the Foundation, and at the 
suggestion of RF staff, he began soliciting advice in 1995 from Gordon Perkin, co-founder 
and then President of PATH.5 
 
When RF first turned its attention to health, individuals such as William Welch and Abraham 
Flexner provided the Foundation with ideational blueprints for how to reform medical and 
public health education, which RF subsequently embraced and expanded through grants. 
Gordon Perkin is one of several norm entrepreneurs representative of particular epistemic 
communities who have provided both the intellectual and normative blueprints informing 
BMGF’s Global Health Program. RF successfully illuminated the utility of PATH model as 
                                                
3 Susan Okie, ‘‘Global Health–The Gates-Buffett Effect,’’ New England Journal of Medicine, 355, no. 11 (2006): 
1085. 
4 Jon Cohen, ‘‘Gates Foundation Rearranges Public Health Universe,’’ Science 295, no. 5562 (2000): 2001-2002.  
5 William Muraskin, Crusade to Immunize the World’s Children: The Origins of the Bill and Melinda Gates Children’s 
Vaccine Program and the Birth of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (Los Angeles: USC Marshall 
BioBusiness Initiative, 2005), 3-4; Anonymous interview 8, June 9, 2011.  
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an approach of collective action. However it was Gordon Perkin who, upon becoming the 
inaugural head of BMGF Global Health Program in 2000, effectively launched the global 
Product Development Partnership (PDP) era and ensured that it would become a defining 
aspect of the global health governance landscape.6 
 
The MVP, which focused on the development of a low-cost vaccine for the prevention of 
meningococcal meningitis specifically for use in Sub-Saharan Africa, highlights the 
Foundation’s early commitment to Science-Enabled Innovation (SEI) focused on the needs 
of the world’s poorest people, the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) paradigm, as well as the 
critical role BMGF has come to play in PATH’s ongoing work.7 
 
MVP was initially granted to PATH in 1995 with a US$ 300,000 grant by the William H. 
Gates Foundation, which was spread over three years. Compared to many if not most 
subsequent Foundation grants, it was relatively small.8 While PATH was tasked with 
overseeing the development of the vaccine, all of the pre-requisite science was already in 
existence. Most importantly, the conjugate technology that informed the eventual 
MenAfriVac vaccine had been developed at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and was 
therefore not under patent. As a consequence, PATH was able to transfer this technology to 
the private for-profit Serum institute in India and involve the World Health Organization 
(WHO), making MVP a PPP from its inception. In 2001, when BMGF made a subsequent 
US$ 70 million grant to PATH to develop the vaccine, the Serum Institute benefited from 
free access to the technology and advanced contracts for up to 50 million doses. WHO and 
UNICEF also benefited by being able to ensure that states in the Sahel region had access to 
a vaccine to confer long-term immunity against a disease that at the time claimed some 
twenty thousand lives per year.9 
 
The rationale for BMGF’s initial focus on developing new technology was that if evidence of 
efficacy could be demonstrated, governments would likely adopt it. While this influence is 
indirect, the process in practice is well illustrated by the Meningitis A vaccine in the context 
                                                
6 Anonymous interviewee 9, November 29, 2011. 
7 Anonymous interviewee 8, June 9, 2011. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
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of the Sahel states, perhaps most notably in Burkina Faso, the first intended beneficiary state 
to launch a nation-wide immunization campaign.10 
 
RF spearheaded the creation of most of the early partnerships: from the overall visioning 
process, mapping of needs and creating the scientific blueprints and the business plans. 
BMGF, in contrast, did not yet exist or was just getting started when initiatives such as the 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), TB Alliance, Medicines for Malaria Venture 
(MMV) and the Global Campaign for Microbicides Initiative were launched.11 However, 
within five years of its establishment, BMGF had become the primary backer for most of the 
large global health PDPs RF initiated in the mid-1990s, allowing them to attain a new level 
of growth.12 Between 1998 to 2007 BMGF’s Global Health Program devoted one third of its 
material resources to supporting Global Helath Partnerships (GHPs).13 While IAVI, for 
example, was established with a US$10 million RF grant, BMGF’s US$ 100 million 
contribution enabled the organization to broaden its scope. According to director William 
Foege former Director of the United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and a Senior Fellow within BMGF’s Global Health Program, Bill Gates always saw 
IAVI as a RF project. Nonetheless it was BMGF’s contribution that catalyzed NIH to 
inquire about what it could do to improve its own HIV research program, which triggered a 
new series of investments in HIV/AIDS research.14  
 
Scaling up pre-existing projects deemed compatible with the Gates family’s vision of 
improving health is a common theme for BMGF, which for example provides more than 
sixty-five percent of funding for MMV.15 The same is true of the Global Polio eradication 
initiative, a program that began in 1988 and was led by WHO, UNICEF and Rotary 
                                                
10 Ibid.; Djingarey, Mamoudou H., Rodrigue Barry, Mete Bonkoungou, Sylvestre Tiendrebeogo, Rene Sebgo, 
Denis Kandolo, Clement Lingani et al. "Effectively introducing a new meningococcal A conjugate vaccine in 
Africa: the Burkina Faso experience." Vaccine 30 (2012): B40-B45. 
11 Anonymous interviewee 2, January 18, 2011.  
12 Anonymous interviewee 17, August 18, 2011.  
13 David McCoy, Gayatri Kembhavi, Jinesh Patel, and Akish Luintel, ‘‘The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s 
Grant-Making Programme for Global Health,’’ The Lancet 373, no. 9675 (2009): 1649. 
14 Interview with William Foege, August 18, 2011; Anonymous interviewee 2, January 18, 2011.  
15 Medicines for Malaria Venture, ‘‘MMV Funding and Expenditure,’’ accessed April 8, 2012 
http://www.mmv.org/invest-us/mmv-funding-and-expenditure 
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International, which has raised US$8.2 billion in pursuit of eradicating polio globally, to 
which BMGF has contributed an astounding US$700 million.16 
 
In contrast, RF had become a relatively minor health donor by the 1990s, and as BMGF 
increased its investments, RF staff began questioning what the organization was bringing to 
the table. From the perspective of one former RF official, BMGF wanted RF to continue in 
global health for two important reasons. The first reason was its established network and 
diplomatic power. A diverse array of organizations responded to RF’s request to come 
together on certain ideas and for that reason Gates wanted RF to play a stronger convener 
role in their initiatives. The second reason was an understanding that RF possesses a unique 
historical memory of what has worked and what has not for almost a century. This is 
significant because in recent years, there has been a push within RF itself that its history 
should not restrict its present and future focus, which explains why the foundation is far less 
focused on health at the present than it has been in the past.17 Since BMGF’s establishment, 
there has been ongoing high-level communications between the two Foundations, with 
individuals such as William Foege, who previously served as Chairman of the Task Force for 
Child Survival (TFCS), serving as a link between the two.18 
 
6.11 The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization and the Allure of Vaccines 
  
PDPs have been an effective strategy for engaging historically reluctant firms to innovate for 
the benefit of historically marginalised people, by providing such firms with both material 
and reputational incentives for investment. However their restricted focus on individual 
diseases means they are not appropriate vehicles for bringing about systematic reforms to 
how any issue is governed globally. Yet in the same way RF and BMGF illuminated and 
innovated around public and private sector gaps via PDPs, they have also been the primary 
drivers of a variety of Informal Global Alliances (IGAs) intended to bring greater coherence 
                                                
16 Polio Eradication, ‘‘Global Polio Eradication Initiative Donor Profile for 1988-2012,’’ accessed Accessed 
November 25, 2012. http://www.polioeradication.org/poliodonors.asp; Robert Guth, ‘‘Gates Rethinks His 
War on Polio,’’ The Wall Street Journal (April 23, 2010), accessed June 24, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303348504575184093239615022.html?mod=e2tw 
17 Anonymous interviewee 1, November 19, 2011.  
18 Anonymous interviewee 2, January 18, 2011.  
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to how complex challenges necessitating collective action are approached, beginning with 
the failed Children's Vaccine Initiative (CVI) but attaining success with GAVI Alliance and 
later with the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA).  
 
While the latter three initiatives are independent entities in their own right, their intended 
purpose has been to catalyze the formation of informal coalitions of actors committed to 
common goals and to coordinate roles and responsibilities to ensure those goals are attained.  
All initiatives serve to illustrate the Foundation’s private diplomacy, for in each instance they 
have played the role of facilitator for establishing new governance arrangements focused on 
the provision of public goods crafted to include the participation of private actors. For in 
addition to states and public international organisations, these entities have sought to include 
private and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) whose participation is deemed just as 
essential as that of public sector entities if the initiative is to be succeed in the long term. 
Underlying the push for these IGAs is the assumption that no single actor or actor category 
(i.e. states, IOs, NGOs, etc.) is sufficiently capable of addressing collective action problems 
on its own. Moreover, these informal frameworks of collective action are also clear examples 
of governance adapted to a neoliberal era in which the United States has driven a shift from 
privileging formal organizations such as WHO to privileging informal self-selective 
organizations. Through the example of GAVI, I shed light on the role played by BMGF in 
the creation of this still emerging form of global governance, which I argue has become a 
defining character of the post-Westphalian landscape. 
 
Despite the many excellent global initiatives undertaken by various public and private 
organizations over the course of the twentieth century to strengthen health in developing 
countries, there was a collective sentiment within BMGF that there remained areas of 
opportunities to make important contributions and vaccines were one such area.19 A small 
group of PATH and WHO-associated scientists committed to saving lives through 
vaccination all convinced Bill Gates that investing in vaccines would fill an important gap, as 
they believed the topic had been neglected since the failure of RF-driven CVI.20 Seen in this 
                                                
19 Anonymous interviewee 8, June 9, 2011. 
20 Anonymous interviewee 9, July 12, 2011. 
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light, the argument that people make history is quite compelling. Gates apparently read 
voluminously and consulted widely. Investing in Health21 emphasized this same point, and his 
life experience in software development is seen to have played a role as well, for vaccines are 
very similar to software in that the majority of costs in rolling out new products lie in the 
research and development stages.  Allegedly, he felt that if the Foundation could accelerate 
the research and development, the rest would take care of itself.22 
 
With CVI’s fractious history in mind, BMGF established the Children’s Vaccine Program 
(CVP) in 1998 as a semi-autonomous entity housed within PATH’s offices in Seattle. Its 
purpose was to catalyze research supporting the development of new vaccines for neglected 
diseases, provide a dedicated source of funding for vaccine purchase and delivery, and 
heighten government’s awareness for immunization as a public good. GAVI grew out of this 
initiative with an initial US$750 million grant made by BMGF through the CVP, which was 
later doubled to US$1.5 billion.23 Gordon Perkin had indicated that BMGF was actively 
seeking any organization that could provide a vehicle for introducing new vaccines at low 
costs, and it was on this basis that the grant was made.24 While IOs, including WHO and 
UNICEF, were intended to benefit from this money, the autonomy of the CVP ensured that 
UN agencies could not hijack or shut down GAVI out of concerns for encroachment upon 
their individual mandates.25 Through GAVI, BMGF ensured that the idea of overhauling the 
global system of immunization was reinstated, and in a time of increasing fiscal austerity, 
those with the authority to undermine the legitimacy of the initiative chose instead to 
embrace it.26 Via GAVI, Bill Gates effectively shamed WHO and UNICEF into cooperating 
for the public good. In the words of Dr. Jim Kim, current President of the World Bank and 
Co-Founder of a CSO committed to global health equity, Partners in Health: “By doing so 
much so fast, the Gates Foundation embarrassed those who were supposed to be doing such things [emphasis 
added].”27  
 
                                                
21 The World Bank. Investing in Health. New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press. 1993. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Muraskin, Crusade to Immunize. 
24 Anonymous interviewee 9, July 12, 2011.  
25 Muraskin, Crusade to Immunize. 
26 Anonymous interviewee 17, August 18, 2011.  
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2003), accessed August 2, 2010  http://www.seattlepi.com/globalhealth/151538_global08.html 
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According to one former senior staff member in the Global Health program, the first three 
years of the Foundation’s existence was characterized by a paucity of employees with 
obvious vested interests, meaning that BMGF was very open to a diversity of ideas. The big-
picture thinking of William Foege was very different from that of Gordon Perkin, whose 
experiences at PATH made him very much focused on the local level. Foege’s ability to read 
patterns and synthesize a diversity of views according to this individual, underlies the success 
of GAVI, which was very much a result of that type of thinking. Consequently, GAVI 
worked as a BMGF-driven initiative because it married Bill Gates’ predilection for 
technological innovation with Foege’s diplomatic ability to soothe longstanding tensions, 
such as those between UNICEF and WHO, which previously impeded overhauling the 
means by which vaccines were developed and distributed, and increasing the overall number 
of new vaccines coming online. A new kind of diplomacy was required to engage with all 
members of the global health community and in this regard GAVI was deemed to have 
worked brilliantly.28 
 
While GAVI is very much a BMGF initiative, it is important to note that RF’s convenor-
status was employed in its creation, in that it was at Bellagio in March of 1999 where the 
alliance was forged.29 Moreover in August of 2011, former RF staff member and founding 
head of IAVI Seth Berkley was appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of GAVI, 
illustrating once again the epistemic ties between the two foundations. 
 
In terms of substance, there was very little that distinguished GAVI from its failed 
predecessor. What was new was a consensus to do away with CVI and create a new 
organization; however it was not immediately clear what that new organization would look 
like or how it would achieve its goals. One former advisor to BMGF in relation to GAVI 
speculates that it is quite possible that the decision to fund GAVI was made more out of 
frustration with the lack of progress of CVI and trust in the people proposing GAVI than a 
definition of a clear and workable path forward.30 In other words, of paramount importance 
was the need to remove CVI from the control of WHO and that is what GAVI achieved.  
                                                
28 Anonymous interviewee 25, August 16, 2011.  
29 Muraskin, Crusade to Immunize. 
30 Anonymous interviewee 9, July 12, 2011. 
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There is, however, little evidence to suggest GAVI represented any new intellectual insight 
about how to proceed programmatically.  To illustrate this last point, a number of task 
forces were founded to develop aspects of GAVI program, which attempted to reinvent 
many wheels. Some of this work was deemed inevitable given that GAVI was a new global 
organization several orders of magnitude larger than anything previously attempted. Yet 
considerable time and money was spent developing specific ideas that were later abandoned 
because they were deemed by one former external advisor as fundamentally flawed from the 
onset. One example was the decision to create a separate Information, Policy and Advocacy 
Task Force to develop a tool-kit of information intended to convince countries to support 
introducing new vaccines, despite the fact that it was well established that individual 
countries typically want information customized to their populations and unique cultural 
context. After a few years of effort, the Task Force was abandoned.31 
 
A second example was GAVI’s initial desire for simple metrics with which to make decisions 
for determining the level of assistance to provide to beneficiary countries. Initially it was 
proposed by members of another task force struck to study this question; that there should 
not be any fixed cut-off level per country given that needs vary significantly with relative 
wealth and that economic status changes over time, and that the amount of support should 
be in proportion to Gross National Product (GNP) per capita. This advice was ultimately 
rejected because GAVI’s leadership wanted a simple metric with which to determine 
eligibility: that being a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of no more than $1000 per capita. 
While this metric was easy for donors to understand, meaning that GAVI would be “helping 
the poorest,” it was subsequently abandoned and a policy similar to the position originally 
advised by the Task Force was adopted when it became apparent that such an artificial cut-
off was excluding many states and populations within states that should benefit from GAVI 
funding.32 
 
As an approach to collective action, the durability of the informal global alliance embodied 
by GAVI and catalyzed by a private non-state actor has been questioned. William Muraskin 
has argued for example that GAVI–while seemingly a powerful entity–is still very fragile in 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
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that it was conceptualized and driven by people operating outside of the traditional state and 
IO-centric global health system, in large part out of a perception that the system was not 
working. At the same time, in order to succeed, GAVI requires the ongoing buy-in of the 
system’s traditional membership, meaning there are no guarantees that the alliance will hold 
itself together in the event of conflicts or changing interests.33 For example, the willingness 
displayed by former WHO Secretary General Gro Harlem Bruntland to engage with the 
foundation and other non-state actors in pursuit of common goals set her apart from 
predecessors such as Hiroshi Nakajima, who did not buy into the importance of making the 
changes to the system TFCS pushed for when CVI was being negotiated.34 
 
Yet the view from within BMGF is that GAVI is as fragile as any robust democracy (i.e. 
even though there have been few great democracies, democracy nonetheless appears to be 
the best approach to government that has been devised to date).35 While it is possible that 
presented with a seemingly intractable conflict of personalities, and that this novel form of 
global health governance might collapse, GAVI remains a functioning alliance, and the more 
it effectively fulfills its intended function–that being successfully immunizing the world’s 
children–the harder it will be to discredit or disband it. A case in point is that prior to the 
establishment of GAVI, UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy actually approved a 
large cut to UNICEF’s vaccination program, which was considered a radical shift from the 
thinking of her immediate predecessor James P. Grant. GAVI’s formation established a 
norm that such cuts were unacceptable given UNICEF’s mandate, and Bellamy was forced 
to retract them.36 This in turn reinforces that in addition to illuminating and filling public-
private gaps, RF and BMGF’s proven potential lies in creating the preconditions for both 
normative and organizational shifts in the governance of global health. While RF has a more 
established legacy of operating at the interface of social philanthropy, it no longer has the 
required capital to act autonomously in this regard.37 BMGF, however, retains this capability 
and given Bill Gates and Warren Buffett’s efforts to stimulate interest in philanthropy as a 
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vocation of the world’s über-rich, there is no reason to suggest that others will not follow in 
its wake. 
 
GAVI in turn has been credited with serving as the model for a series of new bilateral 
initiatives (e.g. the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)) rolled out by 
Northern states, which had become complacent to the health needs of the world’s poor,38 as 
well as other PPPs looking beyond product development, such the Global Fund which was 
created in 2002 specifically to galvanize financial and political support for combating 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB.39 Since its establishment, the Global Fund has become the 
single largest source of financing for malaria and TB research and control, and a major 
source of funding for work on HIV/AIDS.40 BMGF alone has contributed over US$ 1.4 
billion to its coffers. It is widely seen as a model alternative financing mechanism, praised 
not only for its capacity to raise funds for what were historically neglected diseases, but also 
for its transparency and inclusiveness, and consequently many states now choose to channel 
the majority of their health-specific Overseas Development Aid (ODA) through it. Like 
GAVI, the Global Fund has proven to be a functional interim mechanism, in that it is 
helping get vaccines and drugs to people in need of them and could theoretically be used to 
disseminate other needed public goods. It was not, however, intended to be a long-term 
solution to what is inherently a systemic market-based problem in that it cannot be expected 
to ensure that the necessary human-resource balances, policies and infrastructure are in place 
at the country level to ensure public health systems run effectively.41 
 
GAVI made clear that barring a dramatic change in public sector capacity, the private sector, 
which is responsible for over half of all global health related research,42 is needed to be 
included for the arrangement to fulfill its intended function. Consequently, while designed as 
informal global alliance, GAVI nonetheless provided credence to the viability of a broader 
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php 
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model of institutionalized global governance aimed at increasing public-private cooperation, 
envisioned by the likes of John Ruggie and Jeffrey Sachs. As Assistant Secretary General for 
Strategic Planning at UNfrom 1997 to 2001, Ruggie oversaw the creation and 
institutionalization of the Global Compact and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGS), which were both engineered around the PPP paradigm, and intended to bring 
renewed focus and resources to longstanding UN goals related to social and environmental 
stewardship and poverty reduction.43  
 
6.2 From General Contrac tor to  Spec ial i st  Agency :  Deci s ion-making wi thin BMGF 
 
When Perkin officially joined BMGF in 2000, the Foundation had a total of eight staff to 
grant an estimated US$ 600 million per year, which led the team to adopt a general 
contractor model. Despite having clear end-goals, their limited numbers meant that they 
could not be responsible for the details of how these goals were met, leading to work being 
contracted out. That was in essence the granting philosophy of BMGF’s Global Health 
Program for its first five years. Once problems (e.g. the lack of a viable malaria vaccine) were 
identified, a white paper on the current state of the science was commissioned to get a sense 
of what was ready to go to scale. Trusted entities were then sought to manage the projects 
and assume responsibility for ensuring results which negated the need for the program to 
have expertise in the subject areas of the grants being made.44 
 
Once trusted partners were identified, the grants process was kept rather simple, in that that 
grantees had to submit short letters of proposals–which if successful–typically led to a single 
large grant made to that entity and their responsibility for the overall management of the 
project. These partners would then pass on much of this funding to other organizations (i.e. 
producers and NGOs marketing it to the intended target audience). For example, an 
estimated seventy percent of funds granted to PATH would go elsewhere.45 
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The first 180 grants were in fact approved by Bill and Melinda Gates personally. Perkin’s 
team provided abstracts and recommendations, which the couple often questioned or served 
as the basis for additional requests for information. This was effectively the review process 
as there were no technical advisors. Instead, decisions regarding grants were made 
collectively and in bulk by the staff, Bill, Melinda, founding CEO Patty Stonesifer and Bill Sr. 
Under this system, large grants were made in very short order, for example, a US$ 100 
million grant for MMV, which was made in 48 hours after first being reviewed.46 
 
When Richard Klausner left the directorship of the National Cancer Institute in 2003 to 
replace Perkin as head of the Global Health program, he brought with him from NIH a far 
more rigorous and academically-oriented review process that is now used within the 
Foundation to review, score and prioritize grant applications.47 Bill Gates is himself 
admittedly obsessive about metrics, such as reducing the mortality rates of children under 
five, which explains in part the Foundation’s focus to date on individual diseases such as 
pneumonia and malaria.48 The Foundation’s core goal helping all people lead healthy, productive 
lives is in fact reflective of this emphasis on measurement. William Foege notes detractors of 
the Foundation have argued that health equity can never be achieved in practice, which 
greatly diminishes the utility of such goal for any organization. Yet BMGF’s leadership is of 
the view that since it is quite easy to measure if it is not present, it is a perfectly logical goal 
to aspire to.49 
 
 Klausner’s arrival marked an important shift away from continuing to bet on the 
competencies of grantees towards employing issue-experts, which the new head strongly 
advocated and the Gates accepted.50 The decision to hire in-house experts was driven by a 
desire to have more effective means of monitoring how the foundation’s assets were being 
spent because of the focus on product development and the biological complexity of the 
diseases of interest. Initially for example funding to support research on Community-Based 
TB therapy was made available to Partners In Health to support their work in this area in 
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Haiti, Peru and Russia. After some time, however, the Foundation recruited world renowned 
TB expert Peter Small from Stanford to provide a better sense of the status of prospective 
research pathways related to developing new diagnostics, drugs and most importantly a 
vaccine to replace the existing but antiquated Bacillus Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccine. An 
infectious disease physician with a very broad understanding of the ecology and 
epidemiology of TB, Small helped the Foundation narrow its focus to six vaccines 
candidates currently under development through the Aeras TB partnership. At the same 
time, his formal affiliation with the Foundation heightened his own convening power, 
meaning his ability to bring people together in pursuit of a common goal.51 
 
One of the most notable Foundation initiatives originating from this period is the Grand 
Challenges in Global Health (GCGH) program, which epitomized BMGF’s continuing 
commitment to SEI. As an approach to addressing complex problems, the grand challenges 
scheme was first conceptualized over a century ago by mathematician David Hilbert, when 
in 1900 he laid out twenty-three unsolved mathematical problems for the international 
mathematical world to solve.52 Revitalized by BMGF in 2003, GCGH was created as a 
funding scheme aimed at generating interest in solving fourteen specific challenges related to 
improving vaccines, vector-borne disease control, biofortification, and developing new 
pharmaceuticals for communicable and chronic diseases as well new health-related 
assessment tools.53 Since its inception BMGF has contributed a total of over US$ 450 million 
for the program, which is administered by The Foundation At The National Institutes of 
Health (FNIH), a semi-autonomous entity within NIH established by the United States 
congress in 1996 to promote collaboration between private, public and third sector 
organizations. The Grand Challenges program is anomalous in that through international 
polling, it allows scientists to choose both the broad goals and individual challenges, which 
have ended up being research that is high-risk although potentially highly-impacting in 
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nature.54 Nevertheless it is a twenty-person board with considerable developing country 
representation, which ultimately selects the grants.55  
 
That GCGH has had a catalytic effect on NIH research priorities is quite evident. 
Kristin Mathews and Vivian Ho have noted that from 2003 to 2008, NIH supplemented 
GCGH with US$ 1 billion in global health funding, even though its overall budget remained 
unchanged. During this period NIH funding for malaria research increased twenty-six 
percent, general research on vaccines by forty-one percent; and vaccines specific to malaria 
and TB by ninety-six and sixty-two percent respectively, while research on heart diseases–-
the leading cause of death in US–increase by only three percent, and research on asthma was 
reduced by fifteen percent. The authors suggest that GCGH must be viewed as a platform 
from which BMGF has effectively hijacked a public sector organization to advance its own 
skewed agenda with minimal accountability.56 Proponents of the Foundation and GCGH 
certainly take issue with this argument, instead suggesting that while BMGF has been a 
catalyst, GCGH–like GAVI–has been instrumental in galvanizing support for attention on 
neglected issues by those with available resources and should therefore be lauded.57 
 
Moreover, while BMGF has largely focused on discovery related to infectious diseases, the 
approach has been conceptualized in different ways and for different ends. The Global 
Alliance for Chronic Disease for example has embraced the general grand challenges 
concept, but focuses on the process of implementation research, while the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)–which has also identified priorities 
employing the approach–is focused on service delivery. From The National Academy of 
Engineering, to fragile states, GCGH has proven itself to be a flexible approach and is not at 
all limited to discovery science, as utilized by BMGF.58  
 
Coming from NIH, Klausner was viewed internally as a natural empire builder who sought 
to shore up BMGF’s capacity to make informed decisions. Yet by increasing the number of 
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specialists within the Foundation, there has been an inevitable overall reduction in the level 
of engagement with eternal experts, ironically undermining the original goal of convening 
the world’s best thinkers to work on problems of interest to Bill and Melinda. As a 
consequence, donors became less likely to be informed of the both opportunities and 
barriers that exist for any given problem, and transparency of process was reduced.59 
 
A focus on metrics continued to inform the processes through which the foundation’s 
Global Health program identified funding priorities, made grant decisions and reviewed 
internal policies under the leadership of Tadataka ‘‘Tachi’’ Yamada, a gastroenterologist by 
training who came to the Foundation in 2006 from pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) where he was Chairman of Research and Development. At this time and continuing 
today, determinants of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) informed the focus on 
particular communicable diseases including but not limited to HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, 
neglected diseases (i.e. respiratory and diarrheal), and in a more integrated way–maternal and 
child health. Associated with the latter have been initiatives related to family planning and 
nutrition. Within these priorities the program spent amounts that were very roughly 
correlated to the DALY burden.60 
 
Yamada’s tenure saw a narrowing of focus on three equally critical points in the process of 
SEI: (i) discovery (e.g. of new vaccine candidates); (ii) development (e.g. shepherding 
vaccines through clinical trials and the regulatory process and getting them manufactured); 
and (iii) delivery (e.g. ensuring a system is in place so that the same vaccines get to those who 
need them). BMGF’s efforts increasingly related to examining how these three junctures 
could be better integrated to improve the overall efficiency of process.  
 
Much emphasis in this period was placed on developing long-term strategies for the key 
diseases on which the Foundation worked. This became more and more important as the 
scope of its activities broadened and the danger of losing a coherent focus increased. This 
emphasis on integration has been paralleled by an increasing focus on how to measure the 
impact of the Foundation’s investments; for as the program grew, more of its finite capital 
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was being spent, thereby increasing the potential for future constraints. Moreover as 
programs matured, grantees began to apply for additional funding. Accordingly it was felt by 
the Global Health program’s leadership that there was a need for new processes for 
measuring what investments were paying off, given the program’s short and long-term goals, 
and which were not.61 
 
The Foundation initially started out with a broad approach: wherever there where solutions 
available to the problems that the Foundation was intent on addressing, it would apply them 
where it could, the Global Fund and GAVI being such examples. Moreover where there 
were no solutions, the Foundation was committed to invest in developing them. However 
while the discovery side of product development is relatively inexpensive, the development 
side can be very expensive. As the Global Health Program grew and the investment in the 
discovery side began to pay off (i.e. via programs such as GCGH), resources began to shift 
towards subsidizing development costs.62 
 
The shift from a core group of savvy generalists to the acquisition of subject-specialists for 
each of the major disease entities that the Foundation was focusing on has not been without 
criticism, for it has fundamentally changed the dynamics of the organization. The move away 
from contracting out work has resulted in smaller grants, which may mean more control 
over where money is spent. However such a shift also requires many more staff and the 
responsibility of program officers to assess the validity of the science has been greatly 
heightened. This is because with the increase in the number of layers of bureaucracy, wrong 
decisions from the perspective of the final decision makers are far more wasteful in terms of 
resources (time and energy expended) than they once were. This presents a challenge for the 
Foundation as a whole because from the perspective of the program officer dealing with 
very complex subjects, it is far easier to say no to grants than to approve them. Despite the 
program’s staff increasing by more than a factor of twenty, the amount of money granted 
per annum has seen only a threefold increase from US$ 600 million in 2000 to just shy of 
US$ 2 billion in 2010/11.63 This increase reflects both a steady rise in the level of personal 
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funds committed by Bill and Melinda, as well as an influx of new funds from Warren 
Buffett.64 
 
In pursuit of accruing in-house technical expertise, the same corporate strategy that made 
Microsoft the world’s dominant software company–buying up talent in a bid to dominate the 
market–was increasingly being applied to the Foundation. This should be not surprising 
given that much of the leadership (Bill and Melinda Gates, Patty Stonesifer and Jeff Raikes 
who succeeded Stonesifer as CEO) originated there.65 Mirroring the early years of RF, 
control over BMGF has from its establishment been concentrated in the hands of a small 
group of people with close personal ties to its creators. The Foundation has in fact a mere 
three trustees; Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren Buffett. At the same time, their ‘‘hands-
on’’, business-like approach to philanthropy is very different from the traditional RF style, 
which was characterized by growing communities through grant-making based on trust and 
limited interference.66 If models of decision-making typically reflect the leadership 
preferences of any given organization, then BMGF is no different in this regard. While 
decision-making processes within the Foundation have changed over time according to 
changes in leadership, according to one well-placed observer within the Foundation, they 
currently reflect Bill and Melinda’s increasing overall involvement in management.67 
 
A general approach comprised of four general mechanisms now informs decision-making 
across all three Foundation programs (Health, United States and Development). 
 
First, each of the major initiatives (e.g. HIV, TB, agriculture, water and sanitation) has its 
own general strategy, which takes into consideration (i) the state-of-play in wider field; (ii) 
the major actors involved; and (iii) opportunity-mapping, as the intent is to not duplicate 
unless there is a fairly clear argument to be made as to why the Foundation can do 
something better. Each individual strategy takes approximately one year to develop and is 
                                                
64 Anonymous interviewee 27, January 4 2012; in 2006 Buffett effectively doubled the Foundation’s 
endowments with a gift of ten million shares of his company Berkshire Hathaway, then valued at US$ 30 
billion. The 2008 financial crisis however greatly reduced the assets of BMGF Trust; then a separate entity 
formed in 2006 to manage the Foundation’s endowed assets. 
65 Anonymous interviewee 25, August 16, 2011. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Anonymous interviewee 28, July 6, 2011. 
 168 
informed by the expertise of both internal and external consultants, which also relates to 
accountability. These conclusions are then used as a guide toward grant making and the 
senior leadership then signs off on the general strategy. 
 
Second, when the general strategy is in place, the program president and directors will work 
with their teams on the implementation of the sub-initiatives, which is when individual 
program officers start to look for prospective partners and oversee implementation. While 
the review of individual grants is an ongoing responsibility for program officers, at the senior 
level there is an annual review of grants as well to assess how each is working towards 
fulfilling the broader program goals. 
 
Third, roughly every fours years there is what is referred to within the Foundation as a 
‘‘refresh’’ at the program level, which essentially means examining how has the 
internal/external environment has changed (e.g. the issues, the science, the players etc.), and 
how as an organization it needs to change accordingly. The refresh is illustrative of the fact 
that staff cannot operate outside of an approved strategy. Within the refresh process, efforts 
are made to identify a wide variety of stakeholders and issue-experts and solicit feedback 
(typically anonymous) from them. The Foundation has increasingly looked for new vehicles 
by which to obtain objective external advice; all grants for example need this input before 
decisions can be made, meaning each individual grant can be seen as a proxy-measure 
through which external checks on grant-making is obtained. 
 
Finally, all three programs have external advisory boards which convene once a year to 
ensure that BMGF foci are representative of actual needs and compliment the work being 
done by other actors. Members of these boards are typically individuals with significant 
leadership experience at the international/global level (e.g. former Mexican President, 
Ernesto Zedillo). 
 
All four of these measures are reflective of the Foundation’s increased efforts to be 
transparent and accountable. Traditional governance mechanism (i.e. states and IOs) have - 
compared to foundations - far more formal accountability mechanisms built into them, 
which they should, although these do not always function as intended nor are they always 
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acted upon. In the private sector, there are clear market tests as to what firms should or 
should not be doing but this is not the case in philanthropy. From the perspective of 
Foundation leaders, all BMGF can do is aspire to get the appropriate measures and actively 
look for ways by which to attain them.68 
 
6.3 Prominent  c r it i ci sms o f  BMGF’s in f luence in Global Health Governance  
 
6.31 A Too Narrowly Defined Niche  
 
Because BMGF is seen as having agenda setting power, their heavy emphasis on subsidizing 
product development and particularly novel high-risk technologies has raised the ire of those 
who believe the Foundation’s assets would be far better spent on supporting more general 
health systems development and looking beyond communicable disease control to other 
challenges such as chronic disease prevention given the increasing DALY toll attributed to 
diseases such as diabetes and tobacco-associated cancers.69 
 
Critics of BMGF have made the point that historically medical technology has only been one 
factor among many underpinning decreases in mortality at the population level,70 hence it is 
better to fund what has proven to be effective at a low cost (e.g. health education, improved 
diet, housing etc.).71 An example of such evidence is the study conducted by Jef Leroy, Jean-
Pierre Habicht, Gretal Pelto and Stefano Bertozzi, published in 2007 in the American 
Journal Public Health,72 which concluded that existing proven technology can have three 
times the effect of investing in unproven technology. To arrive at this conclusion, the 
authors did an analysis of the top 120 organizations that are providing support for research 
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globally and found that ninety to ninety-five percent of funding has a high-tech focus (a 
basic biomedical approach to public health related to R&D for drugs, vaccines, diagnostics 
etc.). They then calculated the impact of this research on under-5 mortality, with findings 
that the current investment could reduce under-5 mortality by twenty-two percent. Finally, 
they calculated the impact on the same age group if the funding was instead put into 
strengthening existing technology. It was determined that this would lead to a sixty-six 
percent decrease in total mortality,73 meaning that two thirds of all global childhood death 
are thought to be preventable if all of what was known to work were implemented.74   
 
The late medical entomologist Chris Curtis once suggested that public health is the art of 
making the best use of available resources, including knowledge, human capacity and 
finances. All of these resources are always limited, the evidence-base for the effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of many current interventions may be lacking, and policy makers have 
to make decisions based on the best evidence available.75  
 
The rationale for Bill Gates’ activities in global health, which extends into the Foundation’s 
development work, is to bring funding for GCGH-type problems that remain unsolved in 
the developed world. They have defined their niche narrowly and are unapologetic for it.76 
There is advantage in having a narrow focus, in that they are less likely to duplicate what 
other programs are doing. Yet critics would argue that more often then not the high-risk 
ventures they are supporting will fail, while other proven options will have been bypassed 
and these huge opportunity costs create a contradiction for an organization whose purpose 
is to save lives.77 Moreover clinical or social policy intervention may be better options than 
developing a new compound. Yet as an organization, BMGF has been built itself around the 
PPP template. Gates has shown himself to be a technophile and drugs and vaccines are a 
natural fit for the paradigm and for BMGF, which explains their preference for recruiting 
staff from NIH, and the world of R&D, as this kind of expertise complements this 
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paradigm. Their embrace of the PPP paradigm must be seen in the context of larger global 
changes, where PDPs have been a band-aid for challenges borne out of a larger governance 
space, which is why they have been embraced so vigorously in the past fifteen years.78 
 
Nevertheless the Foundation will likely be forced into the health systems debate as time 
moves on, for example in order to sustain getting drugs to people who need them over the 
long term.79 This is because communicable disease control programs cannot be sustained in 
the absence of an institutional entity that provides the skill-sets for all of the necessary 
services (i.e. epidemiology, research, laboratory, training, and surveillance). The Foundation 
can achieve its goals for a brief time via vertical programs, but in order for progress to be 
sustained, its goals need to be attached to a horizontal (systems) approach.80  
 
Historically, RF’s country-level initiatives emphasized such capacity building and RF has 
recently re-positioned itself to focus on the reform of health systems. BMGF in contrast 
remains largely focused on product development and delivery.81 Its many defenders make 
the argument that while science-enabled biomedical innovation will never be the be-all and 
end-all of public health, historically, as acknowledged by vocal critics of the foundation, it 
was and continues to be one of several key sources of reducing morbidity and mortality in 
any setting. Moreover while effective communicable disease control efforts do depend on 
country engagement, by investing in particular diseases such as polio, BMGF is indirectly 
investing in health systems, as their monies go to developing the cold-chain infrastructure, 
purchasing the actual vaccines, and training staff in their delivery. Seen in this light, BMGF is 
bringing needed resources to the table and should be applauded for doing so.82 
 
What has made GAVI such an anomaly as a global health framework is that it is implicitly 
systems-oriented; while it certainly utilises ‘‘push’’ mechanisms to stimulate technological 
innovation, it also rewards countries for delivering vaccines ‘‘pulling’’ them in the right 
direction from a policy perspective.83 Moreover because GAVI has rules on what countries 
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have to achieve in order to gain access to vaccines, it is explicit with regards to governance 
expectations without having to publicly chastise.84 Ironically since GAVI’s establishment 
over a decade ago, most of what BMGF has done has been ‘‘push’’ oriented, which only 
serves to reinforce perceptions that the Foundation is skewing research trajectories in pursuit 
of ‘‘silver bullets’’ as opposed to fostering systemic change. However, the more important 
point is that a primary focus on subsidising technical innovation is not in keeping with the 
optimal use of philanthropic money. This is because so long as there are forces such as 
GAVI prioritising health systems strengthening through incentives and creating the requisite 
pull (i.e. public demand for vaccines), the private sector will ensure the development of the 
needed deliverables.85 In this regard GAVI and BMGF as its underwriter have been catalysts 
of institutional innovation in the governance of global health.  
 
To be sure, BMGF has been subject to strong criticism, informed by rather superficial 
analysis. Based on a review of publicly available data on the foundation’s resource-flows in 
the first decade of its existence, David McCoy and colleagues from the University College 
London suggested in a 2009 article published in The Lancet that BMGF exhibited a clear bias 
towards funding American organizations which in this period received approximately forty 
percent of the foundation’s Global Health funding.86 While the authors acknowledge that 
totals do not reflect sub-recipients, this assessment also does not consider differences in the 
purpose of the beneficiary organizations. PATH, for example, which received approximately 
ten percent of all funds, works primarily on capital-intensive projects. For example, 
MMV through PATH is currently coordinating the largest vaccine trial ever carried out in 
Africa.87 Development on what is now RTS (Mosquirix) began in the 1980s at the Walter 
Reed US Army Institute of Research in Fort Detrick, Maryland as an experimental malaria 
vaccine. It was eventually taken over by GlaxoSmithKline, which over the last twenty years 
has invested $600 million in its development. RTS is the same vaccine that was developed in 
the public sector but with a much- improved adjuvant. It confers immunity but relatively low 
efficacy (thirty to fifty percent protective efficacy) compared to most vaccines approved for 
use. While these effects are real and replicable, malaria experts say that it remains difficult to 
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determine how well it will function in real world conditions. That said, it could certainly 
make a significant health and economic impact given the hundreds of millions of malaria 
infections incurred annually. Furthermore, it is the only vaccine out of 200 or so candidates 
to have accomplished this.88 Currently in phase three and expected to be approved for use 
within the next five years, RTS is thus a private venture that has been heavily subsidized by 
public dollars which requires a tremendous amount of money to sustain and to which 
BMGF has contributed US$ 100 million. MMV was first funded by BMGF in 1999 when 
there were very few organizations working on malaria. Because PATH’s performance as an 
intermediary organization has been viewed positively by the Foundation, its level of funding 
has continued to grow.89 
 
PATH now collaborates with an estimated seventy-five companies in pursuit of developing 
solutions to complex problems.90 From the perspective of one prominent malaria clinician-
scientist, technology needs to answer clinically relevant questions. Consequently, emphasis 
on comparatively complex innovation should be on truly globally important challenges, 
whether developing vaccines for important diseases such as malaria or ‘‘point of care tests’’: 
triage tools that–through a finger prick–provide clinicians with a sense of immediate health 
trajectories. From this individual’s vantage point, there is no utility engineering any 
technology unless it can be applied in the field,91 which is in effect, the philosophy informing 
PATH model.  
 
The total amount of money BMGF spends annually on improving population health in 
developing countries is approximately US$2 billion;92 roughly seven percent of the total US$ 
28 billion in development assistance for health made available annually by all relevant actors 
(states, IOs, firms, NGOs etc.).93 While significant, the Foundation’s contribution is still a 
small fraction of the total, which its leaders use to justify its restricted focus. One former 
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Global Health program senior staff member has stated that the Foundation’s proven niche 
or comparative advantage as an organization is in developing new solutions to longstanding 
problems.  It has deliberately chosen not to work primarily at the country level through an 
operational model so as to not to duplicate the work of others, for this is what traditional 
development agencies (e.g. USAID) are considered to have always done.94 
 
GAVI in contrast represents an unprecedented way to solve established problems and 
BMGF has worked very closely with UNICEF and other organizations to better fund and 
deliver vaccines, negotiating for example optimal pricing schemes with partnering firms. 
From the perspective of its leaders, it is not in the Foundation’s interest to replace existing 
institutions or duplicate the work of others. Instead it is to help them perform as they aspire 
to do, which may require developing novel bridging entities such as GAVI. From this 
perspective the foundation is devoted to doing the most good it can do within the pre-
existing system.95 
 
Yet there is also real danger of BMGF’s fixation on enabling new approaches and 
particularly new technologies. PATH creates incentives for firms to create new products and 
BMGF is its primary benefactor. From the perspective of one former PATH executive, the 
foundation is currently the principal driver of the widest global health research pipeline the 
world has ever seen. The danger that exists for PATH is the same danger that exists for 
BMGF, which lies in the risk of a technology pile-up created if the end products do not end 
up getting used. To prevent this from occurring, there is certainly a need for greater 
investment in health systems; however from the perspective of the Foundation, this 
responsibility lies with states not individuals.96  
 
One prominent perspective emerging from the leadership of the Global Health program is 
that the most critical impediment to attaining global health equity is the lack of capacity to 
ensure product delivery that exists to varying degrees throughout the developing world. 
From this vantage point BMGF’s critics are considered ignorant of how much money 
actually goes into GAVI, and how much of this is in turn invested into the strengthening of 
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health systems. From this vantage point, BMGF can only do so much to appease critics, in 
the same way that there is only so much it can do to persuade states to prioritize the 
strengthening of health systems. What it can and does do well is help facilitate the 
development of new products and the means by which they are delivered.97  
 
Moreover, despite its chosen niche, the Foundation’s health activities are by no means 
limited to enabling product development and delivery. It does for example seek to enable 
chronic disease prevention through its support for the Global Alliance for Improved 
Nutrition (GAIN), a PPP focused on fostering food fortification initiatives at the country 
level, which was established in 2002 with funding from the Foundation, and the American, 
Canadian Dutch and German governments. Mirroring GAVI, GAIN is pulling governments, 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) such as Danone and Heinz, academia and CSOs such as 
the Micronutrient Initiative to cooperate for humanitarian purposes and BMGF has driven 
this cooperation.  Concerns have been raised that GAIN’s technological and pro-business 
orientation lends itself more to creating new markets for participating firms than to the 
addressing larger humanitarian project of under-nutrition it has built itself around.98 This 
does not diminish the fact, however, that BMGF is now an important source of funding for 
both research in the area of micronutrients and the end products of such research.99 
 
BMGF’s program on nutrition is in keeping with its larger paradigm. As will be illustrated in 
Chapter 7, the Foundation is investing in nutrition through agriculture with the belief that 
strengthening the economic security of smallholder farmers is the central link between the 
two. Accordingly, its focus is on providing micro-finance seeds and facilitating bringing 
crops to markets with the belief that doing so will increase incomes and crop availability, and 
improve nutrition at the population level far more than just focusing on micro-nutrients. In 
theory, these goals (via AGRA) are among the most important investments they are making 
towards improving population health,100 but they have received far less attention than their 
work related to communicable diseases. 
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Moreover despite a reluctance to focus directly on health systems strengthening at the 
country level public, BMGF has demonstrated a clear commitment to continuing RF’s 
tradition of institutional innovation oriented towards strengthening public sector capacity. 
While RF’s convening power was critical for IAPHI’s emergence, for example, it was BMGF 
in 2004 that provided the first five years of financing for the organization in the form of a 
US$ 20 million start up grant, which allowed for creating the formal organization, supporting 
meetings, and constructing its website, technical support, and additional monies for 
development which were granted in 2005.101 
 
Interestingly, for an organization that has been criticized for skewing transnational research 
trajectories and not paying sufficient attention to the principal drivers of morbidity and 
mortality across the global South, BMGF has spent considerable amounts of money in 
support of strengthening data-gathering and analytical capacities in global health.  
Since the release of Investing in Health, an emphasis on ‘‘out-come measures’’ has become 
widespread within IOs and partnerships have largely followed suit in embracing a 
performance-based approach to its grant-making.  At the same time, a lack of reliable basic 
country-level baseline data (e.g. mortality rates, cause of death etc.) arising primarily from 
weak health systems remains a considerable problem, in large part because it makes gauging 
improvements exceedingly difficult.102 
 
BMGF’s provision of US$ 50 million in seed funding for the Health Metrics Network, a 
WHO-based PPP established in 2005 in pursuit of strengthening the development of 
evidence-based policy through improved data, is one example of an attempt by the 
Foundation to innovate around such glaring gaps. Another, and perhaps more significant 
example, was the Foundation’s US$ 105 million grant to the University of Washington to 
create the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) in 2007, a highly specialized 
entity focused on improving the quality of global health data through sophisticated statistical 
analysis. From the perspective of one former Foundation official, because data is often 
politicized, entities such as IHME are best situated at independent academic centres as 
opposed to within IOs, and particularly WHO provided they are working in partnership with 
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the countries under scrutiny and not manipulating data autonomously. For while WHO 
portrays itself as the definitive collector and miner of the world’s health data, it is perceived 
by some–including former staff–to lack the resources needed to perform the business of 
methodological innovation in analytics. From this perspective, WHO’s moral and political 
responsibility pertaining to global health statistics lies in ensuring the findings of the IHME’s 
of the world are reported, and that such information dissemination occurs in a standardized 
format.103 
 
6.32 The absence of ‘boots on the ground’ 
 
A second criticism of BMGF has been that despite a surge in staff numbers, its continuing 
lack of dedicated field staff embedded within the countries where it funds programs is 
limiting its understanding of the problems it seeks to address. This absence of ‘‘boots on the 
ground’’ has substance in that while the foundation has country offices, for in China,104 and 
in India,105 where staff oversee the disbursement of funds and provide technical support, its 
field presence is limited. One response to this is that maintaining offices in countries is not 
the only way to keep in touch with what is actually going on at the local level and can 
actually distract from this by limiting the focus to a few particular locations.106  
 
Yet BMGF’s lack of operational programs reveals two larger and inextricably linked 
challenges. The first is that despite demonstrating a willingness to learn from other actors 
and in particular RF, building a large global health program from scratch means a steep 
institutional learning curve in a short period, leading to some inevitable missteps.    
 
According to one former senior staff member, the popularity of many ideas informing public 
health policy has waxed and waned (e.g. the utility of the community health worker), largely 
based on demonstrated effectiveness. Newer organizations, because of their lack of 
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institutional baggage, often bring fresh insight to longstanding challenges. Yet institutional 
memory–which new organizations lack–is also important as it (usually) ensures that old fads 
abandoned for good reason remain confined to history. Because the majority of BMGF’s 
staff members lack experience in public health, the organization is having to discover on its 
own where the big constraints on strengthening public health in developing countries lie.107 
 
The second challenge posed by BMGF’s lack of operational programs relates to its ability to 
sustain its influence within the contexts where it seeks to catalyze change. Formal education 
training programs delivered at the country-level were for decades the basis by which RF was 
able to embed ideas and norms into public policy making institutions. This illustrates that 
investing in human resources is not about creating or distributing technology but instead 
about investing in professional leadership. Historically, and continuing today, RF’s focus–
while certainly on science and technology–has been on capacity building, while to date 
BMGF is more focused on end-points and magic bullets.  
 
While BMGF has brought tremendous resources to bear on technological development, the 
next generation of developing country scientists require not only access to advanced training 
but also to physical resources which countries often cannot or choose not to provide and the 
Foundation has to date balked at investing in this.108 Interestingly, the limited number of 
investments that BMGF has made in post-secondary education related to global health have 
been at the University to Washington, which in addition to IHME include the department of 
Global Health, which was launched with a US$ 10 million start-up grant.109 However, as 
critics have pointed out very publicly, partnerships, universities and NGOs in high-income 
countries are poorly positioned to address these issues. This suggests then that the 
Foundation’s human resources investments would be better spent on people and 
organizations in low-income countries.110 
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RF’s legacy has been that of capacity building in science. BMGF, in contrast, while still 
investing in science, is focusing primarily on bringing about dramatic changes in SEI, which 
tends to mean creating quick technological fixes to large problems as opposed to the much 
longer term capacity building exhibited by RF of the past.111 This gets back to the push-pull 
concept and the Foundation’s natural comparative advantage in global governance. As a 
private, well-endowed organization, BMGF has all the necessary resources to create 
initiatives with built-in incentives to pull beneficiaries towards improving their performance 
and lock-down learning in societies to avoiding the backsliding that often accompanies every 
transition to a new political regime. From the perspective of a former high-ranking Global 
Health program staff member, it is critical then that advocacy–which is becoming a larger 
component of BMGF’s activities–is also directed at developing countries and not just to the 
developed world where it currently focused.112  
 
6.33 Too much emphasis on firms and markets 
 
A third major criticism of BMGF relates to Bill Gates’ expressed support for governments 
developing greater market incentives to engage for-profit entities to innovate for the needs 
of the world’s poor. Gates first advanced the idea of ‘‘creative capitalism’’ at the 2008 World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. His speech focused on the need for developing a 
global system that draws out innovators using profit incentives wherever it is possible. 
Where profit cannot be assured, he argued, then states need to recognize and create some 
form of reward for the altruistic behavior of firms, on the assumption that the combination 
of assured profit and recognition of ethical engagement will drive positive change. Since its 
inception, BMGF has provided such incentives by leveraging funding from states in order to 
subsidize firms to take risks that they would not take otherwise and bring their expertise to 
table of collective action.113  
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An example of this vision in practice is the Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) model, 
which was first conceptualized by Harvard economist Michael Kremer as a means of 
catalyzing industry interest in developing new vaccines for neglected diseases. The model 
was based on a simple yet elegant premise; that an advanced commitment on the part of 
purchasing organizations to buy a specified amount of product at a specified price would 
offer a way of compensating for a lack of traditional market demand.114 
 
In 2007 this model was embraced by BMGF, Canada, Italy, Norway, Russia, and the United 
Kingdom, who committed a total US$ 1.5 billion to launch the first Advance Market 
Commitment (AMC) to expedite the development of a vaccine for pneumococcal 
pneumonia and meningitis, which causes an estimated 1.6 million annual deaths.115 Yet the 
model has also attracted criticism, such as that expressed by Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF), which has argued that the AMC effectively subsidizes Northern firms’ participation 
costs in GAVI by providing firms such as Pfizer and GSK with an artificially fixed profit 
level.116 
 
The AMC is illustrative of how interest in global health that is now reaching the highest level 
of politics can both have both positive and negative connotations. The early visionaries and 
proponents of advance purchase agreements believed that through advertising, one billion 
dollars had been reserved for the benefit of innovators who can design a specific vaccine 
with well-defined characteristics, such innovation would be assured. Yet according to one 
individual well versed in the challenges of vaccine research and development, the reality is 
that the costs of innovation greatly exceed the AMC. Consequently, in the fifteen years since 
its launch, the goal has shifted from removing the risk of engaging in R&D to other ideas 
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including building up production capacity and serving as a pool of funding with which to 
purchase and distribute existing vaccine.117 
 
However according to this same individual, with the British and Italian governments each 
committing hundreds of millions of dollars to the pneumococcol vaccine pilot project, the 
question is no longer to see whether the AMC is the best or even desirable approach but 
how to make the shoe fit no matter what it takes. From this perspective, many well-
intentioned and intelligent people have spent a considerable amount of time and money 
trying to make the AMC work, and as a consequence considerable political ‘‘face’’ (i.e. that of 
Gordon Brown as well as Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti, whose government 
committed over half a billion dollars to the fund) was on the line if it was deemed a failure, 
meaning a political point of no return had been crossed.118 
 
It is the view of many informed observers that the most unfortunate aspect of the AMC 
idea–and this relates to the criticism generated by MSF–is that it may have paradoxically 
stalled a reduction in the price of existing pneumococcol vaccine.119 For example both Merck 
and GSK have announced reductions in the price of rotavirus vaccine.120 However with the 
AMC locking into place a specific price to be paid to producers for pneumococcal vaccines, 
there is no incentive for such producers to reduce the unit price.  
 
The AMC provides an important larger lesson in global governance: when any new idea is 
proposed as a solution to a big complex problem, the entire community of problem solvers 
need to critically examine who is claiming its utility and why. From the perspective of 
someone with decades of experience in facilitating the development of new vaccines, the 
AMC concept was conceptualized and driven by individuals with little understanding of 
vaccines or product development. However from the perspective of an economist, the AMC 
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seemed like a logical way to add on to the success of GAVI.121 
 
The AMC is illustrative of the challenge of how to pull innovation out of a global system 
that still exists in a patchwork form.122 While is not clear to what extent Bill Gates pushed 
the concept on the global stage, only now are its strongest advocates conceding that it has 
not worked as intended and that there will likely not be a second one. Given the finite 
resources and perhaps most importantly the political will to address global health challenges, 
there is great danger in collectively falling victim to big claims lacking evidence of 
effectiveness. Interestingly as alluded to by MSF, the mechanism could still be used for its 
original purpose to entice emerging market manufacturers as per the meningitis vaccine.123  
While the AMC may have been conceptually flawed, the general vision of collective action 
informing it predicated on using market systems to drive positive change is wholly consistent 
with RF’s approach to global governance adapted to the context of the neoliberal era. 
Placing firms at the centre of the collective was a radical departure from the international 
problem-solving paradigm centred around states and IOs in the mid-1990s. However it is 
now the norm and RF and BMGF have played key roles in catalyzing this shift in approach 
to global governance. 
 
At the same time, concern has been expressed that BMGF’s support for including firms in 
global health governance extends well beyond R&D.124 In 2007 an International Finance 
Corporation report funded by the BMGF argued for embracing and improving private 
health care where it is predominant, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa where approximately half 
of all care is delivered by private providers,125 which has been construed by some as evidence 
of the Foundation’s preference for private care delivery.126 
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However, one high-level perspective from within the Foundation is that the best means of 
getting people access to high quality health care will vary from country to country and is thus 
highly context dependent. In most low and middle-income countries it is via the public 
sector. Yet for specific services, for example HIV treatment services for vulnerable 
populations (i.e. intravenous drug users and Men Who Have Sex With Men (MSM), in places 
where they face repression, health care-delivery is considered to be better done by 
community-based or private organizations. For some issues (e.g. family planning) there is a 
definite middle ground where both private and public sectors play and important role. What 
is the right public-private mix is therefore considered by the Foundation’s leadership to be 
highly contextualized, and BMGF does not have an a priori bias towards either.127 
 
The African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) is an example of this 
blending of roles. Established in 2000, the ACHAP is a PPP between the Government of 
Botswana (which provides health care), BMGF (a benefactor), and Merck (which provides 
anti-retroviral drugs) which is focused on the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, 
through the universal access to ARV.128  In the eyes of one former director of a national 
public health agency with significant international experience, it does not matter whether 
care is delivered by public or private providers, so long as there is access, the quality of care 
is sufficiently high, the cost is manageable and outcomes are good. Cultural expectations may 
lend themselves to private care, for example, in the United States, but not in other contexts, 
such as Canada. What does matter if one consistently fails to deliver on those metrics.129 
Whether ideology as opposed to a willingness to accept contextual specificity dictates 
BMGF’s policy positions on public health issues is not clear. What is clear however is that 
the Foundation has not hesitated to embrace market-based measures and the business 
community out of a belief that the private sector is integral to overcoming longstanding 
challenges to public health challenges plaguing the world’s poorest countries. 
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6.4 The Future  o f  BMGF’s Global Health Program 
 
Since its establishment, the focus of BMGF’s Global Health Program has been on providing 
material support for basic and applied research, facilitating the formation of PDPs and novel 
financing mechanisms, and enabling partner organizations involved in the delivery of health 
products and services. Recent leadership changes and grant-making give little reason to 
suggest these general preferences will change in the next ten years. At the same time, there is 
evidence the program is evolving. 
 
The best example of this continuity came at the 2010 World Economic Forum, when Bill 
Gates committed the Foundation to providing GAVI with US$ 10 billion over ten years for 
vaccine development and delivery. This was the largest grant ever made by the Foundation, 
leaving little doubt as to where BMGF priorities lie.130 
 
This emphasis on enabling the development of new vaccines was also evident in late 2011, 
when Trevor Mundel left his position in the Global Health of Development at Novartis to 
succeed Tachi Yamada as President of the Global Health program. Both Mundel and 
Yamada came to the foundation from R&D leadership positions within the pharmaceutical 
industry; however the two have actually had very different career paths. Prior to working at 
GSK, Yamada had a long career in academia engaging in basic research and chairing a 
department of medicine, and working within health systems (as a clinician running a practice 
and later as chief of medicine in a hospital). Mundel’s career in contrast has been spent 
entirely in the private sector on research and development.131 
 
The thinking behind maintaining a focus on vaccines is a certainty that the number of 
vaccines in use will greatly increase over the next twenty-five years. If history is any guide, 
this may be a logical assumption, for in the past seventy-five years, the number of commonly 
administered vaccines has increased from two to eighteen (in certain jurisdictions thirty). The 
Foundation’s leadership believes however that not only will the future standard vaccine 
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regime be much larger, but that the range of applications will also increase (i.e. for 
preventing chronic conditions such as heart disease and cancer).132 
 
While the Foundation’s leadership believes that BMGF can and should play a role in 
catalyzing innovation in vaccines development, they have also committed to seeing the 
organization play a leading role in ensuring the equitable distribution of the fruits of this 
research. Recent changes in BMGF leadership structure suggests the Foundation will indeed 
play a greater role on the delivery side, which may signal an increasing emphasis on heath 
systems strengthening.  In 2012, PATH CEO and President Chris Elias was appointed to 
replace Sylvia Mathews Burwell as President of the Global Development program, which 
was initiated in 2006 with an initial focus on agriculture and financial services. It would now 
appear however that the delivery aspect of the health program is being integrated into the 
global development program, sharpening Trevor Mundel’s responsibility for discovery and 
development, but giving Elias who has a wealth of experience working with organizations 
on the ground full responsibility for the delivery side, thus emphasizing that each are part 
of a larger whole.133 The hope expressed by William Foege is that future technologies will 
inform the system of product delivery, leading to paradigm shifts in the same way that 
vaccination changed how public health was approached.134 While it is difficult to envision 
what these innovations will look like from the vantage point of the present, those setting the 
Global Health program’s trajectory evidently are hoping the Foundation will play a catalytic 
role in their realization. 
 
In addition to product development and delivery, the Global Health program’s leaders are 
confident that the Foundation will play a key role in the continual improvement to the 
political processes informing global health governance. Foege predicts for example that 
firms’ relevance in global health will only increase out of both self-interest for new markets 
and a changing commitment to social welfare.135 If this proves to be the case, BMGF’s 
established links with industry will make it well positioned to continue to play diplomatic 
role at the public-private interface.  
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Initiatives such as GAVI and Global Fund illustrate that global health is an ascending 
political issue and BMGF has played an important role in this. Not so long ago governments 
expressed little interest in public health beyond national borders and in political cooperation 
in pursuit of reduced common health risks. However this has most certainly changed,136 and 
an increased understanding of the causes and economic costs of disease will only further 
cement this interest, as evidenced by the Bush administration’s commitment to global health 
while rejecting other established norms related to international cooperation.  
 
6.5 Conc lus ion  
 
BMGF’s heavy emphasis on underwriting the development of what it hopes will be high-
impacting technology is a continuation of RF’s tradition of enabling innovation in science, 
albeit with a comparatively much narrower focus. However its willingness to invest large 
amounts of capital into unproven technologies has made the foundation susceptible to 
charges of skewing global research trajectories via technology-focused initiatives such as 
GCGH and ignoring low-cost interventions that have already proven to be both efficacious 
and cost-effective. 
 
Moreover its reservation for directly supporting health systems strengthening at the country-
level, while actively promoting greater private sector involvement in mechanisms of 
collective action has also attracted considerable criticism. The Foundation has relied heavily 
on PDPs and IGAs in its efforts to enable the development, production and delivery of 
needed technologies to the world’s poorest people. In this regard it has been more of an 
emulator than an innovator in global health governance. Nevertheless the success of GAVI 
demonstrates that there is continuing merit in the emulation of what is effectively a 
Rockefeller template.  
 
Critics also point to BMGF’s expressed preference for market-based solutions to 
multifaceted problems, as evidence of the Foundation’s role in the advancement of a 
corporate agenda in global governance. This preference stems in part from the fact that, to 
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date, much of the Foundation’s leadership has come from the private sector. An awareness 
of private sector needs is useful for engaging firms, however, as the advanced market 
commitment for a vaccine for pneumococcal pneumonia and meningitis has shown, 
providing direct monetary incentives for firms can in fact work against the end goal of 
increasing access to needed heath technologies. 
 
 As a private Foundation, BMGF is vulnerable to such challenges because critics see a small 
elite group of people controlling the purse strings for initiatives that will affect many people. 
However as noted by William Foege, these perceptions do not detract from the fact that in a 
short period of time, BMGF has galvanized political interest in global health and driven the 
development of new approaches to cooperation oriented towards the pursuit of global 
health equity.137  
 
At the same time, there is a continuously expanding cadre of experts acting as advisors, and 
as a consequence, with the exception of the core commitment to global health equity 
embodied by the belief that ‘‘every life has equal value,’’ the ideas informing BMGF’s work 
continue to change and increase in number. For example, while the thinking of James 
Maynard, a former supervisor of the CDC’s program on Hepatitis B, was critical for vaccines 
becoming a central plank of the Global Health program, he has not been influential in the 
Foundation’s work since the establishment of GAVI.138 Nevertheless it is evident that 
BMGF has provided a home for innovators who share with the Gates family particular 
normative arguments and understanding of determinants of and solutions to particular 
problems, and in this regard the Foundation, must be seen–like RF before it–as an incubator 
of epistemic communities.  
 
The Foundation’s advocacy work, and specifically its use of media, has allowed it to frame 
how the problems it involves itself in are understood in both policy arenas and in the public 
sphere. Policy and advocacy initiatives account for approximately ten percent of the 
foundation’s total annual granting budget, which now exceeds US$ 3 billion. BMGF 
advocacy funds have been used to underwrite health awareness training programs for 
                                                
137 Interview with William Foege, August 18, 2011. 
138 Anonymous interviewee 17, August 18, 2011. 
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journalists and enable coverage on particular issues (i.e. river blindness), which has led to 
concerns expressed by unaffiliated journalists that the Foundation’s resources are being used 
to manipulate public opinion (i.e. focusing on successes as opposed to structural 
challenges).139 
 
This attempt to garner discursive and instrumental power is however not dissimilar from 
other non-state actors: for example, Greenpeace uses media in its advocacy campaigns 
oriented towards instilling an ecological consciousness at the societal level.140 Moreover the 
issues BMGF funds are now bringing illumination to were less than two decades ago 
covered by only a handful of journalists such as Laurie Garrett. Consequently, it could be 
argued that this money is ensuring mainstream media’s interest in a topic it previously 
neglected. 
 
What differentiates BMGF from most other non-state actors vying for influence in global 
health governance is the funding it has at its disposal which has proven to be a source of 
structural power. Grant making is allowing the foundation to shape global health research 
trajectories, and providing it with representation on most of the boards of the partnerships it 
has helped forge. WHO is, for example, not only an equal partner with the foundation 
within the H8,141  it is also now a grantee of the foundation, making it accountable to it. 
Indeed from the perspective of one former foundation executive, it is undeniable that policy 
makers increasingly trek to Seattle to see reality as BMGF sees it because of the huge 
resources the foundation makes available for addressing particular public health problems.142  
 
                                                
139 Sandi Doughton and Kristi Heim, ‘‘Does Gates Funding of Media Taint Objectivity?’’ Seattle Times (February 
19, 2011), accessed April 8, 2011. 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014280379_gatesmedia.html; see also the Living Proof 
Project, a multimedia initiative launched in 2009, illuminating success-stories of American global health projects 
http://www.gatesFoundation.org/livingproofproject/Pages/what-is-living-proof-project.aspx 
140 Paul Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). 
141 The H8 is an informal group of eight organizations that collaborate in the formulation of global health 
policy.  In addition to the Foundation, its membership is comprised of WHO, the United Nations International 
Children’s Fund, the United National Population Fund, the joint United Nations programme of HIV/AIDS, 
the World Bank, the Global Fund and GAVI Alliance. 
 
142 Anonymous interviewee 15, January 18, 2011. 
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Certainly then BMGF is an important player in the governance of global health. Yet has its 
material influence been overstated? Yes and no.  Research and development remains a 
critical public good. RF did not have the money to see products through the entirety of the 
research and development process, which is why the PPP concept emerged.  BMGF, in 
contrast, obviously does. At the same time, less than 0.5 percent of the US$ 6.5 trillion that 
world governments expend annually (on health)143 is being devoted to improving–mostly 
indirectly–the health of the world’s most impoverished people.144 Thus while BMGF 
funding comprises a small but nonetheless significant slice of the global aid money pie 
(seven percent), in the grand scheme of things it is really is just a drop in the bucket 
(comprising 0.03 percent of the total global health expenditures).  
 
Despite its reticence to fund the construction of brick and mortar institutions or human 
resource training programs in developing world, which the Foundation considers to be the 
responsibility of states, BMGF is still directly contributing to health-related public sector 
capacity building. This is evident in its support for informal networks focused such as the 
International Association of Public Health Institutes, and data gathering initiatives such as 
the Health Metrics Network and the University of Washington-based Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation. These efforts illustrate that the Foundation is not seeking to 
undermine multilateralism; although GAVI clearly illustrates it is willing to work outside of 
the traditional UN system, it feels doing so compromises its end goals. In this regard, BMGF 
embodies the neo-functionalist prediction, in which technocratic influence over collective 
action would not be limited to those working out of the IOs. 
 
What is clear is that despite its evident biases, in its short life, BMGF’s Global Health 
Program has made a huge contribution to illuminating the persistence of global health 
disparities, and initiatives such as GAVI have paved the way for other organizations such as 
the Global Fund that have succeeded in bringing resources to neglected health issues. 
As noted by Gro Harlem Brundtland, ‘‘there is a critical mass of expertise now based in 
Seattle, so it’s on everyone’s itinerary.’’145  
                                                
143 World Health Organization, World Health Expenditure Atlas (Geneva: WHO, 2011).  
144 Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 7. 
145 Tom Paulson, “Gates Foundation Out to Break the Cycle of Disease.” 
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In sum, the tremendous capital made available through grants combined with its perceived 
expertise have together provided the foundation with an ability to create incentives for 
developing high-impacting technologies, which in the words of one scientist has “changed 
the way innovators view at development aid.”146  
 
                                                
146 Anonymous interviewee 11, January 20, 2011.  
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Chapter 7: BMGF’s Influence over the Governance of Global Agricultural 
Development 
 
7.0 Introduc t ion   
 
This chapter begins by examining the motivations behind the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation’s (BMGF’s) decision to enter the domain of agricultural development and its 
reliance on a small group of individuals with deep ties to the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) to 
guide its early agricultural initiatives. As per its health program, the Foundation has 
embraced both the RF’s penchant for enabling Science-Enabled Innovation (SEI), and the 
institutions and frameworks of collective action, which RF played a lead role in creating, 
such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system. It 
has consulted with and employed former RF staff and similarly used its wealth and 
convening power to bring public and private actors together to discuss and formulate 
policies for strengthening agricultural systems and addressing agriculture-associated food 
insecurity in low-income countries. In many ways BMGF’s entry into agricultural 
development is a continuation of what appears to be the coming demise of RF’s work in this 
area, and brought attention to a neglected issue. 
 
BMGF’s involvement in agricultural development began less than a decade ago when there 
was still limited interest on the part of wealthy countries to invest in agriculture. In the 
twenty-five years preceding BMGF’s entry into agricultural development in 2006, total 
Overseas Development Aid (ODA) increased by nearly two hundred and fifty percent.1 
However the share that was specifically devoted to total agriculture fell from the peak of 
seventeen percent of the total in 1982,2 to three percent in 2005. Sub-Saharan Africa 
specifically experienced a net thirty-five percent reduction in agricultural aid over this 
period.3 The majority of these reductions occurred during the 1990s when multilateral 
organizations were experiencing severe cuts to their own, which explain in part why the 
                                                
1 Lidia Cabral, ‘‘Funding Agriculture: Not ‘How Much?’ But ‘What for?’’’ ODI Opinion Paper 86 (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 2007). 
2 Jamie Morrison, Dirk Bezemer, and Catherine Arnold, Official Development Assistance to Agriculture (London: 
DFID 2004).  
3 Cabral. 
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greatest decreases to agricultural aid were by multilateral donors, who reduced agricultural 
development spending by eighty-five percent between 1980 and 2002.4 These cuts were 
visible at the country-level in forty-four countries, where the total share of public sector 
spending devoted to agriculture was reduced from eleven percent in 1980 to roughly seven 
percent in 2002.5 Overall, the implementation of neoliberal policies adversely affected 
agriculture in developing countries to the point that an ongoing food crisis threatens much 
of the world’s population. 
 
Building private sector capacity for agriculture with Sub-Saharan Africa and political will 
within African governments for ensuring that agriculture is sufficiently prioritized was the 
basis for establishing the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), to which this 
chapter subsequently turns. While AGRA was the brainchild of the RF, BMGF has become 
its primary financial backer. BMGF’s enablement of AGRA is significant, I argue, as the 
organization has been a driving force behind galvanizing both public and private sector 
interest for African agricultural products and markets.  
 
The chapter casts light on additional initiatives highlighting RF and BMGF’s common 
commitment to SEI and underwriting organizations and partnerships focused on this goal, 
which provides opportunity to explore the idea that much of the contemporary tension 
related to BMGF’s interest in agricultural development relates to BMGF leadership’s 
expressed belief that biotechnology and more specifically Genetic Engineering (GE) is 
essential for ensuring food security in low-income countries.  
 
However despite a common commitment to enabling new technologies intended to benefit 
the world’s poorest people, this chapter shows that BMGF’s agricultural program is by no 
means a mere replication of RF’s program. I show for example how the combination of 
BMGF’s close working relationship with Multinational Corporations (MNCs) such as 
Monsanto - its “hands-on” grant making style and its lack of operational or training 
programs - clearly make BMGF’s agricultural program a far more narrowly focused animal 
                                                
4 Morrison, Bezemer, and Arnold. 
5 Shenggen Fan and Anuja Saurkar, Public Spending in Development Countries: Trends, Determination and Impact 
(Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006).  
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from that of the RF. Indeed the BMGF’s principal focus in agriculture to date has been on 
enabling the development of new high-impacting technologies, such as drought tolerant crop 
varieties. This high-tech focus has meant close collaboration with MNCs such as Monsanto, 
and BMGF has actively recruited agricultural program staff from the private sector on the 
basis that such partnerships will continue to be crucial to developing technologies for 
smallholders across the global South. To critics, this proximity to business and an ongoing 
predilection for technological solutions, and in particular genetically modified organisms for 
complex and highly politically determined problems, make BMGF’s motivations highly 
suspect. The chapter shows however that while BMGF is less innovative than RF in terms of 
fostering new governance frameworks, its track record of political advocacy oriented 
towards reversing the apathy in ODA focused on agriculture that has characterized the neo-
liberal era clearly demonstrates it is not seeking a continuation of the status quo.  
 
I demonstrate how the Foundation’s political influence in both national and international 
policy making arenas has been largely indirect but is nonetheless palpable. Its underwriting 
of advocacy undertaken by affiliated epistemic communities is illustrated through the 
example of The Chicago Council Report entitled, ‘‘Renewing American Leadership in the 
Fight Against Global Hunger and Poverty,’’ a normative document crafted specifically to 
increase the status of agriculture within American ODA. This chapter shows how BMGF 
provided funding for a similar initiative targeting EU member states (The Montpelier Panel) 
while providing the catalytic funding for two very different initiatives at the global level. The 
first examined is the World Food Program (WFP) pilot program, Purchase for Progress, 
which departs from the practice of importing food aid into countries undergoing 
humanitarian emergencies by purchasing food products directly from small holder farmers in 
the regions where operations. The second initiative examined is The Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program (GAFSP), a new global funding mechanism for existing country-led 
agricultural initiatives and multilateral organizations such as CGIAR, for which the 
Foundation also provided seed money. 
 
This chapter then turns to the Foundation’s relationship with CGIAR system and the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) before concluding with brief 
examinations of the limits of its advocacy efforts to shape the rules of the world and the 
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actions of other actors impacting how the world’s poorest populations sustain themselves 
through agriculture, and what the future of BMGF’s agricultural program may hold.  
 
My concluding argument is that while its focus is narrower than its ideational ancestor, 
overall BMGF is following in the wake of RF as a catalyst of institutional innovation 
oriented towards increasing access to new technologies intended to benefit the world’s 
poorest people, yet designed to work within the parameters of the existing state-imposed 
rules of the world. In general the Foundation’s approach to agricultural development has 
mirrored its approach to health. 
 
Because BMGF seeks to catalyze changes that, if achieved, will take many years to 
materialize, I argue that any pronouncements concerning its long-term significance to the 
governance global agricultural development are premature. This is not to say that its ideas 
and strategies for placing these ideas within policy debates have not been laid out, for they 
have. Rather, it is premature to pronounce whether BMGF’s strategies will yield their desired 
results over the long term. Central to Foundation’s efforts in agricultural development, for 
example, is its active engagement of corporate actors to use their resources to help 
historically marginalized populations, which I argue originates in a belief that it is good 
business to lift people out of poverty. The corollary of this is that BMGF’s presence in the 
agricultural realm is increasing opportunity for the private sector to become formally 
involved in the governance of what have historically been public sector-managed challenges, 
which creates opportunity but also vulnerability. 
 
To date little has been published in academic sources on the subject of BMGF’s agricultural 
initiatives. The primary empirical contributions of the chapter lie in the plethora of details 
derived from a variety interviews with early advisors to the program and its core staff, as well 
as members of supported epistemic communities and several of its critics. 
 
7.1 BMGF Turns It s Atten tion to  Agri cu l ture : 2004 - 2009 
 
BMGF’s interest in agriculture originated in the Global Health Program’s examination of 
biofortification as a novel means to decrease immune deficiency driving vulnerability to 
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infection.6 Theoretically, given that the Foundation’s initial global focus was restricted to 
health, it might seem logical that a program on water-sanitation and hygiene would have 
preceded a food and agriculture program, but in practice this did not occur.7 Bill Gates in 
particular was motivated by the logic that improvements to staple crops could improve 
nutrition and with it the overall health of poor people consuming those crops, and that 
increased incomes via better market access and increased yields would only augment this 
effect.8 
 
The first agricultural-related grant of US$ 25 million was made in late 2003 in support of the 
CGIAR’s HarvestPlus initiative.9 A micronutrient project launched in 2002 from funding 
made available by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and International 
Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), HarvestPlus was one of the first of CGIAR’s new 
Grand Challenges for Global Health (GCGH) programs. These time-bound research 
programs were set up as multi-institution partnerships intended to bring high-impacting 
solutions to complex problems perceived to be impeding global agricultural development,10 
making them very much in line with BMGF’s chosen niche.  
 
However, despite the tantalizing potential of biofortification, the Foundation’s leadership 
was initially cautious about moving into agriculture when it became apparent that agricultural 
development or the lack thereof was reflective not only of gaps in science but of a 
longstanding lack of political will on the part of governments in both the North and South 
to prioritize public infrastructure supporting agricultural systems. It was ultimately persuaded 
to do so however by the leadership of FAO, CGIAR, World Bank, and RF, who in the wake 
of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization’s (GAVI’s) success realized the 
potential funding and star-power that Gates could bring to issues that had long been 
neglected by the world’s wealthy countries.11  
                                                
6 Anonymous interviewee 16, December 9, 2010. 
7 Anonymous interviewee 28, July 6, 2011 
8 Anonymous interviewee 16, December 9, 2010; Anonymous interviewee 21, February 8, 2011. 
9 Anonymous interviewee 16, December 9, 2010. 
10 Robert Herdt, ‘‘People, Institutions, and Technology: A Personal View of the Role of Foundations in 
International Agricultural Research and Development 1960–2010,’’ Food Policy 37 (2012): 179–190; Anonymous 
interviewee 16, December 9, 2010; HarvestPlus, Breeding Crops for Better Nutrition, Washington: HarvestPlus, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006).  
11 Anonymous interviewee 22, November 12, 2010; Anonymous interviewee 28, July 6, 2011 
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For an organization devoted to improving the health of the world’s poorest people, investing 
in agriculture was a logical next step, especially given that three quarters of the target 
beneficiaries derive their income and food through farming. In this sense, the family farm 
was seen by BMGF staff as the customer, and the Foundation as a provider of new tools and 
frameworks intended to increase the customer’s agricultural and economic productivity.12 As 
such, innovation in science and governance were identifiable as short and long term 
priorities from the program’s origins, which helped to clarify and expedite the Foundation’s 
agricultural development efforts.13 
 
BMGF first hired Roy Steiner to advise on where in the agricultural spectrum the foundation 
could to make unique contributions. Trained as an agricultural engineer, Steiner previously 
worked at RF through the Warren Weaver Fellows program, which was created by RF Vice 
President Kenneth Prewitt to bring on annual basis a small number of individuals with 
exceptional potential to work at RF for one to two years. After leaving RF, Steiner was 
employed by McKinsey as a consultant, before establishing and managing a number of 
businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa.14 
 
With the help of external consultants such as Cornell-based agricultural economist and 
former RF Vice President Robert Herdt, Steiner led an examination across the entire 
agricultural value chain to identify BMGF’s comparative advantage.15 BMGF’s utility, it was 
ultimately determined, would be on catalyzing economic sustainability at the local level (i.e. 
facilitating seed development and dissemination and access to credit and markets), areas in 
which traditional development efforts were perceived to have fallen short. The long-term 
success of its efforts would depend on other challenges (i.e. land tenure issues, 
transportation and irrigation systems) being addressed; however these would have to be 
addressed by those actors with the capital and legal authority to do so (i.e. development 
banks and governments acting alone or cooperatively). At the same time, the Foundation 
would support the political advocacy of certain organizations such as the Chicago Council 
                                                
12 Anonymous interviewee 29, July 20, 2011. 
13 Anonymous interviewee 28, July 6, 2011. 
14 Anonymous interviewee 19, November 29, 2010; Anonymous interviewee 3, December 6, 2010. 
15 Anonymous interviewee 19, November 29, 2010. 
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that were pushing for changes in food aid policies of Northern states to mitigate the growing 
food insecurity experienced by much of the world’s poor.16  
 
Once it was decided that agriculture was to become a stand-alone program, Rajiv Shah was 
moved over from the Global Health Program to oversee it. A medical graduate with an 
MBA who began at BMGF in 2001, Shah’s only experience up until that point had been in 
coordinating some of the partnerships and funding mechanisms developed by the health 
program. BMGF leadership however thought that such experience would be useful in 
agriculture, and Shah became the first full time employee of the Foundation’s Global 
Development Program, which was officially established in 2006 with agriculture as its first 
focus area.17 Its material impact was felt immediately, however, for as noted by Herdt, in its 
first three years, its agriculture grant-making averaged just under US$350 million per 
annum.18  
 
The same general decision-making process that came to inform the Global Health Program’s 
focus, during the tenure of Tachi Yamada,19 was used to guide the foundation’s agricultural 
development efforts. BMGF staff determined that the greatest needs lay in impoverished 
rural regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia where various factors (e.g. lack of 
technology and access to inputs markets or inappropriate policies) were contributing to poor 
agricultural productivity. Based on its assessments, the foundation established country-
specific priorities where it chose to concentrate its efforts, with the general focus being on 
increasing agricultural productivity as a means of jump-starting economic productivity in 
these regions.20 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Anonymous interviewee 28, July 6, 2011. 
17 Anonymous interviewee 3, December 6, 2010. 
18 Herdt, ‘‘People, Institutions, and Technology.’’ 
19 See page 9 to 10 of Chapter 6.  
20 Anonymous interviewee 30 July 20, 2011. 
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7.11 AGRA: Enabling RF’s Plans for Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The program’s first major grant was US$100 million for the launch of the AGRA, an 
example of private diplomacy to which RF also contributed US$50 million. As noted by 
Robert Paarlberg, this joint venture in many ways represented the beginning of the end of 
RF’s agricultural program and the emergence of BMGF as a game changing organization in 
global agricultural development, which individuals long associated with RF helped facilitate.21 
While RF had spent almost US$150 million on agricultural development within Africa during 
the tenure of Gordon Conway,22 Judith Rodin–who succeeded Conway in 2005–expressed 
little interest in maintaining the Foundation’s agricultural programs. However, through the 
AGRA grant, BMGF unexpectedly injected new life into RF’s plans for agricultural 
modernization in Africa.23 
 
While established as an independent entity, AGRA was effectively an expansion of a pre- 
existing RF program in Western Kenya which focused on working with banks to facilitate 
loans for small holder farmers to improve their access to seeds and fertilizers, and 
developing and training a network of seed and agro-extension dealers. Since its senior staff 
initially consisted of seconded RF employees such as Gary Toenniessen, Joseph DeVries, 
and Akin Adessina, the organization served to broaden an approach that RF had been 
utilizing on a much smaller scale.24  
 
As an institution, AGRA seeks to catalyze efforts to fill two major gaps perceived by its 
architects to be impeding agricultural productivity across much of Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
include (i) the lack of the lack of local indigenous private sectors creating and distributing 
new seed varieties and associated inputs for African farmers and (ii) the longstanding apathy 
towards agriculture as a vessel for economic development displayed by Northern donors and 
African governments alike.25 
 
                                                
21 Robert Paarlberg, Starved For Science: How Biotechnology Is Being Kept Out of Africa (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 107. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Anonymous interviewee 22, November 12, 2010;  Anonymous interviewee 19, November 29, 2010. 
24 Anonymous interviewee 21, February 8, 2011. 
25 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
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The lack of indigenous seed companies are viewed by AGRA leaders as a crucial impediment 
to healthy agricultural sectors, for as previously noted, transnational seed companies have 
long ignored varieties of importance for smallholders in much of the developing world, 
given the limited profit margins, and have instead focused on tradable commodities. This is 
not a surprise, as firms are expected to focus on where there is commercial demand and a 
good return on their investment. Yet as noted by former AGRA Vice-President Akinwumi 
(Akin) Adesina, also a former RF staff member who is currently Minister of Agriculture in 
the Nigerian government, shareholder-needs do little for the tens of millions of African 
smallholders with limited ability to pay for seeds and inputs, who themselves are catering to 
very unique consumer preferences while facing a variety of environmental challenges 
including but not limited to drought, flooding, disease and pests.26 
 
AGRA considers commercial breeders’ disinterest in developing new varieties for African 
growers to be a clear case of market failure and is taking a three-pronged approach to 
address it. First, the organization is spearheading human and physical capacity building 
efforts by providing funding and coordinating the training of plant scientists in the tools of 
biotechnology, ensuring the availability of physical labs and developing networks linking 
Southern and Northern scientists. Second, working with the African Agricultural 
Technology Foundation (AATF), it is helping to facilitate the transplantation of the requisite 
proprietary technology via the provision of licenses for African applications, and developing 
the necessary regulatory biosafety frameworks to govern the flow of materials to look at 
critical risks. Finally, it is working with farmers to ensure that biotechnology provides 
sufficient value added compared to traditional varieties to justify their adoption. This means 
demonstrating a higher nutritive value in the case of varieties that have undergone 
biofortification, or showing increased resistance to the diseases, pests, drought and flooding 
that threaten harvests every year, and which will likely only get worse with climate change.27 
 
Profitable indigenous seed industries are perceived by AGRA as essential for ensuring that 
access to a broad spectrum of crops remain available to African farmers for cultivation. 
Indeed local firms have considerable potential to profit where transnational corporations 
                                                
26 Interview with Akin Adesina, February 10, 2011. 
27 Ibid. 
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cannot. Trade rules related to quality and food safety established by the United States and 
EU are in place for established crops (e.g. cocoa, bananas etc.), which limit the potential for 
African small holders to profit from their export. However indigenous varieties are often not 
subject to these rules, meaning that opportunities exist in global markets for those willing to 
invest in untapped varieties.28 Accordingly, the products that AGRA is taking to the 
improvement phases are from local germ plasm and consumed locally, such as sweet 
potatoes and yams, sorghum, and cow peas, which are being crossed with exotics to 
incorporate desired traits.29 
 
Yet AGRA’s architects see the success of the adoption of improved indigenous varieties 
being contingent on what they view as another pressing gap being filled, that being ensuring 
smallholder farmers have access to chemical fertilizer. While African smallholders have 
limited and often no access to either herbicide or fertilizer, a lack of access to the latter has 
resulted in nutrient depletion, which combined with wood being used as a principal fuel 
source of cooking fuel has in turn driven widespread destruction of forests at a rate of two 
hundred percent greater than the global average. The resulting loss of soil nutrients is costing 
African governments an estimated US$4.5 billion per year and increasing the use of chemical 
fertilizer has been deemed by international donors such as the World Bank as fundamental 
to addressing this deficiency.30 In 2006 Adesina personally led the Africa Fertilizer Summit at 
which attending heads of state agreed to increase fertilizer application rates from 8 to 50 
kg/hectare.31 
 
While still half of the global average of 100kg/hectare, this increase termed ‘‘micro-
building,’’ translates into smallholders now being in the position to devote a single bottle-cap 
of fertilizer per plant, where previously none was applied. Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS) are also being employed to improve knowledge on the state of soils in a given area, 
such what type and how much fertilizer is needed, which will improve guidelines for 
fertilizer use in different regions. Moreover, while organics alone are deemed insufficient to 
                                                
28 Anonymous interviewee 24, January 26, 2011. 
29 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
30 Michael Morris and Valerie A. Kelly, Ron J. Kopicki, and Derek Byerlee, Fertilizer Use in African Agriculture: 
Lessons Learned and Good Practice Guidelines (Washington: The World Bank, 2007).  
31 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
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solve Africa’s soil nutrient deficiencies, chemical fertilizers are being combined with organic 
matter, such as herbaceous legumes and animal manure with the hope of augmenting the 
effect of the former, and studies are being conducted on the efficacy these practices.32 
 
AGRA, according to Adesina, is not merely attempting to transplant the Asian experience in 
Africa as some critics have suggested,33 for the organization seeks to avoid the adverse 
effects to biodiversity brought about by focusing on a few key crops demanding increased 
irrigation and substantial chemical inputs. By advocating practices such as intercropping and 
a general breadbasket approach so that there will always be a mix of crops grown in a single 
given area, AGRA is framing itself as a facilitator of agro-ecological based breeding that is 
specifically tailored to African needs.34  
 
This self-characterization is however very much contested. A coalition of African Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) have, for example, publicly expressed the view that the 
organization is little more than a vehicle for creating smallholder dependency on MNCs for 
the provision of hybrid seeds, chemical inputs, and in the long-term, genetically modified 
organisms, which are viewed as a threat to indigenous biodiversity.35  Raj Patel reinforces this 
perspective in his argument that while framed as a philanthropic venture, the new Green 
Revolution is in essence about employing tools of American hegemony in an attempt to 
control the commodification of African agriculture.36 
 
Activists, including Patel, associated with the transnational food sovereignty movement have 
argued that AGRA and its enablers are perpetuating the false premise that hunger in Africa 
is the result of a lack of technology,37 and integration with global markets.38 
                                                
32 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
33 Eric Holt-Gimenez, Miguel A. Altieri, and Peter Rosset, ‘‘Ten Reasons Why the Rockefeller and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation’s Alliance for Another Green Revolution Will Not Solve the Problems of Poverty 
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34 Interview with Akin Adesina, February 10, 2011. 
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36 Raj Patel, ‘‘The Long Green Revolution,’’ The Journal of Peasant Studies 40 no. 1 (2013): 43.  
37 Raj Patel, Eric Holt-Gimenez, and Annie Shattuck, ‘‘Ending Africa's Hunger,’’ The Nation (September 21, 
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38 Eric Holt-Gimenez, ‘‘Out of AGRA: The Green Revolution Returns to Africa,’’ Development 51, no. 4 (2008): 
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This, such critics charge, serves to distract from larger structural impediments to hunger, 
such as externally imposed trade rules demanding the export of needed food crops, and 
austerity measures which have dramatically weakened African countries capacities to engage 
in agricultural research and development.39 
 
To back their claims, such critics point to the findings of the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), a three-year 
multi-disciplinary study, which drew on the expertise of nearly 1000 scientists and 
development experts. Initiated by the World Bank, and co-sponsored by multiple UN 
agencies, IAASTD sought to assess “the relevance, quality and effectiveness of agricultural knowledge, 
science, and technology (AKST) [and the] effectiveness of public and private sector policies as well as 
institutional arrangements in relation to AKST [emphasis added].”40  
 
IAASTD concluded that the dominant industrial agricultural model is both ecological and 
social unsustainable. Like AGRA, it also endorsed the practice of using agro-ecological 
techniques, building local economies, ensuring local control of seeds, and creating farmer-led 
participatory breeding programs. Where IAASTD departs from AGRA is in its expressed 
reservation over the utility of advanced technology, and particularly biotechnology and its 
willingness to explicitly call for governments to enact land reforms and make changes to the 
rules governing intellectual property for the benefit of smallholder farmers. As noted by 
Jennifer Clapp, these conclusions were deemed sufficiently unpalatable to Canada, Australia 
and the United States; they did not endorse the final report and were the reason why the 
agricultural biotechnology industry association, Croplife, removed itself from the process 
prior to the report’s release.41 
 
For critics, AGRA’s unwillingness to challenge such structural impediments to agricultural 
development make it and BMGF as its principal enabler impediments to transformative 
change. AGRA is, viewed from this perspective, a counter-epistemic community offering 
explanations and policy prescriptions for the problems under scrutiny, which differ radically 
                                                
39 Patel, Holt-Gimenez, and Shattuck. 
40 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IIASTD), 
Agriculture at a Crossroads (Washington: Island Press, 2008).  
41 Jennifer Clapp, ‘‘The Global Food Crisis and International Agricultural Policy: Which Way Forward?’’ Global 
Governance 15 (2009): 302.   
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from the majority of global experts.42 The only explanation for AGRA having policy 
influence from the perspective of its critics is that its strategies do not place it in conflict 
with those firms and Northern states benefiting from existing structural impediments to 
progressive agricultural development. 
 
Admittedly, there is a big difference between RF-driven health-related Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) focused on product development and AGRA. In the mid to late 1990s, 
the main question for those within RF’s health program was how to get vaccines and drugs 
for neglected diseases developed while cutting down on the costs, and Product Development 
Partnerships (PDPs) served to address these concerns. AGRA leaders concede that 
agricultural development is totally different in that it is not about products but about long-
term structural change. The productivity, for example,43 of Sub-Saharan African agriculture 
has been declining for three decades and the continent continues to be a net importer of 
food.44 To reverse this trend, there is a need to work at different levels concurrently.45 
 
The architects and leaders of AGRA readily acknowledge that there will be no silver bullet to 
the continent’s agricultural woes. Consequently, they see the organization first and foremost 
as a catalyst for reversing the longstanding lack of both regional and global dialogue between 
public, private and civil society actors related to strengthening African agricultural sectors, 
which they suggest is evident in their success in bringing together those players who need to 
be at the policy-making table.  
 
AGRA partners with many international development institutions including the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Bank, FAO and the WFP, as well as 
with Northern development agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), and multi-
lateral development banks. However, it also partners with African organizations, from 
national governments to regional economic organizations, to local community organizations 
and the private sector. All of these partnerships are deemed critical because AGRA plans 
                                                
42 Jeremy Youde, AIDS, South Africa and the Politics of Knowledge (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2007), 4. 
43 Productivity defined here as output per unit of input. 
44 Lilyan E. Fulginiti, Richard K. Perrin, and Bingxin Yu, ‘‘Institutions and Agricultural Productivity in Sub-
Saharan Africa,’’ Agricultural Economics 21, no.2-3 (2004): 169-180. 
45 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
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requires others to do the work and as such the organization is critically mindful of being just 
one player in a sea of critical partners.46 
 
Historically, for example, Africa’s domestic financial sector has been excluded from 
agricultural planning, which explains in part why less than one percent of commercial 
financing in Africa is agriculture-related, despite that fact that agriculture-related activities 
account for forty to fifty percent of the GDP and seventy to eighty percent of employment. 
The African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF) is a platform for engaging multiple players, 
including those from the private sector to determine the best policies, instruments and 
investments needed for bringing AGRA plans to scale, as well as what, where and how to 
measure effectiveness. It is assumed by AGRA leadership that attaining robust data related 
to fertilizers, seeds, finance, policy, and infrastructure will demonstrate to CEOs, scholars 
and African heads of state what is working and what is not.47  
 
While the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the International Centre for the 
Improvement of Corn and Wheat (CIMMYT) created the products that drove the Green 
Revolution, it would never have occurred without governments in Asia making huge 
investments in infrastructure. It is true that structural adjustment killed any gains made in 
agricultural development in Africa in the post-colonial period.48 Yet it is also true that the 
investments made by countries such as China and India on roads and irrigation were not 
replicated by African governments.49  Historically and continuing today, smallholders in Sub-
Saharan Africa have relied upon rain-fed irrigation. Indeed less than five percent of 
cultivated land in Africa is irrigated through artificial means.50 Yet seasonal dry spells in semi-
arid/arid zones such as the Sahel create vulnerabilities for smallholders, which may be 
overcome without costly interventions (i.e. collecting rainwater in small ponds during 
                                                
46 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
47 Anonymous interviewee Ibid. 
48 See for example Deborah Fahy Bryceson, ‘‘The Scramble in Africa: Reorienting Rural Livelihoods,’’ World 
Development 30, no. 5 (2002): 725–739; see also Jean M. Due and Christina A. Gladwin, ‘‘Impacts of  
Structural Adjustment Programs on African Women Farmers and Female-Headed Households,’’ American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 73, no. 5 (1991): 1431-1439.  
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50 Suhas Pralhad Wani, Johan Rockström, and Theib Yousef Oweis, Rainfed Agriculture: Unlocking the Potential 
(Cambridge: CABI International, 2009), 184. 
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growing season).51 However droughts, which are projected to be exacerbated by climate 
change,52 present a more serious risk to the long-term viability of agriculture in such arid 
climates and give weight to calls for greater state investment in more complex irrigation 
schemes.53 
 
Adesina uses the example of a lack of irrigation technology to make the larger and well 
established point that for decades governments, African governments have taken their rural 
populations for granted by demanding taxation without providing the infrastructure 
agricultural sectors need to thrive.54A lack of investment in such infrastructure, argues 
Adesina, is one important cause of the rural poverty and rural to urban migration that has 
been occurring for over four decades,55 and is creating tremendous strains on government 
coffers and municipal services. AGRA leadership readily acknowledges the pressure for 
greater political accountability on this issue, which comes from the rise of civil society,56 
growing democracy, and the concept of food as a human right,57 thus sharing with activists 
an unwillingness to see Africa persist as, in the words of Adesina, “a museum of poverty.”58 
Supporting farmers’ access to technology and overall capacity building in agricultural 
development has proven to be an effective strategy to counteract this process.59 
Consequently, AGRA’s most important function has become that of convener of political 
commitments to strengthening agriculture within Africa itself.  
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and Accountability in Africa,’’ HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series (Cambridge MA: John F. Kennedy 
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Both Steven Radelet and Colestus Juma have made the case that effective agriculture sectors 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are the product first and foremost of strong states,60 and that a 
widespread agricultural revolution in Africa is contingent on political leadership, inter- and 
intra-governmental cooperation and continuity of governance to assure that the necessary 
agricultural infrastructure (e.g. irrigation, roads, sources of energy) are in place.  Enthusiasm 
over micro-credit schemes modeled on the Grameen bank, for example,61 oriented at getting 
needed capital to individuals who would otherwise not qualify for loans has waned in the 
face of evidence undermining such claims.62  Proponents of AGRA are of the view that for 
smallholder farmers, it is more important to have secure financial services in a more general 
way (e.g. bank accounts and full credit lines) to ensure payment for inputs and machinery but 
this will require the backing of government.63 
 
Moreover, AGRA proponents believe the role of African governments in the development 
of local agricultural private sectors will come through adherence to certain general principles 
such as maintaining political stability, offering tax subsidies to firms willing to develop new 
crop varieties for local farmers, and most importantly, ensuring demand for such products 
through the establishment of venture capital funds.64 Furthermore, through interstate 
cooperation, AGRA leadership are convinced that regional markets will ensure the demand 
is of sufficient scale. A key role of AGRA therefore is to catalyze indigenous private sector 
growth focused on developing crop varieties for local markets.  
 
Proponents of AGRA see the role of government in the revitalization of African agricultural 
sectors as being creators of the regulatory frameworks and regional institutions deemed 
necessary for support this growth, so as to ensure that a whole value chain is in place before 
firms are asked to make capital investments.65 According to Catherine Bertini, this strategy 
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63 Anonymous interviewee 31, November 22, 2010. 
64 Anonymous interviewee 23, February 3, 2011. 
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should be encouraged on the grounds that building indigenous private sectors adds 
considerable value to any economy, for when processing is done locally, more jobs are 
created and the end product commands a higher price.66 
 
As RF decades of country-level epistemic expansions served to illustrate, political support is 
critical for building national capacity for innovation in science and technology. Not only can 
government policy create an investment climate that encourages research in science, it can 
also provide incentives to university scientists to focus more on applied research as opposed 
to basic science or teaching.67 Yet, even when political support for SEI is weak, through 
non-interference, private sectors can still function as illustrated by Kenya’s thriving 
horticulture sector.68 From the perspective of Bertini, there is growing sentiment among 
supporters of AGRA that it will have to be the private sector that drives such political 
support for a new Green Revolution. This is because popular political support and political 
power across Sub-Saharan Africa is typically concentrated in urban areas, which is why 
agricultural ministries, whose focus is on rural areas, have historically had limited influence 
over broader government policy trajectories.69 
 
Perhaps the most daunting challenge for AGRA is that Africa is an incredibly heterogeneous 
continent, politically, ecologically and biologically in terms of the varieties of importance and 
the fact that this diversity means that many different ideas will have to be attempted. One 
strategy AGRA has strongly promoted in pursuit of policy cohesion is the development of 
regional crop belts or corridors (i.e. for maize, sorghum etc.). Regional crop belts are seen as 
promising because of the economics of scale on production and opportunity to cater to 
larger markets, which through sharing reduce the cost-burden of developing public capacity 
to develop needed technology such as the infrastructure supporting cell phones. These larger 
structural changes are deemed by African Harvest Biotech Foundation International’s 
founding director and CEO Florence Wambugu, to be critical for broadening economic 
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opportunities for Africa’s smallholders. For Wambugu, the cell phone revolution occurring 
in Sub-Saharan Africa illustrates this well, for it is changing the way people communicate and 
conduct business by giving new communications tools to those historically without any 
modern communications equipment.70  
 
Informed by RF experience but enabled by BMGF money, AGRA is working to realize the 
creation of new technologies reflective of diverse ecological conditions and taking into 
consideration past practices by farmers, which it ultimately intends to see developed by local 
organizations–whether private or public. To ensure African countries have sufficient 
expertise to undertake this, R&D and the AGRA is helping to rebuild faculties of agriculture 
at Africa’s universities, while at the same time developing a new generation of seed sellers at 
the local level by helping small ‘‘mom and pop’’ retailers transition from selling products 
such as soft drinks to agro-products through retraining. However the degree to which states 
remain committed to AGRA’s vision is viewed as the most important factor underpinning its 
success. Accordingly AGRA leaders see the organization’s most critical role as creating 
political leverage for what they deem to be positive political change. In this regard, it has 
encountered receptivity for its ideas within governments, illustrated by the fact that the 
African Development Bank is now building roads, irrigation, and warehouses, and AGRA 
and International Organizations (IOs) such as the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) are currently working with governments such as Nigeria to secure 
hundreds of millions of dollars for in-country projects focused on smallholders, while 
leveraging billions more from private banks and donor governments for the same purpose.71 
 
Consistent with the CGIAR system, AGRA engagement is a long-term strategy, as it is 
assumed by AGRA staff, it will take many years to fulfill its goals and only if all partners pull 
their weight. The organization’s strategies were devised by members of an epistemic 
community which the foundation has sought guidance from and provides material support 
to. Indeed AGRA is a clear example that private diplomacy can foster institutional 
frameworks capable of providing public goods to vulnerable populations in developing 
countries when public sector authorities mandated to fill this role have been unable to do so. 
                                                
70 Interview with Florence Wambugu, February 3, 2011. 
71Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
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BMGF’s contribution to enact what it considers to be meaningful structural change in 
agricultural development in Africa has thus been to enable AGRA, which is effectively 
engaging multiple levels of governance concurrently in pursuit of its aforementioned goals.72 
 
7 .2 Beyond the  All iance  for a Green Revolu t ion  in  Afri ca:  Comparing the  Rocke fe l l e r 
and Gates  Foundat ion ’s  Agri cu ltural Programs 
 
7.21 A common commitment to science-enabled innovation 
 
AGRA is an independent entity modeled on a RF vision for agricultural development in 
Africa, which BMGF played a critical role in seeing realized. Yet is the same multi-faceted 
approach informing AGRA also informing BMGF’s own agricultural program? A survey of 
the Global Development Program’s grant making shows its grantees–whether individual 
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs), universities, other Foundations, or 
CSOs–are by no means a homogenous lot.73 
 
However while the Foundation may be willing to invest in initiatives ranging from organic 
farming to genetically modified crops in pursuit of innovation and results,74 its critics say the 
distribution of this funding reveals a preference towards creating access to new advanced 
technologies (e.g. chilling centres for dairy farmers) intended to increase market access and 
overall profit,75 at the expense of low-cost and comparatively simple technologies, techniques 
and strategies for improving overall productivity, and the long-term food security for rural 
populations.76 In the eyes of critics, this preference for advanced technology demonstrates 
that the Foundation remains informed by the erroneous assumption that if it primes the 
technology pump enough, solutions will present themselves.77 
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It is true that Bill Gates has been a vocal supporter of the idea that biotechnology and 
particularly GE is a necessary tool for alleviating global hunger.78 Indeed BMGF is proving 
to be an important driver of PDPs focused on developing new transgenic cultivars such as 
drought tolerant maize intended for distribution in Africa.79 An example of such an 
agricultural PDP is the Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) project, a partnership 
involving Monsanto, AATF, BMGF, CYMMIT and the national agricultural research 
systems of Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, geared towards 
developing drought-tolerant maize varieties for use in Sub-Saharan Africa.80 RF in contrast 
has never taken the position that GE will be integral to African countries meeting their food 
needs or alleviating poverty, and AGRA was not set up to fund GE projects. Having said 
that, RF has always seen advanced technology such as GE being one piece of a much larger 
puzzle. While drought tolerant varieties produced through CIMMYT with conventional 
techniques are showing great promise,81 the appeal of genetic modification for desired traits 
that may be universal lies in the potential of applying said trait once it is developed to many 
different crops.82 
 
Proponents of BMGF’s support of GE such as Robert Paarlberg see resistance to its 
application in agricultural development as a phenomenon driven by EU-based 
environmental NGOs,83 which is based on what he believes to be two erroneous 
assumptions. The first is that genetically modified food creates unacceptable health risks,84 
which its defenders say have not substantiated with evidence of adverse effects,85 despite 
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millions of Americans consuming this food for over a decade.86 The second is that through 
mergers and acquisitions, transnational corporations such as a Monsanto are seeking global 
control over development and dissemination of proprietary technologies.87 The paradox of 
such opposition, say allies of BMGF, is that GE currently under development for African 
environments with the support of firms including Monsanto is targeting food crops that are 
consumed locally and rarely exported to countries outside of Africa.88 Paarlberg asserts that 
resistance to African farmer’s acceptance of GM crops originated in Europe because the 
continent continues to be the largest export market for African farmers .89 From Paarlberg’s 
vantage-point, therefore, European civil society’s resistance to the planting and consumption 
of GM crops, while framed as a health concern, must be seen as efforts to protect the 
European agricultural sector.90  Yet this argument does not diminish the very real possibility 
of MNCs such as Monsanto attaining national or even regional monopolies on seeds 
developed for smallholder production and consumption within Africa once profit-potential 
has been demonstrated.  Indeed this could inadvertently occur via the acquisition of the 
small local start-ups AGRA is seeking to cultivate.  
 
Transgenic crops are an interesting example of an issue that seems to divide scientists along 
disciplinary lines. This is because their views on the subject of inquiry are informed in large 
part by the epistemic filters that characterize the disciplines they have traditionally originated 
from molecular biology and ecology.91 Historically, those expressing reservations of 
purposefully introducing organisms into the world that have not been shaped by natural 
selection thus departing from the central tenant of the evolutionary process - decent 
through modification92 have been ecologists, who as a group are associated with the 
concept of disequilibria characterizing ecosystems.93 
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In contrast GE’s chief proponents have been largely molecular biologists, who have 
espoused narratives of predictability to gain pubic support for their innovations.94 The 
general argument made by proponents of GE is that because there is nothing intrinsic about 
a gene, the distinction between the synthetic and the natural cannot be made on genetic 
grounds. Continuing with this logic is that it is fundamentally inconsistent to label organisms 
with synthetically structured DNA as unnatural, if organisms containing genetic material that 
would never have mixed without human manipulation (i.e. cross-breeding the application of 
Mendelian genetics) are considered natural entities. At the end of the day, for GE’s 
proponents, the products of rDNA technology, specifically transgenic cultivars, are self-
replicating organisms interacting with other species in their respective environments, and as 
such are subject to evolutionary pressures and will invariably change accordingly.95 
 
GE in agricultural development is a polarizing issue, which a lack of understanding of 
molecular biology, genetics and plant breeding processes appears to augment. However, 
such polarization is also driven by a well-founded distrust in the distribution of benefits 
associated with biotechnology in general, and many uncertainties over the long-term 
ecological and health impacts of transgenic crops. And yet, the fact that these debates related 
to one type of agricultural technology remain unresolved does not diminish the fact that 
technology as a whole has been and continues to be essential both on the farm (e.g. seed 
varieties) and off farm (e.g. storage and processing). According to one long-time former 
USAID official, the value added will be much less, as will the ability to meet distant markets 
if technological know-how is lacking,96 which makes BMGF continuation of RF’s tradition 
of SEI wholly relevant to smallholder farmers and governments alike. 
 
In theory, the best reason to advocate for policy change is having something in hand that 
can clearly demonstrate a significant impact if the changes one is advocating are adopted.97 
IRRI Executive Director Robert Zeigler argues that the Green Revolution would not have 
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been undertaken by participating governments without the evidence presented by RF and 
their partners, which demonstrated increases in yields generated by the adoption of the new 
varieties.  The reason for this, says Zeigler, was that the success of the high-yielding rice and 
wheat and varieties was contingent on governments making huge investment in fertilizers 
and extension systems to ensure a proven return on the their investment.98 This was 
demonstrated again in 2011 when India changed its seed laws, for example,99 in order to 
facilitate the rapid dissemination of flood tolerant rice varieties developed for the South 
Asian context with funding from BMGF after IRRI demonstrated their effectiveness.100 
 
If a tangible payoff does indeed need to be shown to exist for governments to make 
substantive policy changes, then this would explain, if not justify, BMGF’s chosen focus on 
investing in new technology today. RF and BMGF certainly have normative goals, but their 
means to bring about changes in policy has largely been and continue to be through 
catalyzing SEI and the evidence accrued from it. From the perspective of IRRI’s Robert 
Zeigler, if the Foundation was making theoretical or normative arguments without evidence 
to substantiate such claims, then this would only serve to undermine its legitimacy in policy 
arenas.101  
 
BMGF’s agricultural program was inspired by RF initiatives in the neo-liberal era, and 
through AGRA it has demonstrated a commitment to scaling up Rockefeller projects. It has 
also demonstrated a similar commitment to enabling and showcasing the merits of SEI. This 
should not be surprising given a cursory look the leadership team currently leading BMGF’s 
agricultural efforts. When Rajiv Shah was appointed administrator of USAID in 2009, Sam 
Dryden assumed responsibility for the agricultural program. A former entrepreneur and 
chair of CGIAR private sector committee, Dryden worked collaboratively on an informal, 
volunteer basis with RF over a 30 year period before coming to work at BMGF and is 
perceived by independent observers as having always understood the need to juxtapose 
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diverse skills to bring the innovation chain together: the same outlook that has defined RF’s 
approach to facilitating innovation. Former RF protégé Roy Steiner now leads partnership 
building as Deputy Director at BMGF, while former IRRI and FAO agricultural economist 
Prabu Pingali is head of the foundation’s policy and statistics branch. Moreover, former 
Monsanto vice-president Rob Horsch, who also participated in most rice biotechnology 
meetings at RF, is leading BMGF’s Research and Development arm.102  
 
7.22 Notable Differences 
 
The RF model is evidently well known to BMGF agricultural program. Despite their many 
similarities, BMGF’s agricultural program is nonetheless proving to be a very different 
animal than that of RF in several important ways that mirror its evolution as an organization 
in the domain of global health.  
 
7.22-1 Relationships with MNCs 
 
The first is the degree to which it works with industry in pursuit of its goals. This may seem 
like a contradiction given the efforts that have been made in previous chapters to link RF 
with the rise to prominence of the PPP paradigm. However for those scrutinizing its efforts, 
RF has always been clearly distinguishable from the firms with which it has partnered with. 
The same cannot be said of BMGF, which has faced substantial criticism for recruiting its 
program officers from agricultural biotech firms.103 The appointment of Rob Horsch in 
particular was seen by many observers as a red flag. Having spent his entire career at 
Monsanto working in tissue culture, Horsch is believed by connected observers to exhibit a 
bias for the kinds of big interventions that made Monsanto the immensely profitable 
company that it is today, yet which work against SEI for the public good by constraining as 
opposed to increasing access to innovation enabling technologies.104  
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BMGF’s tendency of looking to industry for talent is a significant divergence from the 
Rockefeller approach. This could be construed as BMGF pandering to corporate interests; 
however the evidence acquired for this project does not support such speculation. Instead 
the trend of placing those with high-level filling private sector experience within decision-
making roles appears to be informed by a belief that cooperation with industry will continue 
to be intrumental to developing new health and agricultural technologies. 
 
Yet choices of the Foundation’s investment arm have only served to reinforce suspicions 
that its primary allegiances are to firms and market solutions. In September of 2010, it was 
revealed that BMGF Trust had purchased some US$ 23 million worth of Monsanto shares. 
La Via Campesina which claims to represent millions of smallholders around the 
world accused the foundation of further empowering a company focused on maximizing its 
profits through aggressive patenting and defense of such patents, while displaying disregard 
for population health and biosafety in low and middle income countries and limited interest 
in helping those rural poor seeking to preserve of native seed varieties.105 
 
Furthermore, following news of the Monsanto investment, it was revealed by the African 
Centre for Biosafety that BMGF was committing US$10 million to a project focused on 
developing Mozambique’s soya-value chain in partnership with the agro-food giant Cargill.  
These investments and a spate of industry hires placing former industry executives in 
agenda-setting roles prompted The Guardian to suggest in a editorial that the Foundation was 
damaging its reputation by reinforcing concerns that it was setting the stage for corporate 
takeovers and enabling the expansion of genetically modified crops in Africa.106  
 
These decisions do raise the question as to whether the investing practices of philanthropies 
should be guided by the same norms and goals informing their mandates. Up until the end 
of Gordon Conway’s tenure, those managing RF’s endowment invested in whatever 
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provided the best return, with the only restriction being tobacco. While Conway had no role 
in this, it was decided that a socially responsible investment strategy was not viable, on the 
grounds that almost every investment could be traced to something opposed to the 
Foundation’s values.107  
 
The BMGF endowment is also managed by professionals whose compensation depends on 
their performance relative to the market. Hence they have a strong incentive to maximize 
profits, even if it may open up the door to criticism. From the vantage-point of former RF 
Vice-President Herdt, the extent to which condemnation by groups such as La Via 
Campesina and Food First, which claim to represent the populations the Foundation is 
aspiring to help, adversely affects BMGF legitimacy and undermine its ability to advance its 
agenda will depend on how representative of the target population such critics actually are.108 
Proponents of the Foundation see some criticism is inevitable yet feel this will not adversely 
affect BMGF’s legitimacy so long as the Foundation can show that its efforts are having a 
positive effect;109 for in the end, it is assumed that the Foundation will be judged on the 
effectiveness of its ideas like RF before it.110  
 
Nevertheless, the organization’s purchase of corporate shares has given substance to critical 
perceptions. Monsanto’s willingness to license some patents at no cost to poor farmers or 
national centers in low-income countries are, in the opinion of one former RF senior staffer, 
insufficient reasons for working with the firm because the reputational costs of doing so are 
considered too large. From this perspective, there is a danger that by partnering with firms 
whose behavior is historically contradictory to the goal of the partnership, both BMGF’s 
credibility as an enabling institution and wider support for the partnership will undermined 
within the development community and the targeted recipient population. The only way this 
might be justified is if BMGF could use its weight as an investor to shape corporate 
behavior;111 however as Gordon Conway’s actions demonstrate, this can still occur without 
exercising shareholder’s rights.  
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7.22-2 A ‘‘Hands On’’ Style of Grant-making 
 
Mirroring its health program, BMGF’s benefactor style is also very different from that of the 
RF, whose grant-making decisions were, according to Robert Herdt, never informed by 
private sector (e.g. McKinsey) advisories. Instead, RF’s approach has been defined by its 
trust in people and by building networks and network-driven activities via interpersonal 
relationships: essentially, by taking chances on people.112 
 
Extending through the rice biotechnology program, RF maintained two types of grants. The 
first were those that were unrestricted in terms of their application (e.g. granted to the 
individual IARCs). The second were restricted and time-bound such as those made through 
the Rice Biotechnology Program. Yet according to IRRI Director General Robert Zeigler, 
even the restricted grants provided researchers with a high degree of latitude in terms of the 
actual application of funds and were important sources of funding for innovative research.113 
 
In contrast, BMGF is an order of magnitude larger than RF in terms of assets and the level 
of grant making. In 2011, for example, BMGF’s endowment was US$ 34,640,122,664, and 
the foundation gave away US$ 3,239,412,884 in grants. In the same year, RF’s endowment 
was US$ 3,507,144,871, from which it granted a total US$ 132,691,040.114 Zeigler notes that 
when BMGF was initially established, there was considerable dialogue between the 
Foundation and RF, and it appeared that BMGF was emulating RF’s approach. Yet the 
Foundation does not give any unrestricted grants to agriculture and their restricted grants are 
typically much tighter (in terms of timelines, outputs, reviews and etc.) than those of RF. 
While BMGF enters into relationships with grantees open to the idea of being long-term 
beneficiaries of projects, they are still nonetheless very rigorous in their oversight of how 
funded projects are managed, demanding for example detailed reviews every three years that 
are quite time consuming for grantees to undertake. From Zeigler’s perspective, such a high 
degree of rigor is good in that the Foundation’s expectations are clear and “wasteful” 
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spending may be reduced; however having narrowly defined expectations and limited room 
to deviate from the stated trajectory also eliminates much of the ability of scientists to 
engage in the lateral thinking that is often critical to innovation. Having said that, Zeigler 
concedes that the Foundation does support relatively high-risk projects, such as efforts to 
substantially modify photosynthesis in rice to dramatically improve productivity. This quite 
basic area of research, he argues, does require adjustment as new discoveries are made and 
considers the Foundation to have been quite flexible in this regard.115 
 
BMGF’s shift towards a matrix scale/bureaucratized approach to grant making is seen by 
one former RF external advisor and grantee, however, as effectively undermining the kind of 
personal judgment that still embodies decision-making within RF. From this vantage point, 
Bill Gates’ personal predilection for metrics and particular technological solutions in 
conjunction with his continued dominant role in the Foundation’s management is creating a 
“group think” mentality that serves merely to reinforce his individual biases.116 Interestingly, 
the same general criticism was expressed by University of Ottawa aw Professor, Amir 
Attaran, in 2008 in relation to the Foundation’s Global Health program.117 
 
7.22-3 The Ongoing Lack of ‘‘Boots On The Ground’’ 
 
A third important difference between RF and BMGF agricultural programs that has also 
been noted in its Global Health Program is the decision not to embrace RF’s past practice of 
decentralizing its senior staff. For RF, the Green Revolution was an operational program in 
that they were managing the actual breeding, research, and training in the countries where 
they worked. Even when RF’s agricultural program was dramatically reduced, the 
Foundation did establish regional offices in Nairobi and Bangkok where grant-making 
officers were closer to the projects being funded.118 
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Initially, Rajiv Shah relied heavily on external consultants (e.g. former RF, WFP and USAID 
officials and African leaders) who could comment on the trajectory of the Foundation’s 
ideas.119 However giving Shah the reigns of the program in its infancy and its subsequent 
collaboration with McKinsey was in the eyes of one former RF employee indicative of 
BMGF leadership initially incorrectly believing that solving agriculture problems could occur 
without direct agricultural experience. RF in contrast demanded that new hires have proven 
issue and regional field experience as there was no time for on the job training.120 
 
BMGF has largely expected its leadership to live in Seattle.  The implications of this 
expectation according to one former advisor to the Foundation is that not only do their staff 
have to spend a great percentage of their time on planes, but that a lack of a permanent 
presence on the ground is limiting opportunities to establish trust with Ministries of 
Agriculture.121 African heads of state have publicly committed to devote ten percent of their 
government’s total expenditures to agriculture,122 yet some within the development 
community feel there is a need for BMGF to pay closer attention to issues on the ground 
and work more closely with national institutions and policy makers, on the premise that 
there is nothing better than local knowledge to inform development programs.123 Moreover, 
as noted by Bertini, creating a critical mass in Seattle risks undermining the Foundation’s 
quest for greater employee diversity in the form of international hires, thereby limiting the 
range of perspectives informing its work.124 
 
7.3 BMGF and Pol i ti cal  Advocacy  in  the  Governance  o f  Global Agri cu l tural 
Deve lopment  
 
Advocacy is an increasingly important aspect of BMGF work. This section illuminates how 
the networks of experts BMGF have cultivated for guidance or through grant making affects 
its influence within national and international policy-making making arenas.  
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7.31 Seeking to Influence US Foreign Policy  
 
In 2009, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs released a report entitled, ‘‘Renewing 
American Leadership in the Fight Against Global Hunger and Poverty,’’ which made a series 
of recommendations on how the United States government should orient its foreign 
development spending related to agriculture, including but not limited to effectively adapting 
agricultural science and technology to realities of poor small holders and using market 
mechanisms to achieve this: for example, by managing natural resources more effectively, 
producing largely for sale as opposed to consumption and increasing small holders access to 
markets.125 
 
The report was funded by BMGF and one of its co-authors was former WFP Executive 
Director Catherine Bertini, who was then a senior fellow in the Foundation’s Development 
program advising on its growing agricultural portfolio. Bertini and Shah were also involved 
in developing the Global Food Security Act (SB 384), a bill passed by the United States 
Senate Foreign Relations committee earlier that same year,126 which was also crafted with the 
goal of increasing the United States government involvement in strengthening global food 
security and which included many similar ideas.127 
 
In the wake of the Chicago Council report’s release, activists associated with the organization 
Food First argued that its recommendations and the positions of SB 384 (also known as the 
Casey-Lugar Food Security Act) could not be separated from the views of BMGF and 
AGRA, given the key roles played by individuals such as Bertini who advised and were 
supported materially by the Foundation. Despite lauding their common emphasis on 
renewed American investment agriculture, both were criticized for ignoring decades of IMF 
imposed free trade and public sector austerity and cuts to agriculture-specific ODA, and 
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instead ascribing hunger in Africa to a lack of technology that could be availed through 
partnering with United States agrichemical and biotech industries128 Consequently 
‘‘Renewing American Leadership in the Fight Against Global Hunger and Poverty’’ is viewed 
by its critics as a normative document which reflects misguided biases shared by BMGF and 
the United States government, intended to further American commercial interests in low-
income countries.  
 
Bertini readily accepts the charge that “Renewing American Leadership in the Fight Against 
Global Hunger and Poverty’’ is a normative document, since according to Bertini, that was 
its purpose. The mission the authors signed onto was to convince the United States 
government to once again employ its wealth and technical expertise in support of 
agricultural development in the global South, and particularly in Africa. With this mission in 
mind, the question became how to get the government to buy into the aforementioned 
agenda.129  
 
One former USAID official notes the Chicago Council’s agricultural strategies are by no 
means novel and in fact reflect ideas advocated by USAID for 30 years. Support within 
Congress for such strategies was always tepid, however, and within USAID, the core CGIAR 
funding was always under threat, until BMGF started backing the same ideas with their 
assets.130 
 
By the time BMGF’s Global Development Program was launched in 2006, the Foundation 
had already played an important role in revitalizing the American government’s interest in 
vaccines, by providing both energy and seed money. Both the Bush and Obama 
administrations followed BMGF’s lead, and there has been sector-wide support for 
strengthening health care delivery in developing countries. However, according to veterans 
of American development policy pertaining to agriculture, there has been an ongoing 
predilection within Congress to fund global health initiatives while ignoring agriculture.  
Gaining broad political support within the United States for helping developing countries 
overcome agriculture problems has according to these two informants been much more 
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problematic than health, due to the implication that American business might be constrained 
as consequence. This is compounded by the fact that the United States’ R&D advantage in 
agriculture has been eroded by emerging agricultural sectors in middle-income countries 
such as Brazil, which during the Cold War was provided with American technology in the 
name of development, and which now out competes American companies in Brazilian 
markets.  While most policy makers in the United States can agree on what a health-care 
delivery project looks like, according to one career USAID advisor, the same cannot be said 
for agricultural development. Questions such as–“Who should subsidize what?” and “Who 
should license traders?” and “Should biotechnology be involved?”–have allegedly been 
unresolved for years. From the perspective of these two long-time government insiders, this 
lack of foreign policy cohesion is directly related to the historical differences between 
American sympathy for health aid internationally compared to agricultural aid.131 
 
The genesis of the Chicago Council project was that no matter how much money non-state 
actors such as BMGF puts in agriculture, it is up to wealthy governments such as the United 
States to lead global development efforts.132  According to Bertini and one other high-level 
former USAID official, the Chicago Council played an important role bridging the two 
organizations, for example, by coordinating a seminar in Washington, DC in May of 2010, 
which was attended by the likes of democratic representative Rosa Delauro, who chaired the 
sub-committee on agriculture, rural development, food and drug administration and related 
agencies; Cheryl Mills, then Chief of staff to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton; Rajiv Shah; 
Namanga Ngongi, AGRA President; and Mark Suzman, then acting President of BMGF’s 
Global Development Program.133  
 
BMGF’s influence over American development policy is real; however it is indirect. That 
Shah once directed the Foundation’s agricultural efforts and now heads USAID is, according 
to Zeigler, more coincidence than anything as he left the foundation at a very early stage and 
had little or no input into its current agricultural strategy. While it is clear is that similar ideas 
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are guiding both USAID and BMGF’s work in agriculture, although conflict of interest laws 
prevent Shah from collaborating directly with the Foundation on development issues.134  
 
The Chicago Council, I argue, can be seen as being part of BMGF’s larger epistemic 
community and the Foundation’s material support has been key to it achieving instrumental 
power in American foreign policy. Further evidence of this is seen in the Feed the Future 
initiative, a US$ 3.5 billion multi-component aid program established by the Obama 
administration in 2009 aimed at strengthening global food security in cooperation with other 
G8 and G20 countries.135 
 
BMGF has co-funded parts of Feed the Future, including but not limited to (i) Harvest Plus; 
(ii) the CGIAR system, to which it is now the single largest donor; and (iii) Harvest Choice, a 
partnership between the University of Minnesota and IFPRI, which guides investment in 
Sub-Saharan African agricultural projects.136 While not yet a part of Feed the Future, it is the 
hope of the Chicago Council and the Casey-Luger Bill, according to Bertini, to reinvigorate 
the involvement of American universities in global agricultural development. The general 
idea would be to provide developing country governments with a menu of current research 
being conducted at the different American land grant colleges, which they could choose 
according to their needs and develop a partner with the university driving the research, 
effectively a buddy-system for agricultural development.137  
 
Designed as a catalyst, the Chicago Council report fulfilled its intended purpose, and BMGF 
is inextricably linked to this process. From the vantage point of Bertini, what BMGF and the 
Chicago Council did through this report was to create the necessary space for a variety of 
new ideas and issues to be presented to American policy makers.138 For example the 
Foundation Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy, which builds on the report of 
the Chicago Council, is aimed at influencing United States policy and advocates against 
dumping and subsidization in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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(OECD) countries. RF was once again a trailblazer in this regard, influencing, for example, 
Care International’s decision not to monetize food aid, and most countries have moved away 
from grain as aid.139 The United States government, in the eyes of one RF employee, has 
remained one of the most significant impediments to addressing this persistent problem.140  
BMGF efforts related to food aid have been to provide the catalytic funding for the 
Purchase for Progress (P4P) program. This WFP pilot-project links Gates’ interest in 
increasing market access for small holders in Sub Saharan Africa to efforts focusing on 
overcoming opposition to purchasing food intended for aid in the low-income country 
context, as opposed to the open market. WFP is the single largest purchaser of food in 
Africa on commodity exchanges; however historically and still today, most of this food aid is 
purchased from big commercial grain dealers. The concept that BMGF actively championed 
at the end of 2006 when it first became involved in agriculture was to get WFP to buy more 
food products directly from smallholder farmer in the regions where operations are 
occurring in order to boost their base. This is logic, according to Bertini, would certainly 
provide market access for hundreds of thousands lacking such access; but it presents some 
challenges for WFP, which needs reliable, quality, price-appropriate food, and small holders 
are not structured to provide this (i.e. how to test quality, price, transport and store etc.). The 
ideas informing P4P are not new per say, and WFP had to submit a proposal to the 
Foundation for formal consideration of the project. Nevertheless illumination of P4P as an 
international policy shift in food aid is inextricably linked to BMGF, which funded its 
infrastructure although not the actual food.141 By 2010 WFP was committed to purchasing 
almost 50,000 metric tons of grain, produce and milk from smallholders,142 and over the five-
year period of the pilot, the organization hopes to provide new revenue streams to an 
estimated 350,000 smallholders in twenty-one countries.143 
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However in order for it to be brought to scale and institutionalized at a global level, WFP 
must now convince governments to buy into the approach and this presents some stark 
challenges in the American context as purchasing locally works against traditional United 
States policy food aid policy. Nevertheless, according to one former senior USAID official, 
receptivity for governance innovation in agricultural development within the American 
government is higher that it has been in over thirty years, and BMGF can take significant 
credit for enabling such innovation as well as the political will to support it. While 
individuals within USAID have been pushing similar ideas within government for years, the 
political will required to enact them into policy has been lacking. For right or wrong the 
Foundation has come in and made a huge difference.144  
 
7.32 Seeking National Policy Influence Beyond the United States 
 
BMGF has been a catalyst for the recent American support for global agricultural 
development in the new millennium. As has been the case with the United States, the 
Foundation’s influence in national agricultural policy-making arenas outside of the American 
context is indirect, but it is real. Ironically, this influence appears to be limited within 
developing countries. BMGF has for example, according to Robert Zeigler, had some high-
level discussions in China where they are a registered charity, after which restrictions on 
shipments of rice lines outside of China by Chinese research organizations were removed for 
a specific BMGF funded project. Since this has not been extended as a general policy, it is 
highly unlikely that this change is the result of the Foundation’s increasing policy influence in 
China.145 
 
There is however strong evidence that the Foundation is actively seeking the support of 
other Northern governments for increasing the attention paid to agriculture as a means to 
reduce poverty in poor countries. The Montpellier Panel Report embodies this effort in the 
context of the EU. Led by former RF president Gordon Conway, the Montpellier Panel was 
forged in 2009 around the goal of strengthening state and multilateral support for 
agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa within the EU, and improving related policy 
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coordination.146 Recently this advocacy has been extended to African governments as well.147 
 
BMGF did not play a direct role in Montpellier’s formation, which is largely comprised of 
individuals with pre-existing ties to Conway. However it has since supported the panel’s 
work to lobby European governments to provide more support for agriculture in Africa and 
better coordinate their individual aid efforts.148 
 
In this regard the Montpelier Panel Report is very similar to the Chicago Council Report, in 
that the mission of both reports has been to lobby Northern states to put agricultural 
development back on their foreign policy agendas while embracing a set of ideas that have 
come to shape BMGF’s own agricultural program. Moreover both reports were funded by 
BMGF and penned by individuals who have come to inform the Foundation’s approach to 
strengthening agricultural sectors and food security across the global South. To reinforce this 
point, when Conway who is also on the Chicago Council’s advisory group and thus very 
much aware of their experience received the initial planning grant, BMGF recommended 
the Chicago Council as a template.149 
 
In addition to underwriting advocacy undertaken by others, BMGF has also directly sought 
to reverse Northern governments’ reluctance to invest in agricultural development by 
providing US$ 30 thirty million in seed funding for the new multi-donor Global Food 
Security Trust Fund and the GAFSP, which is managed by the World Bank. Founding 
donors include BMGF, as well as the United States, Canada, Spain, and South Korea, with a 
total of US$ 880 million pledged upon its launch in April, 2010.150 
As noted by Timothy Wise and Sophia Murphy,151 GAFSP is effectively a follow-up of the 
L’Aquila statement made at the 2009 G8 meeting in L’Aquila, Italy. There Northern States 
committed to boosting ODA spending on agriculture to the level that it was at prior to the 
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embrace of neo-liberalism and associated development policies in the 1980s.152 ODA for 
agricultural productivity had declined precipitously from its peak at late 1980s, reaching its 
low point in 2006.153 This pledge represents a renewed commitment to reverse this trend.154  
 
GAFSP is a new funding mechanism intended to channel a share of the L’Aquila pledges to 
existing country-led initiatives such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP), multilateral initiatives such CGIAR, and CSOs.155 While not an 
autonomous entity like the Global Fund, GAFSP nevertheless shares with the Global Fund a 
common vulnerability stemming from uncertainly over whether the funding commitments 
on which they depend will be fulfilled.156 As noted by Alex McCalla, Professor Emeritus and 
former dean of the UC Davis College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, this 
would not be the first time that large commitments have been made and not acted upon by 
Northern governments.157 The United Nations World Food Council (WFC) for example was 
created in 1974 to function as the coordinating body for global food security efforts.158 While 
WFC served to better illuminate the social and political determinants of hunger that FAO 
had done prior to its creation,159 it was disbanded less than two decades later in 1993 after it 
became apparent that no single entity could marshal the resources to address global food 
insecurity, and major donors, led by the United States, pulled their support for its 
existence.160 Moreover according to McCalla, in the mid-1990s CGIAR Chair Ismail 
Serageldin received commitments from the World Bank and other donors for increased 
spending on agriculture, which were ultimately unfulfilled.161 Therefore the danger persists 
that any one of GAFSP donors may withdraw from their commitments, or revert back to 
engaging in damaging practices such as issuing agriculture-related ODA in the form of 
wheat, thereby continuing a pattern of dumping which undermines indigenous production.  
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BMGF’s advocacy efforts have been aided by the volatility of global food prices,162 driven in 
large part by the financial speculation of agricultural communities,163 which have amplified 
global hunger and which have been seen by states and multi-lateral institutions, including the 
IMF and World Bank, as constituting a threat to political stability across global South.164 
While this emphasis on advocacy has aroused criticism, the Foundation’s funding research 
supports its position to change the minds of policy makers, underwriting advocacy groups 
who are in a position to shape national policy-making in both domestic and international 
arenas, which is according to RF’s Gary Toenniessen entirely consistent with the purpose of 
private foundations in American society.165 As a practitioner of private diplomacy, therefore, 
BMGF has simply sought to emulate the tradition carved out by RF.  
 
7.4 BMGF & the CGIAR 
 
At the time of its establishment, the CGIAR was hailed as an innovative approach to 
financing agricultural research for the benefit of developing countries; however it too has 
been subject to austerity in the neo-liberal era,166 and many of its original proponents feel it 
has become the kind of overly bureaucratic institution its creators intended it to replace.167  
Under the leadership of Ismail Serageldin when the World Bank ceased functioning as a 
donor of last resort, and extending to the tenure of Ian Johnson who assumed the Chairman 
role in 2000, the proportion of funding that was restrictive (i.e. reserved by donors for 
special projects) increased dramatically. This provided non-members with new leverage but 
also created competition between the centres for funds. Each of the fifteen IARCs are self-
governing, meaning they receive funds from whomever they want and spend it on whatever 
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the want. This system, according to Alex McCalla, who chaired CGIAR’s Technical Advisory 
Committee from 1988 to 1994, has culminated in a situation whereby being a restricted 
donor on a bilateral basis with individual centres ironically confers more influence than 
having general membership, which is subject to a roster of rules. Consequently, the benefit 
of membership was greatly diminished and individual centres can now be subject to thirty 
plus reviews (i.e. one per each donor) every year.168 
 
Beginning in 2005, BMGF began providing the CGIAR with approximately US$ 70 million 
per year, which consistently placed the Foundation within the top three or four donors 
positions.169 However, by the end of 2009 when it sought and attained general membership 
within the organization, all of the Foundation’s contributions were restricted in nature. In 
this period, the Foundation was perceived by some to be taking advantage of previous 
investments by unrestricted donors picking low hanging fruit through funding the final 
stages of long-term projects and receiving what was viewed as disproportionate credit for 
contributions.170  
 
Moreover, the Foundation’s high level of funding, without being a member of the CGIAR, 
also caused embarrassment within the system as BMGF was picking what it wanted to fund 
without any formal accountability for its actions.171 An example of this according to one well 
positioned individual formerly affiliated with USAID was the Foundation’s early funding of 
specific research related to cassava at both CIAT and Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
(IITA), while balking at underwriting general operating costs, which led to tensions within 
the broader CGAIR system. According to this source, most individual centres’ overhead is 
between fifteen to twenty-five percent. BMGF initially refused to fund the fifteen percent 
overhead, so the centres had to draw from their core funding to cover this gap. By doing 
this, BMGF was effectively taking advantage of a system of governance without giving in to 
it, although the Foundation was not unique in this regard. A number of longtime members, 
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including but not limited to Canada, have limited their contributions to overhead costs to 
less than the minimum (e.g. ten percent).172 
 
The hire of Prabhu Pingali in 2008 appears to have reversed this trend. Having spent over a 
decade as an agricultural economist at both CYMMIT and IRRI, and five years as Director 
of FAO’s Agricultural and Development Economics Division, Pingali brought with him a 
deep understanding of CGIAR system. According to sources within and external to the 
Foundation, when the CGIAR reform process was initiated in 2007, BMGF initially sought 
to avoid being involved in its politics by not seeking out member status. Yet despite 
sponsoring much of the research being carried out through the system, an inability to ensure 
its investments were used effectively, to state which parts of reform process it thought was 
proving to be beneficial or weak, or to signal to the individual centers its support for their 
efforts was hampered by not having member rights (e.g. the right to vote on policy 
decisions). To address this perceived lack of accountability, accommodate wishes of regular 
members, and gain greater influence over the system’s direction with the goal of bringing 
more efficiency and effectiveness, the Foundation–following the examples of the RF, Ford 
Foundation (FF) and more recently Syngenta Foundation–sought out and attained CGIAR 
membership in December of 2009.173 
 
Whether BMGF’s capital contributions have created momentum for Northern states to 
fulfill their pledges to GAFSP is not clear. The pledge for contributions of up to a billion 
dollars per year with Core Unrestricted Contributions accounting for sixty percent of the 
total, which according to Alex McCalla, is significant as it would greatly improve the CGIAR 
system by markedly reducing the influence of individual members and ad-hoc donors.174  
Moreover according to one senior BMGF official, if donors do start redirecting money from 
single initiatives to broader research programs, it will mean greater collaboration between 
individual centres. The reason for this is that research programs with clearly articulated 
outcomes (for roots and tubers, maize etc.) are increasingly cutting across the lines 
traditionally separating the responsibilities of centers. Seen in this light, the GAFSP pledge 
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has the potential to enable the CGIAR system to be the truly collaborative vehicle its original 
RF and FF architects intended it to be.175  
 
Ironically, despite its regular membership status, it would appear that for at least the 
immediate future, BMGF is maintaining its past approach of funding restricted projects at 
individual centers, which seemingly works against efforts to shift back to a financing scheme 
prioritizing general funding. In this regard, however, it is not alone according to Robert 
Zeigler who notes that the majority of donors continue to contribute to the system with 
restricted funds.176  
 
Despite an apparent ongoing volition for firm control over how its assets are spent, which to 
critics conveys a sense of exceptionalism, BMGF has brought tangible benefits to 
agricultural-related research intended to benefit developing countries. However from the 
perspective of Louise Fresco, University Professor at the University of Amsterdam who 
from 2000 to 2006 was FAO assistant director-general for Agriculture, the Foundation’s 
most significant contribution has been its commitment to illuminate the neglect of 
agricultural development, which has been effective, as states, international organizations and 
firms are once again taking agriculture seriously as a development issue. 177  
 
As has been the case with its Global Health Program, the Foundation has embraced 
challenges which industry alone has shown little appetite, such as the development of 
submergence tolerant rice. IRRI has developed flood tolerant varieties, according to Robert 
Zeigler, because the rice production most adversely affected by flooding typically occurs 
among poor farmers who plant inbred rice varieties that will be of limited interest to seed 
companies. With money from BMGF, IRRI has been able to demonstrate the performance 
of these varieties under flood conditions. The governments of India, Bangladesh and to a 
lesser extent Nepal have been investing very large sums of money to ensure both seed 
production and product delivery to those poor farmers situated in remote areas. With 
guidance from IRRI, the public sector within these states have been re-invigorated as far as 
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rice research goes, and for this reason as well as the positive results in terms of flood 
tolerance and overall uptake, Zeigler argues that BMGF’s efforts warrant 
acknowledgement.178  
 
Following the example set by RF, BMGF has proven itself adept at creating incentives to 
engage the innovative capacity of industry. The Foundation’s penchant for collaboration 
with the private sector in pursuit of innovation for the public good in conjunction with their 
number one donor status within CGIAR has led to concerns that BMGF is leading the 
system towards greater engagement with for-profit entities. However, from the perspective 
of Pat Mooney, Executive Director of the ETC Group, the system was already well 
supportive of the PPP trajectory prior to BMGF becoming interested in agriculture.179 
 
As per CSOs, industry maintains a presence within CGIAR system through representation.180 
However, up until the World Bank’s commitments were greatly reduced, there was, 
according to Mooney, a general lack of awareness about the system within the private sector. 
Since the mid-1990s, the attitude within IARCs has been to push for more links with big 
seed companies, which has led to increased interest on the part of for-profit entities in the 
fruits of a system created for the public good.181 
 
7 .5 BMGF and FAO 
 
Like AGRA, CGIAR was created outside of the traditional UN structure in large part 
because of the perceived political and bureaucratic constraints of working within that system. 
BMGF has played important roles in the advancement of these two initiatives in addition to 
the establishment of other health-oriented analogues. What does this say then of BMGF’s 
view of IOs such as FAO also working towards strengthening agricultural capacity and food 
security across the global South? 
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One prominent perspective from within the Foundation is the importance of FAO and 
other UN specialized organizations such as has UN Committee on World Food Security 
(CFS), which only increased in the wake of an increase in the number of actors seeking to 
influence how agricultural challenges and global food insecurity should be addressed 
collectively. From this perspective, being a member country organization with every country 
having an equal vote tends to make FAO slow moving and cumbersome. Yet it is also 
acknowledged to be one of the last remaining forums in the world where countries can come 
together and have inter-country dialogue on agriculture as equals.182 Moreover, the CFS 
provides a space for countries with little structural power or CSOs to shape policy on food 
security issues,183 which is why it considered by its proponents to be the most authoritative 
forum for discussions on global food security.184 Indeed, the democratic and inclusive and 
nature of FAO and CFS confers a degree of legitimacy that private or wealthy country 
organizations cannot attain.  
 
Moreover, in addition to democratic legitimacy, FAO is viewed by BMGF’s leadership as 
maintaining two other key comparative advantages over other organizations working on 
food and agricultural issues. The first is its ability to provide global data and statistics, as it 
remains the sole entity to which states entrust their national data. Because the quality of this 
data is deemed to be overall quite poor at present, this is one area in which BMGF is 
attempting to help FAO fulfill its mandate.185 
 
The other area where FAO is deemed to maintain a comparative advantage is on standard-
setting, which is particularly important for food and agriculture (i.e. safety, biosafety etc.). 
While the Foundation’s leadership consider CGIAR to have been very effective in the role 
of generating new technology and ensuring it is applied and adopted (the role of the 
innovator), it has not been deemed particularly effective at addressing multilateral policy 
challenges, for example, related to trade, standards, or climate change. This is however an 
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area where BMGF considers the FAO to have performed well, for example, in partnership 
with WHO by leading the development of the CODEX standards. Moreover, because both 
FAO and WHO are multi-lateral organizations, they have the authority to demand from 
member states that the standards they set are enforced, which BMGF leadership admits the 
Foundation lacks.186 
 
From this perspective, IOs including FAO are perceived to have credibility problems 
because they have taken on, or been forced to take on, too many responsibilities, without 
sufficient increases in the resources required to fulfill them. To be efficient, decision makers 
within BMGF’s development program believe FAO needs to be substantially reduced in size 
to limit its focus to those functions it does well.187  
 
While acknowledging that the organization continues to be considered a necessary actor in 
global governance, there is an understanding within BMGF that regardless of whether FAO 
exists, there is still a need for other organizations to carry out the work its grants are 
designed to fund. This is because BMGF does not have operational programs and clearly 
relies on its partners (e.g. IFPRI, FAO, firms, universities etc.) to fulfill its goals, from basic 
research, to product development, to advocacy on and implementation of policy.188 
 
7 .6 The limi t s  o f  the Gates Foundat ion ’s in f luence  in  the  Governance  o f  Global 
Agri cu l tural Deve lopment  
 
Global rules governing trade and intellectual property favour rich countries and 
corporations. As previously noted, the IAASTD has explicitly called for changes to WTO 
rules that would make SEI for the world’s poor easier to undertake.189 Even though political 
advocacy is increasingly being employed by BMGF to get specific ideas into the relevant 
policy making arenas, it has not called for such changes. This may be because there is likely 
no real role for a private philanthropic foundation in attempts to resolve international treaty 
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disputes, for example, in bringing coherence to conflicting rules related to Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) created by multiple regimes (i.e. the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Convention on Biodiversity, and FAO’s 
Plant Genetics Treaty). Nevertheless RF, via the Public Intellectual Property Resource for 
Agriculture (PIPRA) and AATF, actively supported efforts to provide access to Intellectual 
Property (IP) where it could be used to benefit historically marginalized populations.190 
Moreover, Gordon Conway’s 1999 speech to the Monsanto board of directors is often cited 
as the catalyst for the firm changing their behavior by disavowing Genetic Use Restriction 
Technologies.191 
 
With these precedents in mind, can BMGF maintain its status as a progressive agent of 
change in global agricultural development without challenging industry when its positions 
conflict with values espoused by the Foundation? Moreover to what degree can Bill Gates’ 
star power at Davos, or the diplomatic efforts of the Foundation’s epistemic networks 
influence the policy positions of firms and the states, thereby creating the conditions for 
structural change? These are important questions because the vision of ‘‘creative capitalism’’ 
articulated by Bill Gates sees a heightened role for firms in strengthening agricultural 
development in low-income countries.  
 
From the Foundation’s leadership, there is a general view that however big BMGF’s 
resources appear to be, they are nowhere near sufficient to fully address any single issue in 
which the Foundation is engaged. Consequently the answer to the question of whether 
BMGF can overcome structural impediments to health disparities and strengthening 
agricultural sectors in developing countries is that the Foundation is merely one entity in a 
diverse sea of actors (states, IOs, NGOs, firms, and other foundations etc.) all actively 
seeking solutions to common problems, often, but not always in concert with one another. 
With this in mind, one of BMGF’s proven strengths is in creating new ways of bringing 
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these different skill-sets together in pursuit of more effective collection action than has 
existed otherwise, with GAVI and AGRA listed as the most prominent examples of such.192  
 
In this light, BMGF is not dedicated to the status quo in that it is seeking to bring more 
viable options to bear on very complex challenges.193 Yet it is by no means an activist 
organization seeking to name and shame states and firms for practices that work against its  
goals because the advancement of the Foundation’s knowledge structures requires their 
embrace. For BMGF, therefore, caustic criticism of the sub-optimal performance of states 
and firms is not conducive to the advance of new norms within policy-making arenas. 
 
Moreover, American legal restrictions prohibit the Foundation from explicitly engaging in 
normative lobbying. Consequently its advocacy work is informed by the existing evidence-
base, which is why so much of its endowment is put into research.194 As such, the biggest 
threat to BMGF’s overall credibility may not be its unwillingness to challenge structural 
inequity in political arenas, but instead whether its strategies lead to its stated goals being 
achieved.195 This is why so much effort is spent in trying to illuminate innovation it deems as 
successes;196 as in the eyes of one senior staff member, the Foundation’s credibility rests in 
large part on showing what is going to work and what should therefore be adopted by 
others.197 
 
The Foundation acknowledges that it is important to have responsible critics watching over 
its shoulders, and despite having received substantial criticism over their perceived lack of 
receptivity and transparency for honest feedback, it purports to engage with a wide variety of 
commentators and act on their constructive criticism. Yet it maintains its own agendas, for 
which it is wholly unapologetic,198 and in this regard the Gates family has been quite open 
about the two functions in which they see the Foundation effectively serving its intended 
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beneficiaries in the capacity of advocacy: first as a catalyst for resource mobilization, and 
second as an illuminator of scientific innovation.199 
 
The Foundation’s funding of the advocacy work of Bertini with the Chicago Council and 
Conway’s Montpelier Panel are illustrative of what it seeks to achieve at a high level and how 
it seeks to do so. As internationally renowned leaders in their fields, Bertini and Conway are 
perceived by the Foundation’s leadership as having have earned legitimacy that insulates 
them from being criticized of being swayed by BMGF money. Moreover, both have their 
own networks both scientific and political which indirectly the Foundation has been able 
to capitalize on. Both therefore bring knowledge, gravitas as well as political influence to the 
task of illuminating advances in technological knowledge and the means of organization at 
high levels. Capitalizing on the strengths of individuals in pursuit of fostering relationship at 
high levels (i.e. with policymakers in governments or regional organizations) is according to 
one senior Foundation staff member important for the Foundation in the same way that it is 
in fostering relationships with community organizations at the grassroots level. That both 
ends of the spectrum buy into particular ideas is considered fundamental by BMGF 
leadership to ensuring that innovation can be applied as intended and sustained over the 
long term.200  
 
Another range of partnerships centered on building the requisite evidence-base with which 
to inform policy are less about individuals then actual organization. For example, to help 
ensure the L’Aquila Group follows through with its commitments, the Foundation has 
contributed to the ‘‘One Campaign’’ to publicly assess the L’Aquila Group’s claims.201 
Furthermore, because BMGF is interested in applied policy as opposed to research policy, it 
funds organizations such as the Overseas Development Institute to assess the credibility of 
approaches which governments or IOs take in both their health and development work,202 
which is revealing of being not only champions of issues but also champions of particular 
approaches to understanding those issues.  
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7.7 The Future  o f  BMGF’s Agri cu l tural Program 
 
BMGF is now one of the most important sources of funds for agricultural development-
related research. Yet from the perspective of one prominent molecular biologist working in 
agriculture, its preferences are already well known and this is seen as undermining its stated 
goal of attracting new ideas. For individuals committed to tearing down the international 
architecture securing existing IP laws, the Foundation is at a critical point in its history. If it 
proceeds while supporting the dominant paradigm (i.e. supporting the logic of 
propriatization as a reward for innovation and what are viewed as monolithic approaches via 
CGIAR), it will not accomplish its goals of being a catalyst of innovation in either science or 
governance, which is problematic because so many actors are following the BMGF’s 
example. From the perspective of such critics, the Foundation can only become the true 
catalyst for innovation it purports to be once it embraces and supports decentralization and 
democratization to facilitate access to research tools.203  
 
This viewpoint reinforces my argument that BMGF is following in the wake of RF as a 
catalyst of institutional innovation oriented towards increasing access to new technologies 
intended to benefit the world’s poorest people, yet designed to work within the parameters 
of the existing state-imposed rules of the world. In the neo-liberal era, BMGF’s unparalleled 
wealth provides it with significant material influence relative to the diminishing resources of 
other–most importantly public–actors. Its ability to leverage money to advance favored ideas 
allows for a level of influence over research and policy trajectories is out of proportion to 
what is actually spend via grants. This disproportionate ideational influence is likely to be 
conferring a degree of structural power in terms of skewing priorities in agriculture in the 
same way that it is skewing research trajectories in global health. Yet while RF and BMGF 
do facilitate innovation and appear to have a lot of money, their material and political 
influence is still small compared to states and large firms.  
 
RF and FF, for example, were the catalysts of the Green Revolution. They provided much of 
the initial funding for developing and proving the viability of the technology upon which the 
revolution was based. However, compared to how much governments eventually spent after 
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buying into the idea of the Green Revolution (on fertilizers, irrigation, extension systems and 
etc. to ensure a proven return on the their investment), those initial funds were actually quite 
small. As noted by one BMGF decision-maker, the foundation is playing a similar role today 
in the context of a the resurgence of interest in agriculture in Africa, and as a result, it is safe 
to predict that BMGF’s contribution to any new agricultural revolution will never exceed 
five percent of the total cost.204 
 
Moreover, since 2011 BMGF’s Development Program has broadened its focus beyond 
agricultural and food security initiatives. While its agricultural program initially took centre 
stage, its water sanitation and hygiene program was kept as a “learning program” in the 
Special Interests section of the Foundation. Water conservation is a topic that has received 
considerable attention by scientists,205 and politicians alike,206 but the same cannot be said for 
sanitation, which, in the eyes of the Foundation and many public health experts,207 is a 
neglected issue in the same way that diseases like TB and malaria were for many years 
neglected issues. The scale of the demand for sanitation greatly exceeds the capacity to 
provide traditional piped water and water-fed latrines,208 and as a consequence BMGF’s 
leadership believes that new technologies and behavioral changes are urgently needed. 
Through its grant-making, the Foundation is actively subsidizing experimental research into 
new sanitation options intended for water-free environments as well as how to promote the 
associated behavioral changes (i.e. community led initiatives for such communities to 
become ‘‘open defecation free’’), thus seeking to catalyze change at the local level from 
within. Extending its emphasis on technological innovation to the realm of sanitation is 
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expected to increase criticism of the Foundation being fixated on developing silver bullets, 
yet its staff emphasize that it does work in both product development and delivery.209 
 
7 .8 Conc lus ion 
 
The maturation of BMGF as a global albeit private development organization has occurred 
largely as a result of it broadening its focus beyond health. The motivation that brought RF 
to Mexico–that being helping smallholders who have traditionally kept their seeds increase 
their productivity and incomes–remains the same motivation that has brought BMGF to 
Sub-Saharan Africa through organizations like AGRA and AATF. A critical aspect of the 
past and present work has been facilitating technology transfer with the hope of improving 
many so-called ‘‘orphan crops’’ (e.g cassava, lentils, and squash) in which the private sector, 
focused on globally traded crops (e.g. wheat, maize, rice, barley) has never shown interest.210 
 
In general the Foundation’s approach to agricultural development has mirrored its approach 
to health. Many of the diseases BMGF focuses on are rooted in poor sanitation and nutrition 
because for the world’s poorest people, public health and development are fundamentally 
intertwined. While BMGF donations in conjunction with the Buffett gift have endowed the 
Foundation with tremendous material assets from which it provides grants, the problems it 
seeks to address are immense and multi-faceted and its assets still finite, a small fraction of 
what states have the capacity to spend should they choose to do so. Accordingly it was 
decided early on that the Foundation’s comparative advantage in both global health and 
agricultural development would be in leveraging market-based solutions to develop needed 
products and facilitate access to them.211 
 
I have argued that BMGF displays discursive, instrumental and structural power in the 
governance of global agricultural development, which has been attained through its support 
for and promotion of SEI and private diplomacy. Its strong support for CGIAR system and 
PPPs such as the WEMA initiative and GAIN strengthen the narrative that technologies 
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employed in biofortification and genetic modification are critical for addressing the 
challenges of strengthening agricultural sectors and related food insecurity.  
 
The Foundation’s instrumental power has been exercised directly in its ability to leverage 
financial commitments from larger players, as has occurred via GAFSP and AGRA. Yet this 
influence has been indirect as well, via the enablement of organizations and networks such as 
the Chicago Council and Montpelier panel, whose members share a common view with the 
Foundation over the determinants of and solutions to global hunger, and who are directly 
involved in lobbying governments for changes in aid policy.  
 
Its structural power has come in the form of selective grant-making, and through the 
enabling of governance mechanisms that provide support for maintaining in place, the 
existing rules and structures governing the global political economy. BMGF has thus 
continued the RF tradition of adaptation in governance by innovating within externally 
imposed parameters. In the neo-liberal era, this means accepting Northern governments’ 
preference for firms developing and producing goods intended to address discrete problems. 
This is not to say that the Foundation is not aware of a substantive need across much of the 
global South–particularly Sub-Saharan Africa–for investments in, for example, the 
infrastructure supporting health and agricultural sectors (i.e. hospitals, roads, and irrigation 
schemes). However, from the perspective of BMGF’s leadership, the costs of providing 
these are beyond the capacity of foundations and as such must be paid for by states and 
development banks.212 
 
While inspired by, and in many ways modeled after RF, BMGF’s willingness to engage with 
the private sector goes beyond RF’s adaptation to the rise of corporate power resulting from 
the diffusion of neo-liberal ideology. BMGF wants to take risks and invest in technological 
innovation that has the potential for big payoffs as opposed to investing in what is already 
known to work, collaborating with industry factors prominently in strategies to achieve these 
goals. Concern has been expressed within the broader agricultural community that that 
BMGF’s push towards greater private sector involvement in producing what are supposed to 
                                                
212 Ibid. 
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be public goods may end up competing with or clouding the primary goal of increasing 
smallholder’s capacity to farm. However, based on his articulation of ‘‘creative capitalism,’’ 
Bill Gates’ answer would likely be that it is fully in the interest of the private sector for the 
small holder to succeed financially. Hence the utility of hiring people from the private sector 
to ensure their expertise is sufficiently tapped.  
 
Bill Gates is, in the eyes of one former FAO official, representative of a larger epistemic 
community within the business world that believes it is good business to lift people out of 
poverty. Certainly BMGF’s core leadership is very strongly convinced of this and has helped 
embed the narrative in both the public and private spheres. Moreover because there are 
some very large private companies (e.g. PepsiCo) that are making changes to their leadership 
based around this idea, there is, in the eyes of this individual, currently a degree of optimism 
about the possibilities for collaboration between private and public sector organizations that 
was previously lacking in policy arenas.213 Nevertheless, notes Conway, it is too early to say 
how any increase in wealthy governments’ attention to agricultural development will impact 
private sector involvement in global food security initiatives and vice-versa.214  
 
BMGF is unique according to one executive within the its Global Development program 
because there has never been a single agricultural program this large emphasizing investing in 
global public goods. The Foundation is facilitating access not only to goods intended to 
benefit producers, but also to data and statistics that can be used by a very broad audience. 
In this regard, its efforts seek to increase the effectiveness of actors at all levels: from the 
grassroots working with small-holders; to the regional level supporting individual IARCs 
were it has been and continues to be a key sponsor of applied research; to the global level 
where it is working with the CGIAR and FAO in pursuit of making the overall system more 
efficient.215 
 
The head of the Foundation’s agricultural program Sam Dryden has expressed the view that 
for the most part, the cuts to agriculture-related overseas development aid which occurred in 
                                                
213 Anonymous interviewee 31, November 22, 2010. 
214 Interview with Gordon Conway, February 3, 2011. 
215 Anonymous interviewee 29, July 20, 2011. 
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the 1980s and 1990s as part of a more general commitment to financial reform via austerity 
was very preventable; and while not the fault of any one organization, it is illustrative of a 
lack of collective political foresight and will.216 Yet not only has BMGF reinvigorated 
government’s interest in agriculture, it has also provided opportunities for firms to increase 
their involvement in efforts to strengthen agricultural sectors and food security within the 
world’s poorest states. That corporate participation in collective action focused on meeting 
the needs of the world’s poorest people is necessary, is part of the knowledge structure being 
advanced by BMGF in global agricultural development. For this reason, the motivations 
behind its entry in the agricultural domain continue to be questioned by those resisting the 
rise of corporate power in the global food system.  
 
In conclusion, BMGF’s efforts to re-engage Northern governments in agricultural 
development illustrate it is not simply an unquestioning aid to states, which would be 
consistent with the purpose of private Foundations as perceived by the liberal lens. Yet this 
advocacy for re-engagement and push for a change in policies (e.g. trade) deemed damaging 
to the interests of developing countries also demonstrates that it is not simply a reinforcer of 
the status quo, as the critical lens would suggest.  Less than a decade old, it is simply too 
early to draw any firm conclusion as to the long-term significance of BMGF in the 
governance of global agricultural development. 
 
                                                
216 Interview with Sam Dryden, July 20, 2011. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion  
 
8.1 Summary o f  the  Main Arguments  
 
The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) have 
been largely portrayed by critical scholars as members of the transnational capitalist elite 
working to advance the interests of their peers, and by liberal scholars as mere aids of 
interstate cooperation. However, neither of these lenses has sufficiently considered the social 
constructivist position that knowledge construction can, in and of itself, be a vehicle for 
autonomous agency in world politics. I argue in this dissertation that the basis of RF and 
BMGF’s longstanding influence over how responses to public health and agricultural 
challenges have been organized lies in their design and advancement of knowledge structures 
intended to increase access to public goods that accommodate the expressed preferences of 
dominant states in the contexts where they seek to catalyze change. 
 
Critical perspectives have made valuable contributions to the study of how RF and BMGF 
influence outcomes in world politics. The first generation of critical scholars were the first to 
demonstrate that by merely advancing ideas, RF was a powerful transnational actor.1  The 
second generation has shown how this ideational influence has helped to blur the line 
between public and private roles and responsibilities in collective action related to public 
health and agricultural development.2 
 
Moreover the collection of critical perspectives examining RF and BMGF agency also serve 
to illustrate that much of what has been produced on the subject of norms currently shaping 
                                                
1 For example, see Bruce Jennings, Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican 
Agriculture (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Marcos Cueto, ‘‘Visions of Science and Development: The 
Rockefeller Foundation's Latin American Surveys of the 1920s,’’ in Missionaries of Science: the Rockefeller Foundation 
and Latin America, ed., Marcos Cueto (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1-22. 
2 For example, see Eric Holt-Gimenez, Miguel A. Altieri, and Peter Rosset, ‘‘Ten Reasons Why the Rockefeller 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Alliance for Another Green Revolution Will Not Solve the 
Problems of Poverty and Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa,’’ Food First Policy Brief no. 12 (October 2006): 1-11; 
David McCoy and Lindsey McGoey. ‘‘Global Health and the Gates Foundation: In Perspective,’’ in Partnerships 
and Foundations in Global Health Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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the world order brought forth by non-state actors,3 has in fact come from scholars working 
outside of the International Relations (IR) mainstream. While perhaps not acknowledged by 
the IR community, this early critical literature nonetheless foreshadowed not only the 
explosion of scholarship on non-state actors involved in the governance of domains long 
exclusively associated state stewardship,4 but also the debates related to how global collective 
goods problems are most legitimately addressed.5 
 
Finally, there is evidence that a number of critical scholars’ charges and concerns are well 
founded. BMGF’s preference of funding research related to particular diseases is, for 
example, having a skewing effect on both overseas development assistance and research 
trajectories, for their funding preferences have not always reflected the burden of disease in 
the low-income countries where their efforts are focused.6 
 
However, the evidence presented in this dissertation does not support the viewpoint, 
espoused by some contemporary critical scholars of global governance,7 that as the architects 
of many of the large global health partnerships in existence today, RF and BMGF’s 
‘‘framing’’ of health problems and solutions lend credence to the neo-liberal worldview. 
Contemporary global health governance scholars Simon Rushton and Owain Williams have 
argued for example that with some key exceptions the World Health Organization (WHO) 
crafting the International Health Regulations and Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control both the direct (e.g. the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) 
and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)) and indirect (e.g. WTO rules) 
                                                
3 For example see Peter Haas, ‘‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,’’ 
International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35; Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
‘‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’’ International Organization 52, no.4 (1998): 887-917. 
4 For example see Rodey Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Robert Falkner, ‘‘Private Environmental 
Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links,’’ Global Environmental Politics 3, no. 2 (2003): 72-
87 
5 For example see John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New 
York: Routledge, 1998); Alice Ba and Matthew Hoffmann, eds., Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (New 
York: Routledge, 2005); and Klaus Dingwerth and Philip Pattberg, ‘‘Global Governance as a Perspective on 
World Politics,” Global Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 185-203. 
6 Jeremy Shiffman, ‘‘Donor Funding Priorities for Communicable Disease Control in the Developing World,’’ 
Health Policy and Planning 21, no. 6 (2006): 411-420. 
7 See for example Simon Rushton and Owain D. Williams, ‘‘Frames, Paradigms and Power: Global Health 
Policy-Making under Neo-liberalism,’’ Global Society 26, no2 (2012): 147-167 
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instruments of global health policy that the Foundations have either played a role in 
formulating or tacitly supported are informed or shaped by the core ideas and assumptions 
of neo-liberalism.8 While the authors do not self-identify as critical scholars, their views are 
entirely consistent with the historical materialist perspective of global governance posited by 
the likes of Henk Overbeek, who suggests that global governance is merely attempts by the 
transnational managerial class to reproduce and re-legitimize neo-liberalism on a global scale 
through legal means.9 
 
Yet from the progressive era to the present, RF has steadily sought to catalyze states’ 
investment in public sectors as a means of strengthening public health and agricultural 
systems, particularly so in developing countries. The motivations for doing so may be 
contested, but such contestation does not diminish the fact that the Foundation has been a 
steadfast supporter of public sector entities seeking to ensure access to public goods, and 
this has remained the case despite the diffusion of neo-liberal ideology. 
 
RF’s emphasis on partnerships beginning in the early 1990s was an attempt to compensate 
for the adverse impacts of applying neo-liberal ideology to public policy and the ensuing 
atrophying of government’s capacities to produced needed public goods.  The Foundation’s 
attempts to strengthen public sector capacity by tapping the resources of industry are 
incongruent with the ideas and assumptions informing neo-liberalism. What RF most 
certainly does have is a track record of successfully adapting its knowledge structures to the 
realities of larger changes to global political economy beyond its control. This capacity for 
adaptation in governance has been the basis of its sustained influence over how 
governments organize their responses to public health and agricultural challenges.  
 
While BMGF lacks RF’s legacy of directly investing in public sector strengthening, it has 
nonetheless demonstrated a similar capacity–embodied in the form of GAVI–to catalyze 
innovation in global governance in the neo-liberal era that has been engineered to 
compensate for reductions in public sector capacity created by policy informed by neo-
                                                
8 Rushton and Williams, ‘‘Frames, Paradigms and Power.’’  
9 Henk Overbeek, ‘‘Class, Hegemony and Global Governance: a Historical Materialist Perspective,’’ in 
Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation, and World Order, eds., Matthew Hoffmann and 
Alice Ba (London: Routledge, 2005), 47.  
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liberal ideology. The Foundation’s ability to shift the behavior of states and firms driving and 
benefiting from inequities in the global political economy in ways which increase access to 
public goods for marginalized populations undermines suggestions that RF and BMGF are 
conservative actor seeking to buttress support for the dominant world order through 
philanthropic distraction.  
 
This dissertation lends support to the liberal view that RF and BMGF have carved out a 
niche for themselves in world affairs as “honest brokers” capable of facilitating institutional 
innovation in global governance, geared towards the development of novel strategies and 
mechanisms focused on the production and dissemination of public goods intended for 
historically marginalized populations. If BMGF is conceptualized as an extension of the RF, 
then for a century, these two unique actors have demonstrated an ability to bring needed 
resources to bear on issues adversely affecting large segments of the world’s poorest people. 
More importantly, the institutionalization of RF and BMGF strategies has led to 
fundamental changes in how governments have organized their individual and collective 
responses to public health and agricultural challenges experienced by developing countries.  
 
In summary, critical analysis of RF and BMGF agency is important in the sense that it brings 
necessary scrutiny to the initiatives of transnational actors, who compared to public sector 
authorities, operate with limited transparency and accountability. However it has nonetheless 
obscured the comparative advantage of these two private Foundations as agents of change in 
global governance, thus overlooking what exactly they do and how their anomalous 
attributes allow them to do so.  
 
Framing RF and BMGF as inherently conservative actors who actively resist structural 
change is inconsistent with their longstanding role as agents of institutional innovation.  
These two organizations have in fact been the drivers of some of the most novel approaches 
to the governance of global health and agricultural development ever embraced by the 
society of states. Their current capacity to shape collective action oriented to addressing 
discrete and agricultural challenges is merely a continuum of a larger legacy as illuminators of 
state and market failures constraining access across the global South to needed public goods 
and as facilitators of innovation in science and governance intended to close those gaps.  
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Moreover by accepting power inequities in world politics and readily adapting to the 
constraints and opportunities afforded by different world orders, RF and BMGF have 
attained policy influence which they used to embed ideas previously absent from policy 
arenas, which have normative implications for global governance. As has been shown in 
detail in chapters 4 through 7, in the neoliberal era the Foundations have illuminated 
through Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) how firms can aid public authorities to reduce 
socio-economic disparities. While far from perfect, RF and BMGF bring to global 
governance an independent thinking, pioneering spirit, and long-term perspectives largely 
free of political pressure, making them well placed to facilitate innovation.10 
 
In this vein, I argue that RF and BMGF’s agency serves to illustrate that to institutionalize 
knowledge structures of global governance, non-state actors must adapt their knowledge 
structures and accommodate - or at least not be seen as challenging or undermining - the 
preferences of the prevailing world order’s most powerful states. While operating at the 
country level in the immediate post-colonial era, RF was focused primarily on 
accommodating the expressed preferences of developing country governments. Yet at the 
international level, the dominant power that RF has had to work with since the post-war era 
has been the United States. For RF or now BMGF to openly contest the preferences of the 
United States would place the Foundations at risk of losing the support of those with the 
capacity to impede the institutionalization of their ideas.  
 
RF’s influence in global health governance has endured for a century because of the 
Foundation’s ability and willingness to adapt its long-term organizational goals to the 
constraints and opportunities presented by the changing preferences of the world’s 
dominant states. Involving firms in attempts to resolve what had previously been accepted as 
public sector problems was an adaptation to the parameters of neo-liberal era. BMGF has 
built itself around this paradigm. In demonstrating how RF and BMGF’s agency has 
centered on adapting their knowledge structures to accommodate changes in the distribution 
of global political and economic power, I argue, my findings build on existing theories of 
                                                
10 John Wyn Owen, Graham Lister, and Sally Stansfield, ‘‘The Role of Foundations in Global Governance for 
Health,’’ in Making Sense of Global Health Governance: A Policy Perspective, eds., Kent Buse, Wolfgang Hein and 
Nick Drager (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 235.   
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how knowledge can be a source of power in world politics. These include both 
functionalism, which articulated how specialized knowledge alone may serve as the basis of 
power in international relations, and more importantly, neo-functionalism, which illustrated 
that such technocratic influence was not limited to International Organizations (IOs).  
 
Both Foundations lend credence to neo-functionalism in their common commitment to 
Science-Enabled Innovation (SEI), thereby demonstrating for would-be adopters how 
science and resultant technology can provide solutions to longstanding challenges perceived 
to be jeopardizing public health and food security, and constraining economic development. 
SEI has been key to state acceptance of RF knowledge structures, and this was particularly 
true for states emerging from the clutches of colonialism seeking to modernize their public 
health and agricultural systems. Credibility attained by scientific prowess can be explained in 
part by the deep faith in the power of science and the appeal of technology to improve 
humanity’s lot, which transcends cultures in the modern world. Demonstrating evidence of 
the effectiveness of science and technology remains integral to the Foundation’s discursive 
power, meaning their ability to shape the dominant discourse related to the determinants of 
and solutions to disease, weak agricultural sectors, and food insecurity in developing 
countries.  
 
Moreover, this study draws heavily from the epistemic communities concept, which casts 
light on how disciplinary training matters in establishing world-views and normative beliefs. I 
also draw inspiration from Karen Litfin, who clearly articulated that the discursive nature of 
knowledge means that particular ways of understanding problems gives rise to biases for 
particular solutions, which when combined with agenda setting power leads to other ways of 
conceptualizing and responding to complex problems being excluded from the decision-
making process.  
 
Historically, participating in the development of post-secondary infrastructure was integral to 
RF’s success in building epistemic communities in public health and agriculture within the 
countries where it operated.11 RF was instrumental in facilitating for states the training of 
                                                
11 James S. Coleman and David Court, University Development in the Third World: the Rockefeller Foundation Experience 
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1993). 
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communities of experts in select scientific disciplines, such as agronomy, epidemiology and 
molecular biology. By virtue of their training, these communities approached health and 
agricultural problems in ways that reflected and reinforced the dominant norms and ideas 
guiding the foundation’s work. These country-level epistemic expansions provided RF 
instrumental power, in that through training the Foundation embedded epistemic 
communities into policy-making arenas.  
 
A common pedagogical background also meant these communities of experts were receptive 
to the Foundation’s advocacy for specific institutional reforms and efforts to establish new 
mechanisms intended to facilitate collective action related to strengthening public health and 
agricultural capacity in developing countries. Consequently, the construction and support of 
epistemic communities heightened the credibility of RF’s positions and their lobby influence 
within national and international public policy arenas. Moreover, it has also allowed them to 
orient research trajectories directed at solving said problems and to establish institutional 
legacies such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
managed by members of those communities within which those same specific ideas and 
approaches are embedded and perpetuated. The CGIAR is one of the few examples whereby 
RF attained structural power by proxy, in that at the explicit request of states, its 
technocratic leadership was delegated authority to inform the rules and operational 
frameworks governing participation in an albeit voluntary system. 
 
Such structural power-by proxy illustrates, however, that while knowledge construction is 
integral to RF and BMGF’s status as discrete actors in world affairs, Peter Haas’s argument 
that epistemic communities are unable to institutionalize their normative enterprises 
autonomously applies equally to RF and BMGF.12 To institutionalize and translate the ideas 
and norms they espouse, states must invite the Foundations to retool the institutional 
machinery, as occurred in the formation of CGIAR. Institutionalizing ideas and normative 
enterprises at the global level therefore requires convincing those controlling the levers of 
power to buy into the utility of the proposed ideas.  
 
                                                
12 Peter Haas, ‘‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,’’ 
International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989): 377-403; Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. 
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To attain this commitment, both RF and BMGF have proven to be masters of private 
diplomacy, which refers to the convening of informal, private dialogue between actors 
whose individual receptivity and cooperative ability has been deemed essential for the 
successful institutionalization of the Foundation’s strategies.  
 
The most recent example of the Foundation’s influence via knowledge power is the ascent 
of the PPP paradigm in public health and agricultural development. RF and BMGF have 
been a driving force behind PPPs becoming the dominant approach in the neo-liberal era for 
creating new technologies in these two arenas, intended to benefit the populations of the 
world’s poorest counties.13 Their effectiveness in selling PPPs as a form of global 
governance has centred on illuminating state-market gaps, showcasing how science and 
technology can overcome problems long deemed intractable, reducing financial risks for 
firms through subsidizing research and development (R&D) costs and negotiating between 
public and private actors across sectoral boundaries.14 Through Product Development 
Partnerships (PDPs) such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and Informal 
Global Alliances (IGAs) such GAVI, the Foundations have ensured that functional 
strategies and institutional frameworks exist to provide public goods to the world’s poor 
when public sector authorities mandated to perform this role have fallen short.  Moreover, 
through their support for organizations such as the African Agricultural Technology 
Foundation (AATF) focused on facilitating technology transfer, RF and BMGF are 
illuminating structural inequities stemming from the unequal global distribution of power, 
which Northern states and firms have created and benefited from. Without explicitly 
chastising, the Foundations have provided Northern states, pharmaceutical and agrochemical 
companies and IOs with frameworks that work to compensate for each of their individual 
shortcomings as global governors.  
 
One enduring criticism of both Foundations is that their chosen emphasis on facilitating 
innovation in science and technology serves to distract from larger structural determinants of 
                                                
13 Michael Moran and Michael A. Stevenson, ‘‘Partnerships and the MDGs: Challenges of Reforming Global 
Health Governance,’’ in The Handbook of Global Health Policy, eds., Garrett Brown, Gavin Yamey, and Sarah 
Wamala. Wiley-Blackwell, Forthcoming 2014). 
14 Michael Moran, ‘‘Philanthropic Foundations and Global Health Partnership Formation: The Rockefeller 
Foundation and IAVI,’’ in Health for Some: The Political Economy of Global Health Governance, eds., Sandra MacLean, 
Sherri Brown, and Pieter Fourie (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 129. 
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the same problems they purportedly to want to solve. Yet end-products such as the yellow 
fever vaccine and submergence tolerant rice varieties serve to illustrate that advances in 
science and technology have played and will continue to play an important roles in 
strengthening public health and food security across the global South. 
 
The Foundations’ eagerness to collaborate with, as opposed to contest, Northern states and 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that have engineered and benefited from structural 
inequality in pursuit of their goals has also attracted criticism. Yet such collaboration does 
not mean the two Foundations are conservative actors seeking to impede transformative 
change in the global political economy. 
 
PPPs have been well received by Northern governments guided by neo-liberal ideology 
because the model functioned in the face of deep cuts to public sector research capacity and 
accommodated their expressed volition for private sector involvement in the development 
and distribution of public goods. Indeed the PDP model emerged as a form of global 
governance to compensate for the reduction in public sector capacity driven by neo-liberal 
ideology. However, while the promotion of governance innovation intended to benefit 
marginalized populations is integral to the Foundations’ character as political actors, with 
few exceptions, activism (i.e. naming and shaming) is not.  
 
Consequently, through the PPP, the Foundations have produced a general knowledge 
structure that accommodates the preferences of those actors possessing the means to block 
the uptake of their strategies for increasing marginalized populations’ access to new public 
goods such as essential medicines. Through PDPs such as IAVI and AATF, and informal 
global alliances such as GAVI and Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the 
Foundations have shown that institutional innovation benefiting historically marginalized 
populations can occur in the absence of changes to the global power structure. 
 
In any given context, the distribution of political and economic power is always unequally 
distributed. RF’s longevity as an actor of influence in global governance lends credence to 
the argument that if an actor can successfully adapt its strategies to be sufficiently palatable 
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to the dominant political establishment, they will be well positioned to affect change in the 
norms and institutions guiding that system. 
 
The institutional frameworks and governance strategies advanced by the Foundation have 
never been contested the legitimacy of the dominant liberal economic paradigm. They have 
worked within it, without a longstanding end goal–that is, enabling the provision of public 
goods to historically impoverished and marginalized populations–being compromised. By 
not contesting the legitimacy of the overall system, RF has been afforded opportunities to 
affect change within it. 
 
As knowledge structures guiding actors’ behaviors, RF and BMGF have used PPPs in an 
attempt to embed new norms within policy making arenas, which has led to behavioral 
changes among participants. Pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms are now far more 
willing to waive licensing fees or royalties for those who seek to duplicate their products or 
employ patented molecular tools and processes for the benefit of the world’s marginalized 
than they were fifteen years ago. PDPs, I argue, have created the expectation for firms to be 
more receptive to the needs to the world’s poor. Whether PDPs are catalyzing a shift in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) from mere charity towards corporate recognition of 
public health and food security as fundamental human rights is by no means clear. What is 
clear, however, is that through the likes of the Public Intellectual Property Resource for 
Agriculture (PIPRA), Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation International (AHBF) and AATF, 
the Foundations have succeeded in loosening the reigns currently controlling access to 
proprietary knowledge that is constraining science-enabled innovative capacity across the 
global South. 
 
RF has been a trailblazer in creating approaches to the governance of global health and 
agricultural development, although its strategies for advancing its ideas have changed over 
time in response to larger changes in the global political economy. Its advancement of the 
PPP approach reflects its willingness to acknowledge and accommodate the unique 
capacities and needs of those various actors whose cooperation is required to achieve 
pressing end goals.  While inspired and in many ways modeled after RF, BMGF departs 
from its ideational and institutional ancestor by exhibiting a reservation for investing directly 
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in strengthening public sector capacity or establishing operational programs. Moreover the 
degree to which BMGF is willing to engage with firms goes beyond RF’s adaptation to the 
rise of corporate power resulting from the diffusion of neo-liberal ideology. BMGF has built 
itself around the PPP paradigm on the grounds that it wants to take risks and invest in 
technological innovation that has the potential for big payoffs as opposed to investing in 
what is already known to work and collaborating with industry factors prominently in 
strategies to achieve these goals. This means the BMGF is more closely aligned with the 
private sector than RF ever has been. 
 
RF and BMGF’s ability to influence collective action revolves around the framing of debates 
and persuading states to embrace particular norms and ideas, and both Foundations have 
provided very unique platforms for small groups of individuals to advance their ideas and 
shape public policy and collective action in the domains of public health and agricultural 
development. Without overtly seeking to alter the overall distribution of political and 
economic power, RF and BMGF have brought a dynamism to the process of constructing 
functional mechanisms of global health governance, which has been especially apparent 
when the capacities of WHO and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) have been diminished by financial neglect and political isolation. 
 
In a mere fifteen years, the PDP paradigm has become the dominant global approach to 
facilitating low-income countries’ access to proprietary technologies in pursuit of 
strengthening public health and agriculture. RF and BMGF have been the catalysts of 
multiple global PDPs, which have effectively bridged public and private sector gaps to 
develop and distribute new technologies to millions across the global South in need of them. 
Moreover, exemplified by GAVI and AGRA, RF and BMGF have been architects of IGAs 
coordinating and sustaining the activities of often very incongruent actors in pursuit of 
common goals.  RF and BMGF-driven partnership approach to facilitating access to public 
goods which both the PDP and IGA embody began in public health but is now embedded 
across the entire development spectrum: from agriculture through AGRA, to water resource 
management (Global Water Partnership), to environment and climate change (the Clean 
Development Mechanism), to gender empowerment (the One Woman Initiative).  
Partnerships are now the master ideational concept underpinning the Millennium 
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Development Goals, which reinforces the perceived success and political support for PPPs 
as an institutional innovation in global governance.15 Consequently, RF and BMGF are 
reshaping the way we should think about international politics; however this is entirely 
consistent with RF’s historical role as an agent of change.  
 
8.2 Three  impli cat ions o f  stat e s  embrace  o f  PPPs in  the  governance  o f  g lobal publ i c  
heal th and agri cu l tural deve lopment  
 
The first twenty years of the neo-liberal era (from 1980 to 2000) was characterized by (i) 
dwindling levels of bilateral and multilateral aid; (ii) diminished public sector capacity in 
countries subject to structural adjustment programs; (iii) explicit preferences expressed by 
Northern states for bringing market solutions to bear on historically public sector challenges; 
and (iv) continued market apathy for the needs of the poor. In this context RF and BMGF 
have clearly understood both the utility of and political receptivity for the PPP paradigm in 
global public health and agricultural development.  
 
Here I examine three implications of states’ broad embrace of the partnership paradigm, 
which has functioned as RF and BMGF knowledge structure intended to buttress public 
sector capacity and overcome market failures in the neo-liberal era.   
 
First, the spread in state support for PPPs across the development spectrum has resulted in 
the creation of new global approaches for developing, financing, producing, and 
disseminating public goods in developing countries. The proliferation of PPPs has 
heightened coordination, legitimacy and accountability challenges in global governance, and 
for their willingness to work outside of the UN system to achieve their goals, the 
Foundations have in recent years been accused of undermining the authority of IOs. Yet by 
developing and lobbying for the embrace of alternative governance mechanisms outside of 
traditional multilateral arenas, are RF and BMGF undermining the legitimacy of WHO and 
FAO, or are they compensating for their deficiencies? I argue that the decline of IO 
authority in the neoliberal era is the result of political and fiscal constraints that have been 
imposed on IOs by donor states, as well as by IOs’ own antiquated governance structures 
                                                
15 Moran and Stevenson, ‘‘Partnerships and the MDGs.’’ 
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that limit their ability to cooperate with non-state actors in pursuit of common goals. 
Through PPPs, RF and BMGF have demonstrated a willingness to help both WHO and 
FAO perform their intended functions, but are also willing and able to innovate around 
them if they feel it is necessary to do so.  
 
Second, the embrace of PPPs has meant a resurgence in support for collective action 
emphasizing technological solutions to problems with often deep political determinants. 
Technological innovation has been and continues to be critical to strengthening public 
health, agricultural productivity, and food security and this is where the Foundations have 
been effective as catalysts. Through PPPs, RF and BMGF have facilitated the unlocking of 
privately held Intellectual Property (IP) for the intended benefit of the public good without 
radical changes having to be made to international trade law. In this regard, RF and BMGF 
have effectively illuminated a key structural impediment to achieving equity in global health 
and food security, even if they alone cannot overcome it. Nevertheless, their capacity to 
catalyze normative shifts and organizational change in global governance is limited to 
domains where they have exhibited expertise. Moreover, while significant, trade-related 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are merely one example of structural inequity adversely 
affecting the world’s poor. 
 
Third, the PPP paradigm has provided firms with opportunities to become formally involved 
in the development and management of institutional frameworks focused on strengthening 
public heath, agricultural capacity and food security in low and middle-income countries. 
Consequently, RF and BMGF have faced criticisms of inadvertently cementing structural 
inequities by reinforcing the power of MNCs. However, through the partnership paradigm, 
RF and BMGF are illuminating how firms can help public authorities reduce socio-economic 
disparities. In doing so, the Foundations have provided both proponents and detractors of 
global capitalism with a new way of conceptualizing the role of business in society.  
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8.21 Traditional IOs are facing pressure to recognize the unique skills of a diverse array of actors 
 
In the neoliberal era, the implementation of RF and BMGF ideas and those of their 
institutional progeny have occurred through partnerships with other organizations, including 
but certainly not limited to traditional IOs. The network structure through which each 
foundation operates to advance their goals poses a tremendous challenge for those 
determined to hold either foundation accountable for any misguided assumptions or adverse 
effects of their initiatives.  
 
Since IO policy positions are representative of the collective wishes of the society of states, 
they will always posses a degree of legitimacy that is unattainable to a private organization. 
While the Foundations’ positions are determined by a small group of individuals, WHO for 
example has a legal responsibility to deliver on a range of health issues affecting its member 
states.16 Consequently, red flags have been raised that PPPs are functioning as parallel 
decision making bodies to IOs: undermining the legitimate authority of the likes of WHO 
and FAO and muddying the waters of accountability in global governance.17 The evidence 
attained in my research on RF and BMGF agency demonstrates, however, that the 
proliferation of PPPs in global health and agricultural development are a reflection of public 
sectors being weakened by the embrace and/or imposition of neoliberal ideology to the 
point that they are no longer able to fulfill their mandates autonomously. This has been 
exacerbated by the governance structures of IOs which were forged in the state-centric 
world of the 1940s, limiting their ability to engage with the increasing number of non-state 
actors seeking to strengthen public health and agricultural capacity in poor countries. 
 
As noted by one former senior WHO official, the basic weakness of both WHO and FAO’s 
governance structures is that they were set up as policy making entities that must get 
approval from member states, which are the sole constituency to which they are accountable. 
This of course does not reflect the multiple actors involved resolving global health and 
                                                
16 Anonymous interviewee 13, March 1, 2011. 
17 See for example: Benedicte Bull, Martin Boas and Desmond McNeill, ‘‘Private Sector Influence in the 
Multilateral System,’’ Global Governance 10, no.4 (2004). See also: McCoy, David, Gayatri Kembhavi, Jinesh 
Patel, and Akish Luintel. ‘‘The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Grant-Making Programme for Global 
Health.’’ The Lancet 373, no. 9675 (2009): 1645-1653. 
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agricultural challenges, which under WHO and FAO rules may participate in or observe 
policy discussions but lack the power to make (i.e. vote) on actual policy.18 
 
The structure of IOs acting as an impediment to collective action has been particularly 
evident in the domain of global public health. Within WHO constitution, according to 
another former WHO official, one relic of the state-centric world of 1948 is the clause that 
allows the organization to take over responsibility for issues it believes it is best suited to 
oversee.19 Such thinking reinforces the relevance of the single authority notion, and there 
remains strong support, among proponents of WHO,20 for ensuring that organization 
maintains its authority to direct and coordinate the global flow of ideas and resources 
intended to respond to pressing health challenges.  
 
Yet at present the fixation on a single global health leader may not be feasible or desirable, 
given that health expertise is now so broadly distributed. As noted by the same 
aforementioned ex-WHO official, when IOs were created, they were one of the only 
mechanisms that existed to coordinate activities across borders in pursuit of the common 
good. Since that time, a multitude of firms and NGOs have proven themselves to be highly 
adept in this role. Yet IOs such as WHO were not designed to collaborate constructively 
with the private sector or civil society, and despite repeated calls for them to develop this 
capacity, whether they can transcend this historic inability remains to be seen.21 
 
The argument that IOs were not designed to work with non-state actors as equals on issues 
of collective action is equally true in agricultural development as it is in health. For many in 
the development community, there is no loss of authority on the part of FAO arising from 
the proliferation of partnerships because the organization is seen as having never lived up to 
its full potential.22 Over the last decade, the organization has faced a barrage of criticism 
                                                
18 Anonymous interviewee 12, November 24, 2010. 
19 Anonymous interviewee 25 August 16, 2011. 
20 See for example Gill Walt, Neil Spicer, and Kent Buse, ‘‘Mapping the Global Health Architecture,’’ in Making 
Sense of Global Health Governance: A Policy Perspective, eds., Kent Buse, Wolfgang Hein and Nick Drager 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 47-71 
21 Anonymous interviewee 25, August 16, 2011. 
22 Anonymous interviewee 3, December 6, 2010. 
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from donor states over a perceived lack of transparency and accountability,23 and framed as 
an inefficient bureaucracy lacking strategic focus at the country level.24  
  
The CGIAR system, for example, was created because FAO was not designed to deliver 
science and technology products to developing countries,25 and in the current era, Prabu 
Pinagli’s department (statistics) within BMGF is perceived to be helping FAO fulfill one of 
its core duties.  Furthermore, according to Catherine Bertini, with Purchase 4 Progress 
(P4P), the work of BMGF has been credited with helping revitalize the role of the World 
Food Programme (WFP), which traditionally has been limited to emergency aid.26 
 
WHO in contrast was designed to be a technical authority and disseminator of information 
but was not intended for ad-hoc work. ‘‘Mission-creep’’ as opposed to an inability to fulfill 
core responsibilities, in the eyes of one former high-ranking official of the organization, is 
what is undermining its legitimacy as a leading body.27 In the world of 1948 when the 
organization was conceived and RF was preparing to cede its own authority to this new 
entity, transnational not-for-profit organizations like CARE did not exist, nor did health 
focused MNCs resemble their modern day analogues. Today, BMGF’s total annual spending 
on health is approaching that that of the typical WHO budget, yet the governance structure 
of the latter is blind to the former as it is to other non-state actors, and this is seen by one 
former President of the Global Health Council as having a huge adverse impact on 
coordination.28 
 
WHO continues to play an important role in convening and consulting health expertise. 
The key advantages for WHO in global health governance and what will likely be preserved 
is the World Health Assembly (WHA) structure which provides sole authority for WHO 
                                                
23 Christoffersen, Leif E., Bezanson, Keith., Lela, Ume., Davis, Michael., del Castillo, Carlos Perez., and Awori, 
Thelma. The Challenge of Renewal. An Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Rome: FAO, 2007. 
24 Department For International Development, Multilateral Aid Review: Assessment for the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) (London: DFID, 2011). 
25 Alex F. McCalla, ‘‘FAO, Research and CGIAR,’’ Working Paper no. 07-005 (Davis: Department of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics University of California, 2007), 3.  
26 Interview with Catherine Bertini, January 26, 2011. 
27 Anonymous interviewee 25, August 16, 2011. 
28 Anonymous interviewee 6, June 23, 2011. 
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setting global standards, and the organization’s direct connection to national ministries of 
health. Given the push for evidence-informed governance, WHO needs to be able to parlay 
those skills into bringing harmonization in approaches to a very diverse field, and this is 
where it shows an inability to adapt to a changed world.29 Due to its limited resources, it is 
incapable of duplicating such diverse expertise. Moreover WHO cannot ignore the multiple 
non-state actors collaborating effectively through partnerships. Hence there is pressure on 
the organization, and indeed on all UN agencies, to adapt and allow other organizations to 
have input in ways that compliment what states and IOs do best.30  
 
As private actors, the legitimacy of RF and BMGF’s claims of acting on behalf of the poor 
and marginalized will be questioned. They, like other non-state actors such as Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and Save the Children, have not been elected to perform the roles they 
have undertaken. Instead, they perceived gaps and moved in to fill them. Every type of actor 
needs to ask questions about whom they are representing and be open to feedback and 
change accordingly.31 The downside of philanthropic agency, notes William Foege, is that the 
more money a Foundation has, the less likely current and aspiring grantees will challenge 
their ideas, which makes it easy to lose sight of what is correct, what is flawed, and where 
changes need to be made. To prevent this from occurring, the boards of the Foundations 
must be truly reflective of the diversity that exists in the issues the Foundations are involved 
in, be capable of critical reflection, and have no stake in the future of any one Foundation 
initiative.32 
 
However, the legitimacy of RF and BMGF has never been derived from electoral processes 
but instead from whether their ideas have proven effective over time.33 In this regard PPPs 
such as IAVI and GAVI, which have been effective catalysts for collaboration in the 
development and delivery of health technologies intended specifically for historically 
marginalized populations in the global South, have legitimized both Foundations roles as 
innovators in global health governance.  
                                                
29 Anonymous interviewee 12 November 24, 2010; Anonymous interviewee 6, June 23, 2011; Anonymous 
interviewee 15, January 18, 2011. 
30 Anonymous interviewee 25 August 16, 2011; Anonymous interviewee 6, June 23, 2011. 
31 Anonymous interviewee 6 June 23, 2011. 
32 Interview with William Foege, August 18, 2011. 
33 Anonymous interviewee 25, August 16, 2011. 
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What the embrace of PPPs in global health and agricultural development illustrate is that the 
world has changed and UNspecialized agencies, largely because of their design, have been 
slow to catch up. RF and BMGF have both supported WHO and FAO in their work. Yet 
the Foundations have also demonstrated a willingness to innovate around them, by 
developing informal mechanisms outside of the international system, if they feel doing so is 
justified.  Any loss in legitimacy experienced by WHO and FAO in the neo-liberal era 
therefore stems not from RF or BMGF’s ability to advance PPPs as an approach to 
collective action, but from their own inability to adapt to political and fiscal constraints on 
their capacities that have been imposed by their political masters. 
 
8.22 The narrative of technology as a path to progressive change is now deeply embedded in mechanisms of 
global governance focused on strengthening public health and agricultural capacity  
 
Historically RF demonstrated an affinity for science-enabled innovation and a commitment 
to public sector capacity building in science, which has been reflected in the governance 
mechanisms it helped forge. The International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) of the 
CGIAR, for example, were not constructed to address explicitly political determinants of 
food insecurity. Yet they have nonetheless produced tangible benefits in the face of them. In 
the context of Sub-Saharan Africa where a lack of political will to strengthen agricultural 
systems persists, the Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) has, for example, proved 
instrumental in ensuring continued access to cassava, which is the continent’s most 
important crop.34 
 
More recently, BMGF’s propensity towards promoting technological innovation has been 
criticized for skewing the global research and governance trajectories in public health.35 
BMGF priorities are set by a small group of individuals, yet this is perfectly normal for a 
private philanthropic entity. It is legitimately entitled to its own particular vision of global 
health and how it can be attained so long as long as no laws are broken. The problem for 
critics is that its purchasing power relative to the diminished or diminishing purchasing 
                                                
34 Anonymous interviewee 18, February 10, 2011. 
35 For example see David McCoy, Gayatri Kembhavi, Jinesh Patel, and Akish Luintel, ‘‘The Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation’s Grant-Making Programme for Global Health,’’ The Lancet 373, no. 9675 (2009): 1645-1653. 
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power of other private and more importantly public actors constitutes structural power, in 
that the Foundation is driving research agendas, which begs questions of relativity and the 
disproportionate influence of a private entity on the public good, or what a public good 
actually is and how it can be attained.36 The primary impediment to BMGF’s prioritizing 
health systems strengthening reflects Bill Gates’ fascination with all things molecular, his 
preference for subsidizing the development of tangible advances in technology and his belief 
in the innovative capacity of the private sector operating in free markets. With the exception 
of Gordon Perkin (whose initiatives were allegedly increasingly out of sync with Gates’ own 
interests),37 the leadership of the Global Health Program (Richard Klausner, Tachi Yamada 
and Trevor Mundel) has been reflective of these technological, biomedical and 
entrepreneurial biases.  
 
BMGF has built itself around the PPP paradigm, and from an economic standpoint there is 
evidence to support assertions that the Foundation focuses too heavily on product 
development.38 The global access to medicines movement has also inadvertently though 
predictably had a crowding out effect on other options, as only so much money can be spent 
on public health and pharmaceuticals–which even at greatly reduced prices are quite 
expensive.39 This does not diminish the fact that one of BMGF’s proven strengths is its 
ability to focus considerable material resources on specific areas, most notably the 
development and delivery of vaccines. Its willingness to invest heavily and early in GAVI is 
both a testament of this and was an important incentive that pulled the various prospective 
partners towards GAVI, which RF-led Children’s Vaccine Initiative (CVI) did not enjoy. 
Having said that, GAVI has worked because it is truly multi-sectoral in nature, and all parties 
were represented equally from its inception. Previously, the public sector organizations had 
banded together in uneasy alliances to force the hands of the private sector or developing 
countries, and BMGF was the catalyst for organizational change in this regard.40 
                                                
36 Anonymous interviewee 5, June 30, 2011. 
37 Anonymous interviewee 25, August 16, 2011. 
38 Jef. L. Leroy, Jean-Pierre Habicht, Gretal Pelto and Stefano M. Bertozzi, ‘‘Current Priorities in Health 
Research Funding and Lack of Impact on the Number of Child Deaths Per Year,’’ American Journal of Public 
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39 Anonymous interviewee 2, January 18, 2011. 
40 Anonymous interviewee 6, June 23, 2011; William Muraskin, Crusade to Immunize the World’s Children: The 
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RF and BMGF have been very effective in showing how science and technology matter in 
public health and agricultural development (although how much and which technologies are 
most appropriate will always be highly polarized debates). Moreover through private 
diplomacy, the Foundations have created spaces for Northern states and firms to admit that 
the international rules governing access to technology is preventing those who stand to 
benefit from particular technologies most from accessing it. What RF and BMGF-led PPPs 
focused on product development have effectively illuminated, however, is that proprietary 
technology, which has relevance for pressing social problems in poor countries, can be made 
available to those engaged in SEI for the public good, or directly for intended beneficiaries 
by working in partnership with those firms otherwise preventing such access. In this regard 
RF and BMGF have effectively illuminated a key structural impediment to achieving equity 
in global health and agricultural capacity and provided a framework to overcome it. 
 
The reality according to one international expert on pharmaceutical research and 
development who was involved in the formation and CVI and GAVI is that no company 
will invest in developing a marketable product without some sort of IP protection. However, 
according to this individual, there is an alternative to firms having either total or no control 
over IP in that it can be retained but not applied to people who cannot access the benefits it 
may confer. The PDP model decreases the financial risk firms would otherwise take so that 
products can be developed for populations with limited purchasing power. Pharmaceutical 
companies will usually place their money where returns are highest. If a third party–be it a 
Foundation, or public entity offers to reduce the risk of their investment through direct 
subsidization or for example by guaranteeing a minimum profit margin through a 
commitment in advance to purchase a certain amount of product at a fixed price, it allows 
those same firms to invest in something they would not invest in because the risk of doing 
so is markedly reduced.41 RF and BMGF have been champions of this alternative. 
 
Their instrumental power has been deemed worthwhile on the basis that it is possible to 
measure the net benefit of PPPs. Global health PDPs, for example, are fulfilling their 
intended purpose in the sense that new drugs, vaccines and related technologies are being 
                                                
41 Anonymous interviewee 27, January 4, 2012. 
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developed and delivered in response to longstanding state and market failures.42  This 
template is now being extended to agriculture to address general challenges such as drought 
and more specific threats such as the particularly virulent stem rust, UG 99 (short for 
Uganda 1999 where and when it was discovered), which is currently a threat to much of the 
wheat production in Africa and Asia, given there is limited natural resistance to it in existing 
varieties and its ability to mutate rapidly is undermining attempts to confer resistance.43  
 
RF and BMGF have both chosen to focus on unlocking the potential of science and 
facilitating marginalized populations’ access to resultant technologies. However, by 
attempting to engage and bring together relevant public, private and civil society at local, 
regional, as well as inter- and trans- national levels, the Foundations’ current approach to 
public health and development is anything but singular. Protracted and divisive arguments 
over whether African agricultural productivity can be improved via conventional breeding 
versus genetic modification for example are likely–from the Foundation’s perspectives–
viewed as distracting from the primary issue, which is the longstanding wholesale continent-
wide neglect of agricultural sectors.  
 
From a macro-economic standpoint, developing countries such as China and Brazil whose 
overall agricultural productivities have increased over time demonstrate both that indigenous 
capacity for applied agricultural research is indeed a critical determinant of success. 
Conversely, a collective failure to invest in the national agricultural capacity of Sub-Saharan 
countries during the 1950 and 1960s in large part explains its comparatively weaker 
agricultural sectors. RF and BMGF are evidently cognizant of the fact that simply 
transplanting technology that worked in India will not address the region’s food woes. What 
is absent across much of Sub-Saharan Africa from a technological standpoint, and where the 
Foundations have focused their recent efforts, is the capacity to take globally available 
technology from IARCs and the private sector and adapt it to African needs. This reality 
underpins RF’s advocacy of addressing chronic low-levels of funding at universities and 
agricultural research institutes, which lack funds for the hiring of faculty and conducting 
                                                
42 Mary Moran, “A Breakthrough in R&D for Neglected Diseases: New Ways to Get the Drugs We Need,” 
PLOS Medicine, 2, no. 9 (2005): e302. 
43 Anonymous interviewee 29, July 20, 2011. 
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research, as well as a push on the part of both Foundations for incentives to nurture private 
sectors to develop and produce local varieties.44 
 
All trends are pointing towards the direction that technology oriented partnerships focused 
on meeting the needs of low-income populations are here to stay. On any issue relevant to 
this target population, there is a growing gap between public monies and needs. Accordingly, 
there is a need to identify alternative sources of funding. Through partnerships, private 
sector money is helping to close those gaps;45 however this does not mean that the model is 
static. 
 
Taking the example of pharmaceuticals, a significant long-term change is that Southern firms 
are increasingly meeting the needs of their own populations with lower-end costs. As the 
technological gap between North and South is reduced, it has expected that middle-income 
country based pharmaceutical firms will increasingly function as the innovators of global 
product development partnerships. This is due in large part to the economics of scale which 
allow such firms to produce high volumes at a low cost, as the Serum Institute’s new 
meningococcal vaccine demonstrates,46 but also because of changing trends in product 
demand and the maturation of developing country economies.47 
 
Yet the degree to which firms in emerging markets are integrated into global markets is also 
credited with factoring into their success.48 Northern firms are paying much more attention 
to firms in the South because–as illustrated by Abbott’s 2010 purchase of India’s Piramal 
Healthcare Solutions49–it is increasingly difficult to make the distinction between a Northern 
and Southern firm.50 
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Moreover, new approaches to product financing–notably the concept of advance purchase–
are ensuring the continuing relevance of transnational corporations. Initially conceived as a 
way of pulling additional innovation out of firms that markets would otherwise, advanced 
purchase agreements (also known as Advance Market Commitments (AMCs)) have in 
practice become vehicles for expanding vaccine delivery. The reason for this is that far more 
resources are needed to innovate than have been set aside of advance purchases as 
demonstrated in the case of the AMC for pneumococcal vaccine.51 Advanced purchase 
means that the likes of Merck and GSK can ensure the production of vaccine or drugs at 
cost or very low profit margins, with GSK’s CEO Andrew Witty publicly committing the 
firm to do just that in 2011.52 Northern and Southern firms thus each have their own 
comparative advantages. The challenge, according to one former pharmaceutical executive, is 
how to come up with the right incentives to engage all players operating in very different 
markets.53 
  
8.23 Firms are now formally involved in the development and management of institutional frameworks 
governing global health and agricultural development 
 
SEI provided RF with a means to persuade states of the utility of its ideas throughout its 
history. With the rise of neo-liberalism, however, the Foundation’s emphasis on epistemic 
expansion waned to adapt to cuts in public sector expenditures resulting from the imposition 
of structural adjustment policies. To adapt to this new reality, operational programs and 
country level initiatives were reduced, and RF began to actively solicit corporate involvement 
in collective action and develop governance models around such participation. The PDP is 
just the latest knowledge structure for addressing global health challenges that RF has 
presented for consideration, which reflects its ability and willingness to adapt and innovate 
within externally imposed parameters. 
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While the embrace of PPPs has not driven transformative change, it has driven positive 
change nonetheless, evidenced by the change in the state of R&D focused on the needs of 
the world’s poor over the past two decades. Global health and agricultural PDPs are 
fulfilling their intended purpose of developing and delivering new health technologies and 
crop varieties after longstanding failures on the part of states and markets to ensure this 
autonomously.54 This success has strengthened the argument that there is a clear need for 
for-profit entities to be formally involved in the development and management of 
institutional frameworks informing collective action focused on mitigating the adverse 
effects of global poverty and inequality.55 The corollary to this has been a rise in corporate 
power in the governance of global health, agricultural development and food security.56 This 
increase in corporate influence is disconcerting to many, in no small part because it presents 
a new set of coordination, legitimacy and accountability challenges.57 
 
The traditional purpose of firms has been to increase the wealth of a few. However, PPPs 
are conferring to firms equal partner status with public sector institutions in the creation of 
what are intended to be global public goods. Yet because IPRs are usually retained by private 
sector partners, the resultant technologies of PDPs tend to be neither non-rival nor non-
excludable and cannot be considered true public goods. 
 
The initial PDPs in global health were never intended to enable low-income country 
scientists to engage in health-oriented SEI without the aid of Northern private sector 
partners. This is significant because via the PDP model, the capacity to innovate for the 
public good in the world’s poorest countries remains largely contingent on a very uncertain 
premise, that being Northern firms’ willingness to continue sharing proprietary technology. 
Such uncertainty inevitably casts doubt on the overall sustainability of the PDP paradigm as 
                                                
54 Roy Widdus and Katherine White, Combating Diseases Associated with Poverty (Switzerland: Initiatives for Public-
Private Partnerships for Health and Global Forum for Health Research, 2004), 1-30; Mary Moran, “A 
Breakthrough in R&D.’’ 
55 Richard T. Mahoney and James Maynard, ‘‘The Introduction of New Vaccines into Developing Countries,’’ 
Vaccine 17, no. 7-8 (1999): 647; Klaus Schwab, “Global Corporate Citizenship: Working with Governments and 
Civil Society,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 107-118. 
56 Kent Buse and Andrew Harmer, ‘‘Seven Habits of Highly Effective Global Public–Private Health 
Partnerships: Practice and Potential,’’ Social Science and Medicine 64 (2007): 267.  
57 Rushton and Williams, ‘‘Private Actors in Global Health.’’ In Partnerships and Foundations in Global Health 
Governance. Edited by Simon Rushton and Owain Williams, 1-28. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.  
 
 268 
a governance model guiding collective action geared towards reducing global health 
disparities. The long-term uncertainty of the PDP model thus illustrates the limits of the 
Foundation’s structural power, as their institutional innovations will only succeed if essential 
participants (states and firms) remain committed to their success.  
 
What alleviates some of this doubt however is the fact that for twenty years, firms have 
displayed a willingness to make their IP available to initiatives oriented towards addressing 
highly complex social problems facing the world’s most vulnerable people.58 Whether PPPs 
are serving to socialize firms to be more receptive to the needs of societies less fortunate is 
unclear. Bill Gates and Tachi Yamada, for example, would meet with the CEOs from the big 
pharmaceutical companies on an annual basis, which produced new investment by these 
firms in the Foundation’s work, yet this does not constitute an admission on the part of 
corporate leaders that such private diplomacy is instilling new norms within corporate 
culture. The possibility that this may be occurring is compelling, however, and demands 
further exploration. 
 
MNCs’ power in world affairs predates the rise of the partnership paradigm.59 In theory, 
because PPPs bring firms into the spotlight as problem solvers for the public good, it is 
possible that their formal inclusion into mechanisms of global governance will translate into 
increased accountability for their actions and/or broadened responsibilities to society. Doris 
Fuchs has suggested that when corporations make discursive commitments (e.g. to improve 
public welfare), their legitimacy as actors may increase in the eyes of a wary public, but so do 
public expectations of how such companies operate. If companies then fail to fulfill these 
societal expectations, the legitimacy gained through their commitments is lost, curbing their 
future ability to influence outcomes dependent on public opinion.60 It is logical to assume 
but difficult to prove that through PPPs, RF and BMGF are setting firms up to assume more 
responsibility in global governance. What is clear however is that through the PPP, RF and 
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BMGF are illuminating how firms can help public authorities reduce socio-economic 
disparities.  
 
The establishment of the CGIAR ensured that public sector entities exist to develop new 
crop varieties for the specific benefit of farmers lacking the means to pay for such. No such 
analogue exists however in public health. The reality is that currently, with few exceptions, 
only drug companies develop and manufacture drugs.61 BMGF engagement with industry 
illustrates that it is imperative for those working to strengthen public health in developing 
countries to have a strong relationship with these companies given the central role they 
inevitably play in producing essential medicines and vaccines.62  
 
Undoubtedly placing firms at the centre of collective action efforts was a radical departure 
from the problem-solving paradigm centred on the inter-state system and IOs. At first 
glance the spread of the PPP paradigm in global governance might seem to mirror what 
Steven Bernstein labeled the ‘‘compromise of liberal environmentalism’’; the normative 
compromise which “predicates environmental protection on the promotion and 
maintenance of a liberal order.”63 Bernstein argued that this compromise meant that private 
sector support for institutionalizing the consideration of ecological integrity would be 
maintained so long as the legitimacy of the dominant liberal economic paradigm built around 
the liberalization of trade and finance and the premise of infinite growth remained 
unchallenged. Similarly, transnational pharmaceutical and agro-chemical companies have 
demonstrated a willingness to participate in collaborative initiatives to develop products 
aimed at strengthening the health of the world's poor, so long as the structural determinants 
of their wealth are not undermined. In the context of SEI, this means ensuring that IPRs are 
not weakened. 
 
What RF and BMGF-driven product development partnerships have demonstrated, 
however, is that under certain conditions, firms are willing to waive licensing fees or royalties 
altogether for those who seek to duplicate their products or employ patented molecular tools 
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and processes for the benefit of the world’s marginalized.64 Seen in this light, the PPP may 
be construed as a vehicle for introducing new norms into global governance, which are 
catalyzing both behavioral changes in participants and overall changes in how collective 
action is organized, without overtly seeking to alter the overall distribution of political and 
economic power. Prior to PPPs, the process of tinkering had been from the 
onset restricted to a small rich minority. The social justice side of this is that by opening up 
the innovative arena, RF and BMGF are attempting, with some success, to democratize it.65 
 
8.3 Final thoughts  
 
RF and BMGF are sufficiently anomalous so as to be seen as a distinct type of private actor 
in world politics, distinct from both the overwhelming majority of private Foundations, as 
well as from other power-seeking transnational non-state actors. Two common 
attributes financial and political autonomy equip them with a unique potential to exert 
influence in world politics and help explain how they have been able to accomplish what 
others have not.  
 
First of all, they exert agency through financial autonomy. Most government agencies,66 CSOs,67 
and IOs,68 rely on funding made available on an annual basis to support their initiatives and 
are forced to shift their goals when funding is withdrawn, delayed or reduced. RF and 
BMGF in contrast have large endowments that alleviate the need to solicit money from 
public or private donors in order to test ideas they support. This financial autonomy allows 
them to approach issues with a distinctive long-term perspective most publicly funded 
organizations cannot afford to take. At the same time their financial autonomy allows them 
to take risks, such as investing in new technologies intended to benefit populations with 
limited purchasing power, which firms are generally unwilling to bear. Financial autonomy, 
therefore, permits RF and BMGF to function as catalysts: private actors using their own 
                                                
64 Reich; Frost and Reich.  
65 Anonymous interviewee 20, June 8, 2011. 
66 See for example T.D. Jick and V.V. Murray, ‘‘The Management of Hard Times: Budget Cutbacks in Public 
Sector Organizations,’’ Organization Studies 3, no. 2 (1982): 141-169. 
67 See for example Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘‘Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of 
Transnational Action,’’ International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): pp. 5–39. 
68 See for example Gill Walt, ‘‘WHO under Stress: Implications for Health Policy,’’ Health Policy 24, no. 2 
(1993): 125–144.  
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money to leverage the money of others for the public good. At the same time, in a world of 
finite public resources, the Foundations’ material wealth provides them with considerable 
agenda-setting (i.e. structural) power.69 Their financial autonomy translates into a level of 
influence over how we understand and respond to complex problems that is often 
disproportionate to the actual amount of money paid out via grants. 
 
Second of all, they exert agency through political autonomy. RF and BMGF have no political 
masters or any official status in the international sphere. Their informal status however is key 
to their influence. While closely aligned with both firms and CSOs, they are comparatively 
unencumbered. While bound by the rule of law (e.g. US restriction on charities), they are 
freed from the constraints and caveats which donors, shareholders and constituents place on 
CSOs, firms, states and IOs respectively. This political autonomy has allowed them to 
function as “honest brokers,” bringing together different stakeholders who might otherwise 
not meet.  Because of their perceived political neutrality and demonstrated technical 
expertise, states have repeatedly afforded these private actors a unique and privileged 
position within both domestic and international policy making arenas on health and 
agricultural development-related issues. 
 
In the neo-liberal era, RF and BMGF have proven themselves to be innovators in 
governance at the private-public interface and masters of private diplomacy. This has been 
demonstrated through their ability to convene informal, private dialogue between actors 
(states, firms, IOs, and NGOs) whose individual receptivity and cooperative ability has been 
deemed essential for successful institutionalization of the Foundations’ strategies.  
 
Through PPPs, the Foundations have indirectly forced the specialized agencies of the United 
Nations to re-examine their relationships with the increasing number of non-state actors 
seeking to use their material resources and expertise to strengthen food security and public 
health across the global South, shaping collective action oriented towards the same goals.  
 
                                                
69 Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in Stateless Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), 94. 
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Moreover PPPs have reinforced the argument that science and technology matter in public 
health and food security and provided a politically acceptable venue for firms to make 
concessions on increasing access to proprietary technologies for the benefit of populations 
with limited purchasing power.  Consequently, RF and BMGF have provided both 
proponents and detractors of global capitalism with a new way of conceptualizing the role of 
business in society. 
 
PPPs are by no means a panacea for global governance. Concern has been expressed for 
example that many of RF and BMGF-driven PPPs remain dependent on their funds,70 
which illustrates that while the Foundations exhibit the capacity to catalyse innovation in 
governance, they are typically not sufficiently endowed to sustain it.  The entrenchment of 
the PPP paradigm–undeniably a market-based approach to development–reflects that we live 
in a much more market-based world than any other period in the post-war era, which is due 
to the global diffusion of capitalism. In this regard the PPP model represents governance 
adapted to externally imposed constraints and opportunities. The result is an approach to 
strengthening public health and agriculture that works within the dominant market-liberal 
economic paradigm, while seeking to correct for any of its deficiencies, which is wholly 
consistent with private governance as envisioned by the likes of Ruggie,71 and not, as critics 
suggest, a strategy intended to undermine the authority of public authorities while advancing 
the power of market actors. For while the nation state remains the most important actor in a 
sea of actors seeking to shape the governance of global health and food security, effective 
collective action is no longer something states are capable or are willing to orchestrate 
themselves, meaning that the PPP as an approach to collective action will remain relevant 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
There is no shortage of organisations seeking to scrutinise, critique, or oppose corporate and 
government policies, or the structures of collective action that are often viewed as privileging 
the world’s most powerful actors. Yet there are very few organisations that can capitalize on 
the very inequitable distribution of political and economic power in any given context to 
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catalyse changes in global governance that benefit society’s most disadvantaged. In this 
regard, RF and BMGF appear to have a comparative advantage over other actors, whether 
private or public.  
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